Briggs v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 070700e (or.tax 1-30-2008)

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 30, 2008
DocketTC-MD 070700E.
StatusPublished

This text of Briggs v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 070700e (or.tax 1-30-2008) (Briggs v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 070700e (or.tax 1-30-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Briggs v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 070700e (or.tax 1-30-2008), (Or. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

DECISION
Defendant adjusted Plaintiff's 2006 state income tax return, denying Plaintiff's claim for the working family child care credit and the credit for dependent care expenses. Plaintiff appealed. Trial was held December 12, 2007, by telephone. Plaintiff appeared and testified on his own behalf. Also testifying for Plaintiff was Alice Thayer (Alice), Plaintiff's child care provider in 2006. Defendant was represented by Maribel #3930, 1 an auditor with the Department of Revenue.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2006, Plaintiff worked full time in the wood products industry. Plaintiff worked the day shift, Monday through Friday, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Plaintiff left the house each day at approximately 6:15 a.m. Plaintiff dropped his son Robert off at his sister Alice's home each morning on the way to work. Plaintiff and his sister lived in two separate mobile homes in the same mobile home park in Forest Grove. Plaintiff returned home each day between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m., and picked up his son at his sister's house on his way home. *Page 2

Robert was born September 18, 1999, and was therefore six and seven years old in 2006. Robert attended school at the Cornelius Elementary School. Robert rode to school and back each day on a school bus that picked him up in the mobile home park each morning between 8:30 and 8:45 a.m., and dropped him off after school between 3:30 and 3:45 p.m. Robert was not in school during the summer and his aunt Alice cared for him all day during the summer months.

Plaintiff reported $4,800 in child care expenses in 2006, paid at a rate of $400 per month. Defendant reviewed Plaintiff's return and certain additional information and ultimately concluded that Plaintiff failed to substantiate the payment of his expenses for child care. Accordingly, Defendant denied the two credits, thereby reducing Plaintiff's $1,985 reported refund to $17. Plaintiff appealed.

II. ANALYSIS
ORS 315.2622 provides a refundable credit for certain low-income taxpayers to partially offset the taxpayer's child care costs incurred for the purpose of allowing the taxpayer to work or attend school. The credit is commonly referred to as the working family child care credit. The statute provides in relevant part:

"A qualified taxpayer shall be allowed a credit against the taxes otherwise due under ORS chapter 316 equal to the applicable percentage of the qualified taxpayer's child care expenses (rounded to the nearest $50)."

ORS 315.262(2).

ORS 316.078 provides for a nonrefundable credit3 for certain employment-related expenses, including child care, paid by a taxpayer for the care of a dependent child or children. That credit is referred to as the dependent care credit. The dependent care credit is specifically *Page 3 tied to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 21, the pertinent language being that the amount of the credit is "equal to a percentage of employment-related expenses allowable pursuant to section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code." ORS 316.078(1). IRC section 21(1), in turn, provides for a partial credit for "employment-related expenses * * * paid by such individual during the taxable year."

Both credits are based on the amount of child care expenses incurred by the taxpayer each year. The credits, like all credits, are a matter of legislative grace, and a taxpayer must be prepared to prove that the claimed expenses were actually incurred in order to receive the credit. When, as in this case, the Department of Revenue (department) denies the credit and the taxpayer appeals, the taxpayer must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. ORS 305.427. This court has previously ruled that "[p]reponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of evidence, the more convincing evidence." Feves v. Dept. of Revenue, 4 OTR 302, 312 (1971); see also Riley Hill General Contractor v. TandyCorp., 303 Or 390, 394, 737 P2d 595 (1987) (defining "preponderance" as "the greater weight of evidence.") The question in this case is whether Plaintiff convincingly demonstrated that he actually paid his sister for the child care services she provided.

Plaintiff testified that he paid Alice $200 every two weeks for child care, from January through December 2006. Those payments were made in cash. Alice testified that she was paid $400 per month, which she testified is her "standard fee" for monthly child care, regardless of whether she was caring for the child of a relative or an unrelated third party.

Because the payments were in cash, Plaintiff does not have canceled checks. Plaintiff also does not have any bank records showing the withdrawal of the child care payments. Plaintiff testified that he does not have a bank account because he "cannot afford one." The court finds *Page 4 that statement difficult to understand. Plaintiff had a full-time job working for a local employer and, according to information he provided to the department, earned a net pay of approximately $1,300 per month. The court sees no reason why a bank would refuse to allow an individual with a full-time job to open a checking account. Plaintiff could have deposited his paychecks into such an account and paid for his child care by check. The fact that Plaintiff chooses not to have a bank account does not mean that he could not afford one.

Plaintiff's proof of child care payments consists of the sworn testimony discussed above and certain written documents prepared after the fact, for submission to the department once it questioned Plaintiff's entitlement to the credit. Plaintiff submitted written receipts, but those receipts were prepared sometime in 2007, and they all appear to have been written in one sitting. (Ptf's Compl at 7-12.) All of those receipts are dated for the fifth and twentieth of the month. Defendant also submitted a written statement Plaintiff had provided to the department which is signed by Plaintiff's sister Alice. That statement indicates that Alice watched Robert each week Monday through Friday. That statement was also prepared in 2007. Finally, Plaintiff submitted a document titled "Record of Payments," which shows that Plaintiff paid $400 each month on the twentieth. That statement is inconsistent with the written receipts referenced above and with Plaintiff's sworn testimony.

The court finds Plaintiff's evidence inconsistent and unpersuasive. Moreover, the court does not find the witnesses credible. As indicated above, one set of Plaintiff's receipts show two monthly payments of $200 on the fifth and twentieth, whereas the "Record of Payments" shows one monthly payment of $400 on the twentieth. Moreover, Plaintiff purportedly paid his sister the same amount of money year-round, regardless of whether his son was in school most of the time Plaintiff was working, or home all day with his aunt Alice. According to the testimony, Alice *Page 5 watched Robert for approximately two and one-half hours each day during the school year, and approximately 10 hours each day during the summer months when school was not in session.

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Related

Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp.
737 P.2d 595 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1987)
Feves v. Department of Revenue
4 Or. Tax 302 (Oregon Tax Court, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
Briggs v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 070700e (or.tax 1-30-2008), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-v-department-of-revenue-tc-md-070700e-ortax-1-30-2008-ortc-2008.