NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0471-24
BRIDGES DARKO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUNRUN INSTALLATION SERVICE INC.,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Decided May 22, 2026
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1446-23.
Bridges Darko, self-represented appellant.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, attorneys for respondent (Suleman Malik, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Bridges Darko appeals the August 27, 2024, Law Division order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Sunrun Installation Service, Inc. and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. This case arises from defendant's
installation of a solar electric system on plaintiff's roof. Plaintiff contends
defendant damaged his roof during the installation, causing leaks and the
deterioration of his interior ceiling and walls. After reviewing the record in light
of the governing legal principles, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record.
Plaintiff purchased a solar electric system from Costco on or about November
30, 2019. Defendant served as Costco's independent third-party subcontractor
for the purposes of providing and installing the system. In January 2020,
defendant installed the system on the roof of plaintiff's home. In May 2020,
plaintiff noticed water dripping from his ceiling following snowmelt and rain.
He reported the issue to defendant, believing it was related to the installation of
the system. On May 27, 2020, defendant sent a technician to inspect plaintiff's
roof.1 The technician concluded that there were no "solar [electric system]
related leaks" and instead attributed the leak to "poor shingles" and an issue with
the flashing near the attic vent.
1 Plaintiff disputes that this inspection ever occurred. However, in its summary judgment motion, defendant provided a copy of the May 2020 inspection report as well as photos from the inspection. A-0471-24 2 According to plaintiff, over the next two years, the leak continued to get
worse and mold developed on his walls and ceiling. In late 2022, plaintiff hired
a contractor, Kevin Mulholland LLC, to inspect and repair his roof. According
to plaintiff, the contractor assessed the roof and determined that the leak was
caused by the solar panel installation. On December 19, 2022, plaintiff notified
defendant of additional damage to his roof.
Defendant requested that plaintiff provide a report from his roofing
contractor on company letterhead indicating that the damage was solar-related.
In response, plaintiff forwarded an email from the contractor, in which the
contractor states that he inspected the roof and determined that the leak was
coming from the solar panels. Plaintiff never produced any report or further
documentation from the contractor.
On December 22, 2022, plaintiff requested that defendant remove the
panels from his roof so that he could fix the leak. In response, defendant
dispatched a contractor to perform a second inspection of plaintiff's roof.
According to plaintiff, this contractor—Untouchable Roofers—concluded that
two exhaust pipe sleeve seals had been damaged during installation of the
system and required replacement. Plaintiff further states that defendant refused
to give him a copy of Untouchable Roofers' inspection report, but that he was
A-0471-24 3 able to get a copy from Untouchable Roofers directly. Additionally, in
discovery, plaintiff disclosed a video he took, which shows an unidentified
individual stating that the damage to plaintiff's roof was caused by defendant's
installation.2 According to plaintiff, this individual is the inspector from
Untouchable Roofers. Plaintiff further claimed that in February 2023, he hired
a contractor to repair his roof at a cost of approximately $16,000.
On May 26, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, which it
answered on September 14. On December 2, the court notified the parties that
the discovery end date would be February 11, 2024. On December 27, defendant
served discovery requests on plaintiff. On February 2, 2024, plaintiff provided
responses, in which he certified that "[a]nything related to the case
(video/text/photos)" was already submitted to defendant by email. On February
13, the parties submitted a joint request to extend the discovery end date to
March 12. The court denied this request on March 6. On May 3, the court
notified the parties that the case was scheduled for trial on September 16.
On July 12, defendant moved for summary judgment. The court notified
the parties that the motion would be decided on August 16. In support of its
motion, defendant provided a report from its expert witness, Tyler Ellis. In an
2 Neither plaintiff's nor the unidentified individual's face is shown in the video. A-0471-24 4 affidavit, Ellis concluded that, based on his assessment of photos of the roof and
interior ceiling, any leaks that may have occurred were not caused by the
installation of the solar electric system. Plaintiff did not file any opposition to
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On August 21, defendant requested an adjournment of the September 16
trial date. On August 23, plaintiff submitted a letter to the court opposing
defendant's adjournment request.
On August 27, the court held a hearing on defendant's summary judgment
motion. At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked plaintiff if he had filed
any opposition to defendant's motion. Plaintiff replied, "Yes, I did it on Friday."
Defense counsel then interrupted and informed the court that the document
plaintiff was referring to was his letter opposing adjournment of the trial date,
which did not include formal opposition to the summary judgment motion. The
court asked if plaintiff "underst[ood] that," and plaintiff said he did.
The court proceeded to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant,
issuing an oral decision. The court noted that it had received no formal
opposition to defendant's motion and would therefore decide the motion based
on defendant's submissions. The court adopted defendant's statement of
undisputed material facts and concluded that plaintiff failed to provide any
A-0471-24 5 admissible evidence in support of his position that the leaks were solar-electric-
system-related. Specifically, the court held that both the forwarded email from
Kevin Mulholland LLC and the video recording were inadmissible hearsay. The
court further concluded that plaintiff failed to establish the authenticity or
reliability of the video recording, as it only shows that he had a discussion with
"someone, not a representative of Untouchable Roofers as he alleges in the
complaint." Finally, the court determined that plaintiff's case required expert
testimony as a matter of law, because his claim that the construction or
installation of the solar electric system caused the leaks is beyond a jury's lay
understanding. The court thereupon granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant.
This appeal follows. Plaintiff raises the following contentions on appeal:
POINT I THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY DENYING THE PARTIES' JOINT APPLICATION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY, THEREBY PREJUDICING PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE.
POINT II THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND, IN ANY EVENT, IGNORING THE CONFUSION OF PRO SE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE SCHEDULED TRIAL DATE.
A-0471-24 6 II.
We first address plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred when it
denied the parties' joint motion to extend the discovery deadline. Specifically,
plaintiff contends that, if granted more time, he could have deposed various
contractors who believed that defendant's negligence caused the damage to his
roof.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the governing legal principles,
including the scope of our review. "An appellate court applies 'an abuse of
discretion standard to decisions made by [the] trial courts relating to matters of
discovery.'" C.A. ex rel. Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449, 459 (2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp v. New Cmty. Corp., 207
N.J. 344, 371 (2011)). "It 'generally defer[s] to a trial court's disposition of
discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination
is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.'" Ibid. (alteration
in original) (quoting Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 371).
Under Rule 4:24-1(c), parties may consent to extend the time for
discovery but must do so "prior to the expiration of the discovery period." "The
'good cause' standard applies to motions to extend discovery unless an
arbitration or trial date is fixed." Tynes v. St. Peter's Univ. Med. Ctr., 408 N.J.
A-0471-24 7 Super. 159, 168 (App. Div. 2009). Here, the parties moved to extend discovery
before a trial date was set, so the good cause standard applies. "'[G]ood cause'
is a 'flexible term' without a fixed or definite meaning," and courts consider a
non-exhaustive list of nine factors when deciding whether good cause exists.
Building Materials Corp. of America v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448,
480 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Tynes, 408 N.J. Super at 169); see also
Hollywood Café Diner, Inc. v. Jaffee, 473 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 2022)
(noting that the factors articulated in Building Materials Corp. of America are
non-exhaustive). Specifically, trial courts must consider:
(1) the movant's reasons for the requested extension of discovery;
(2) the movant's diligence in earlier pursuing discovery;
(3) the type and nature of the case, including any unique factual issues which may give rise to discovery problems;
(4) any prejudice which would inure to the individual movant if an extension is denied;
(5) whether granting the application would be consistent with the goals and aims of "Best Practices";
(6) the age of the case and whether an arbitration date or trial date has been established;
(7) the type and extent of discovery that remains to be completed;
A-0471-24 8 (8) any prejudice which may inure to the non-moving party if an extension is granted; and
(9) what motions have been heard and decided by the court to date.
[Tynes, 408 N.J. Super. at 169-70 (quoting Leitner v. Toms River Reg'l Schs., 392 N.J. Super. 80, 87-88 (App. Div. 2007)).]
Here, plaintiff brought suit on May 26, 2023, defendant answered on
September 14, 2023, and on December 2, 2023, the court informed the parties
of the February 11, 2024, discovery end date. Importantly, plaintiff does not
claim in his appellate brief that he made any efforts to pursue discovery during
this time period and provides no explanation for his failure to do so —nor does
anything in the trial court record explain that failure. Furthermore, plaintiff does
not explain what he would have done between February 13, the date the parties
submitted the joint request, and March 12, the proposed new discovery end date.
We add the court denied the request on March 6, just days before the proposed
new end date. In these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the parties' request to extend discovery and we see no
harm to plaintiff resulting from the denial.
A-0471-24 9 III.
We next address plaintiff's contention the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to defendant. Once again we begin by considering the legal
principles that govern this appeal. We review decisions on a motion for
summary judgment de novo, applying "the same standard as the trial court."
State v. Anderson, 248 N.J. 53, 67 (2021) (quoting Woytas v. Greenwood Tree
Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019)). Courts must grant summary judgment
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or
order as a matter of law." Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 471-72 (2020)
(quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). In contrast, the court must deny summary judgment if
the evidence is conflicting and there are material facts in dispute that a rational
factfinder could resolve in favor of the non-movant. Mangual v. Berezinsky,
428 N.J. Super. 299, 308-09 (App. Div. 2012) (denying summary judgment
because "a rational jury could . . . readily conclude" that the movant's assertions
were incorrect); accord Conforti v. Cnty. of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 162 (2023)
(courts "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
A-0471-24 10 permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the"
non-movant (quoting Statewide Ins. Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 119, 125
(2023))).
In applying this standard, the "court must accept as true all the evidence
which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must
accord [them] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced
therefrom." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995)
(quoting Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 174 (1991) and S. Pressler, Current
N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:40-2 comment (1991)); see also Crisitello v. St. Theresa
Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 218 (2023) (allowing "reasonable inferences" from the
record in the non-movant's favor). However, "conclusory and self-serving
assertions by one of the parties are insufficient" to overcome a summary
judgment motion. Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533
(App. Div. 2019) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)).
Under Rule 4:46-5:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading, but must respond by affidavits meeting the requirements of R. 1:6-6 or as otherwise provided in this rule and by R. 4:46-2(b), setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the
A-0471-24 11 adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered.
[(Emphasis added).]
Here, plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's motion. Therefore, the trial
court properly restricted its review of the motion to defendant's statement of
undisputed material facts and supporting exhibits.
The trial court found two grounds for granting summary judgment: (1)
the only pieces of record evidence that could plausibly establish a material
factual dispute—the forwarded emails and the video recording—were
inadmissible, unauthenticated hearsay; and (2) plaintiff's case required expert
testimony as a matter of law, which he failed to produce.
A.
We first address plaintiff's failure to present admissible evidence in
support of his claim. "We have commented on numerous occasions that
summary judgment motions must be supported by relevant and admissible
evidence." El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 164 (App.
Div. 2005) (collecting cases). Relatedly, "[w]e defer to a trial court's evidentiary
ruling absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021).
"Under that deferential standard, we review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only
A-0471-24 12 for a 'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)
(quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)).
Here, the trial court determined that both the forwarded email and video
recording constitute inadmissible, unauthenticated hearsay evidence. The email
purports to be from Kevin Mulholland LLC, but plaintiff provided no affidavit
or certification establishing its authenticity. Nor was Kevin Mulholland
disclosed as an expert. Likewise, plaintiff failed to authenticate the video
recording, establish that the unidentified person in the video is an inspector from
Untouchable Roofers as he alleges, or provide an affidavit or certification from
the alleged inspector.
In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the trial court properly
declined to consider the emails and video recording. Given that defendant's
statement of facts and the remainder of defendant's exhibits all indicated that the
installation of the solar electric system caused no damage to plaintiff's property,
summary judgment was proper.
B.
Although the first ground relied upon by the trial court is sufficient by
itself to support summary judgment dismissal, we proceed to consider the
second ground—plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony. The law is well-
A-0471-24 13 settled that in some negligence 3 cases, "the 'jury is not competent to supply the
standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct,' and the plaintiff must
instead 'establish the requisite standard of care and [the defendant's] deviation
from that standard' by 'present[ing] reliable expert testimony on the subject.'"
Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 407 (2014) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted); see N.J.R.E. 702. "[W]hen deciding whether expert
testimony is necessary," we consider "'whether the matter to be dealt with is so
esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid
judgment as to whether the conduct of the [defendant] was reasonable.'" Ibid.
(quoting Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283 (1982)). For example, we
have required expert testimony to establish the standard of care governing the
"repair and inspection" of an automobile, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mendola,
427 N.J. Super. 226, 236-37 (App. Div. 2012); whether "improper maintenance
caused an elevator door to malfunction," Rocco v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations,
Inc., 330 N.J. Super. 320, 341 (App. Div. 2000); and, generally, allegations of
"deficiencies in design or construction," D'Alessandro v. Hartzel, 422 N.J.
Super. 575, 581 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted).
3 Plaintiff's self-represented complaint does not mention a particular cause of action, but the facts he alleges appear to state a negligence claim. A-0471-24 14 Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant improperly installed a solar electric
system on his roof, causing the leak. We are satisfied that the interrelated
questions of what caused the leak and whether installation of the solar electric
system fell below the standard of care are beyond the understanding of a lay
juror, meaning that plaintiff was required to present expert testimony to prove
his case. His failure to present such expert opinion provides an independent and
sufficient ground to grant summary judgment in defendant's favor.
IV.
Finally, we address plaintiff's contention that his failure to file any
opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion was due to his mistaken
belief that he could wait to present his evidence at trial in September. More
specifically, he contends that the trial court's order declining to adjourn the trial
date misled him into thinking that the trial would occur regardless of the
outcome on summary judgment. Plaintiff suggests that, because he is a self -
represented litigant, this confusion was understandable and excusable, and he
"should not be punished for seeking to do the right thing and should not be
denied his day in court."
A-0471-24 15 Defendant stresses that by August 27, the day the court declined to adjourn
the trial date, plaintiff had already missed the August 6 4 deadline to oppose
summary judgment. Therefore, defendant argues, plaintiff's alleged confusion
related to the court's order—even if it were a cognizable excuse—was not the
cause of his failure to oppose the motion. We add that plaintiff could not
reasonably have expected to present evidence at trial that had not been disclosed
in discovery. See Pretrial Information Exchange, Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XXIII to R. 4:25-7(b) (requiring disclosure of all
witnesses and exhibits to be relied on at trial seven days prior to trial date).
We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's explanation. Self-represented litigants
"are not entitled to greater rights than litigants who are represented by counsel."
Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014)
(citing Rubin v. Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1982)). However,
we have also recognized that "due process principles permit the imposition of a
procedural bar only after consideration of [a self-represented] litigant's
'reasonabl[e] expect[ations]'" about what might occur. Midland Funding LLC
4 Under Rule 4:46-1, plaintiff's opposition was due ten days before the August 16 return date. A-0471-24 16 v. Albern, 433 N.J. Super. 494, 500 (App. Div. 2013) (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Rubin, 188 N.J. Super. at 159).
We find our decision in Rubin to be instructive. In that case, the self-
represented defendant believed he could respond to the plaintiff's motion by
appearing in court on the return date, when in fact, he was required to file written
opposition. Despite the defendant's appearance on the return date, the trial court
did not allow him to respond to the motion and granted it on an ex parte basis.
188 N.J. Super. at 156-57. We held that the trial court was obligated to allow
the defendant "a right to be heard, either orally or by filed papers," and we noted
that the defendant "reasonably expect[ed] from the text of the notice [of motion]
that his procedural rights [would] be protected by his appearance in court on the
noticed date." Id. at 158-59.
Here, in contrast to the situation in Rubin, plaintiff took no action to
respond to defendant's motion for summary judgment, despite the court's
notifying both parties that it would decide the motion on August 16.
Furthermore, unlike in Rubin, plaintiff's claim that he believed that he need not
respond to defendant's motion and could simply wait for the September 16 trial
was not reasonable in light of the court's notice that it would decide the motion
for summary judgment in mid-August. We stress that the court order declining
A-0471-24 17 to adjourn the trial came after plaintiff had already missed the summary
judgment deadline and therefore could not have caused his failure to oppose the
motion. And as we have already noted, plaintiff could not reasonably have
expected to admit evidence at trial that had not been revealed during discovery.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments raised by plaintiff lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0471-24 18