1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 ) Case No.: SACV 23-01734-CJC (KESx) BRIDGE WF CA CRYSTAL VIEW LP, ) 13 ) ) 14 ) Plaintiff, ) 15 ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING v. ) CASE TO SUPERIOR COURT OF 16 ) CALIFORNIA FOR LACK OF IGNACIO SALAZAR AND ) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 17 ) GABRIELA SALAZAR, ) 18 ) ) 19 Defendants. ) ) 20 ) ) 21 ) ) 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 24 25 Fernanda Missu, acting pro se, removed this unlawful detainer action originally 26 filed in Superior Court, County of Orange by Plaintiff Bridge WF CA Crystal View LP, a 27 Delaware Limited Partnership, asserting federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 1 a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction exists because Plaintiff’s claim raises a 2 substantial federal issue related to the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 3 (“PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5201. (Id. ¶¶ 5–13.) The PTFA is a federal law that provides 4 certain protections to tenants during foreclosures, including certain notice requirements. 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 8 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 9 if the federal court may exercise original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1441(b). A federal court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over cases that involve 11 questions arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action arises under federal 12 law if federal law creates the cause of action or if the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 13 depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Grable & Sons Metal 14 Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 245 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). Federal question 15 jurisdiction will lie over state law claims that “really and substantially” involve a dispute 16 or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of federal law. Id. 17 18 Principles of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously 19 confine their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” 20 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, 21 “[n]othing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United 22 States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 23 The defendant removing the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that 24 the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is 25 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right 27 of removal in the first instance.”). Under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” federal 1 the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 2 392 (1987). A defense or counterclaim based on federal law does not give rise to federal 3 question jurisdiction. Id. at 10. Federal courts have a duty to examine their subject 4 matter jurisdiction whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life 5 Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court's 6 duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ 7 arguments.”). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists may be raised by the Court sua 8 sponte at any time, and if it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 9 at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, the case must be remanded to state court. 10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time 11 that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 12 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 15 As a threshold matter, it is not clear that Missu is a defendant to this action. Missu 16 is a tenant in the property at issue, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is against Ignacio and 17 Gabriela Salazar, the apparent former owners of the property. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. A.) Missu 18 provides no indication that she has sought to intervene or otherwise become a party to the 19 case. If Missu is not a defendant, removal is improper, and the action must be remanded. 20 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A v. Alvarado, 2014 WL 5786555, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 21 2014) (“Defendants are the only parties who are statutorily permitted to remove cases 22 from state to federal courts.”). Similarly, Missu provides no indication that Defendants 23 Salazar joined in removal, other than stating in her notice of removal that “Defendants 24 allege,” followed by argument as to why removal is proper. (Dkt. 1 at 1); see Force v. 25 Advanced Structural Techs., Inc., 2020 WL 4539026, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020) 26 (“[A]ll properly named and served defendants must join a removal petition for the 27 petition to be valid.”). Without the consent of all defendants who have been properly 1 2 Even if Missu were a proper party to remove the case and did so with the other 3 defendants’ permission, removal would be improper. Plaintiff’s Complaint, which states 4 a single claim for unlawful detainer under California law, does not raise a federal 5 question. (Dkt. 1 Ex. A.) Missu contends that “Plaintiff has actually filed a Federal 6 Question action in State Court” because Missu is a “bona fide residential tenant of a 7 foreclosed landlord” under the PTFA. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 17.) But “[t]he Complaint does not state 8 claims under the PTFA or any other federal law. The well-pleaded complaint rule makes 9 the plaintiff the master of his claim, so he may avoid federal jurisdiction by basing his 10 claim exclusively on state law, as is the case here.” Hyalite Invs., Inc. v. Sprague, 2015 11 WL 5286747, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015). 12 13 The PTFA is at most a defense to the unlawful detainer action, and thus does not 14 confer subject matter jurisdiction. See Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 15 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The PTFA is framed in terms of ‘protections’ for tenants, 16 suggesting that it was intended to provide a defense in state eviction proceedings rather 17 than a basis for offensive suits in federal court.”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 18 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer 19 jurisdiction on a federal court.”). Nor does the straightforward federal issue presented by 20 this defense — whether there was compliance with the PTFA — present a “substantial 21 federal issue.” See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 22 308, 314 (2005).
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1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 ) Case No.: SACV 23-01734-CJC (KESx) BRIDGE WF CA CRYSTAL VIEW LP, ) 13 ) ) 14 ) Plaintiff, ) 15 ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING v. ) CASE TO SUPERIOR COURT OF 16 ) CALIFORNIA FOR LACK OF IGNACIO SALAZAR AND ) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 17 ) GABRIELA SALAZAR, ) 18 ) ) 19 Defendants. ) ) 20 ) ) 21 ) ) 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 24 25 Fernanda Missu, acting pro se, removed this unlawful detainer action originally 26 filed in Superior Court, County of Orange by Plaintiff Bridge WF CA Crystal View LP, a 27 Delaware Limited Partnership, asserting federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 1 a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction exists because Plaintiff’s claim raises a 2 substantial federal issue related to the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 3 (“PTFA”), 12 U.S.C. § 5201. (Id. ¶¶ 5–13.) The PTFA is a federal law that provides 4 certain protections to tenants during foreclosures, including certain notice requirements. 5 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 8 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 9 if the federal court may exercise original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1441(b). A federal court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over cases that involve 11 questions arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. An action arises under federal 12 law if federal law creates the cause of action or if the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 13 depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Grable & Sons Metal 14 Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 245 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). Federal question 15 jurisdiction will lie over state law claims that “really and substantially” involve a dispute 16 or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of federal law. Id. 17 18 Principles of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously 19 confine their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” 20 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, 21 “[n]othing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” See United 22 States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 23 The defendant removing the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that 24 the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is 25 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 26 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right 27 of removal in the first instance.”). Under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” federal 1 the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 2 392 (1987). A defense or counterclaim based on federal law does not give rise to federal 3 question jurisdiction. Id. at 10. Federal courts have a duty to examine their subject 4 matter jurisdiction whether or not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life 5 Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court's 6 duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ 7 arguments.”). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists may be raised by the Court sua 8 sponte at any time, and if it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 9 at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, the case must be remanded to state court. 10 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time 11 that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 12 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 15 As a threshold matter, it is not clear that Missu is a defendant to this action. Missu 16 is a tenant in the property at issue, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is against Ignacio and 17 Gabriela Salazar, the apparent former owners of the property. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. A.) Missu 18 provides no indication that she has sought to intervene or otherwise become a party to the 19 case. If Missu is not a defendant, removal is improper, and the action must be remanded. 20 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A v. Alvarado, 2014 WL 5786555, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 21 2014) (“Defendants are the only parties who are statutorily permitted to remove cases 22 from state to federal courts.”). Similarly, Missu provides no indication that Defendants 23 Salazar joined in removal, other than stating in her notice of removal that “Defendants 24 allege,” followed by argument as to why removal is proper. (Dkt. 1 at 1); see Force v. 25 Advanced Structural Techs., Inc., 2020 WL 4539026, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020) 26 (“[A]ll properly named and served defendants must join a removal petition for the 27 petition to be valid.”). Without the consent of all defendants who have been properly 1 2 Even if Missu were a proper party to remove the case and did so with the other 3 defendants’ permission, removal would be improper. Plaintiff’s Complaint, which states 4 a single claim for unlawful detainer under California law, does not raise a federal 5 question. (Dkt. 1 Ex. A.) Missu contends that “Plaintiff has actually filed a Federal 6 Question action in State Court” because Missu is a “bona fide residential tenant of a 7 foreclosed landlord” under the PTFA. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 17.) But “[t]he Complaint does not state 8 claims under the PTFA or any other federal law. The well-pleaded complaint rule makes 9 the plaintiff the master of his claim, so he may avoid federal jurisdiction by basing his 10 claim exclusively on state law, as is the case here.” Hyalite Invs., Inc. v. Sprague, 2015 11 WL 5286747, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2015). 12 13 The PTFA is at most a defense to the unlawful detainer action, and thus does not 14 confer subject matter jurisdiction. See Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 722 F.3d 1163, 15 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The PTFA is framed in terms of ‘protections’ for tenants, 16 suggesting that it was intended to provide a defense in state eviction proceedings rather 17 than a basis for offensive suits in federal court.”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 18 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer 19 jurisdiction on a federal court.”). Nor does the straightforward federal issue presented by 20 this defense — whether there was compliance with the PTFA — present a “substantial 21 federal issue.” See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 22 308, 314 (2005). Accordingly, this action does not arise out of federal law, and thus the 23 Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See Wilmington Sav. 24 Fund Soc’y v. Bagheri, 2023 WL 3005005, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) (“Defendant 25 fails to show how Plaintiff's Complaint, which raises a single claim for unlawful detainer, 26 alleges facts to show it arises from the . . . the PTFA[.] The Court must therefore 27 conclude that [Defendant] intends to raise these issues as defenses which do not give rise 1 ||summary, the state court Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for 2 |}unlawful detainer, which arises solely under state law and not under federal law. Thus, 3 || this action does not arise under federal law and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction 4 |}are apparent. Therefore, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of 5 || federal jurisdiction.’’); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for Harborview Mortg. Loan Tr. 6 2005-8, Mortg. Loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-8 vy. Somo, 2019 WL 7 3315568, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2019) (‘[T]he PTFA does not create a cause of action 8 || that could have originally been brought in federal court, and the PTFA on its own does 9 ||not grant jurisdiction to this Court.”’). 10 11 Diversity jurisdiction is also lacking. Based on Missu’s representations, there is no 12 || diversity of citizenship. (Dkt. 1-1 at 1); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Additionally, diversity 13 || jurisdiction exists “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 14 |]exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The amount in controversy 15 requirement has not been met because the complaint demands less than $10,000 in 16 ||damages. (Dkt. 1 Ex. A.) 17 ig ||} IV. CONCLUSION 19 20 For the foregoing reasons, this action is hereby REMANDED to Superior Court, 21 ||County of Orange. The pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Dkt. 2), 22 |}is DENIED AS MOOT. 23 24 DATED: October 2, 2023 Ko fe 25 f——_ f/f. tf 26 CORMAC J. CARNEY 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28