Brian Williams v. Ifeoma Okeke, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 19, 2026
• Docket: 5:26-cv-00693
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRIAN WILLIAMS, Case No. 26-cv-00693-NW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT, 9 v. DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 IFEOMA OKEKE, et al.,

Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff Brian Williams filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit related to his medical care and 14 conditions of confinement at California Training Facility in Soledad, California (“CTF”). ECF 15 No. 1. The Complaint is now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 16 For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Williams raises several claims against Defendants in their individual and official 19 capacities.1 He seeks monetary and unspecified injunctive relief. 20 A. Medical Claims 21 Williams alleges that Defendant Ifeoma Okeke, a primary care provider with California 22 Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”), failed to inform or treat Williams for chronic 23 kidney disease for more than one year after he was diagnosed with the condition on February 14, 24 2024—information which was apparently captured in Williams’ medical records but never shared 25 with him until he obtained copies of the records several months after the diagnosis. Williams 26 alleges that chronic kidney disease is considered a “silent killer,” and requires treatment to slow its 27 1 progression. ECF No. 1 at 7. Williams also states that he was not provided information about the 2 proper eating plan for prisoners with chronic kidney disease, which limits intake of popular foods 3 and fruits high in potassium, to slow progression of kidney disease. Williams’ grievance and 4 appeal regarding Okeke’s failure to inform or treat him for chronic kidney disease were 5 subsequently denied by the CCHCS. Williams asserts that the failure to provide him with the 6 eating plan violates prison regulations, and that these Defendants’ actions violated the Eighth and 7 Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the California Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”). 8 B. Rules Violation Report Claims 9 Williams states that on October 30, 2024, Defendant Rolando Casi, a correctional officer at 10 CTF, prepared a rules violation report (“RVR”) falsely accusing Williams of refusing a housing 11 assignment. In the RVR, Casi asserted that Williams said, “I’m going to refuse,” in response to 12 Casi’s instructions that Williams move to a different cell. ECF No. 1 at 13. Prior to his 13 disciplinary hearing, Williams procured the testimony of a fellow prisoner, McCurty, who stated 14 that Williams never said he was unwilling to move. However, on November 6, 2021, at the 15 disciplinary hearing for the RVR, Defendant C. Alapisco, who was the Senior Hearing Officer, 16 allegedly refused to allow Williams to call McCurty as a witness. Williams asserts that Casi and 17 Alapisco’s actions violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and violated 18 California Penal Code sections 132 and 134, which prohibit the filing or preparing of forged or 19 fraudulent documents. Williams’ attached exhibits show he was assessed 90 days of credits as a 20 result of the guilty finding. 21 C. Mail Room Claims 22 Defendant Robbin Strickland2 is a correctional counselor at CTF. On October 12, 2023, 23 Williams allegedly gave Strickland an in forma pauperis form to mail to the district court. On 24 October 26, 2023, Strickland returned the mailing to Williams and said that “[t]hey sent it back.”3 25 26 2 This Defendant is referred to as “Stricklin” in some parts of the Complaint and “Strickland” in 27 others. See ECF No. 1 at 3, 18. As “Strickland” appears more prevalent, the Court will use this name to refer to the Defendant. 1 ECF No. 1 at 19. Williams filed a grievance and appeal regarding Strickland’s actions, but they 2 were denied. He asserts that Strickland’s actions violated CDCR regulations and his First 3 Amendment right to meaningful access to the courts. He also alleges Strickland’s actions were 4 “retaliatory.” Id. at 21. 5 D. Supervisor Claims 6 Defendant Edward Borla is, and was at the time of the incidents, the warden of CTF; he is 7 allegedly responsible for training of primary care providers and correctional staff at CTF. 8 Defendant Martin Macombe is the current Secretary of CDCR and is allegedly responsible for 9 operation of the prison system, including “implementation of an ongoing arbitrary policy and 10 practice of allowing staff to violate Incarcerated Persons[’] constitutional rights without 11 accountability.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Williams contends that these supervisory Defendants jointly 12 and/or severally deprived him of his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 13 failing to adequately train their correctional officers and healthcare providers. Williams also 14 alleges that CDCR’s official policy and/or customs and practice resulted in multiple violations of 15 his constitutional rights as alleged against Defendants Okeke, Casi, Alapisco, and Strickland. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal courts engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress 18 from a governmental entity or officer, or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 20 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 21 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro 22 se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 23 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 26 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 27 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 1 the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. 3 at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of 4 Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 5 supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should 6 assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 7 relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 9 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 10 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 11 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 12 plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions actually and proximately caused the deprivation of 13 a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 14 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions in this context 15 include when a defendant engages in the affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, 16 or fails to perform a legally required act. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 The Court discusses each group of claims below. 19 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 20 At the outset, the Court notes that Williams raises a plethora of claims naming different 21 Defendants and unrelated incidents, and he largely does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil 22 Procedure 20. “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as 23 many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). When there are multiple 24 defendants, they may be joined in one action only if “any right to relief is asserted against them 25 jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 26 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and “any question of law or fact common to 27 all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B). Accordingly, while 1 joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2 2007); see also Scott v. McCay, Case No. 24-cv-01335-HSG, 2024 WL 3033619, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 3 Jun. 17, 2024). 4 As explained further below, Williams states a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference 5 against Okeke for failing to treat him for chronic kidney disease for more than one year. He also 6 states a cognizable procedural due process claim against Alpisco. These claims, however, do not 7 appear to be related to each other, occurred months apart, do not share common Defendants other 8 than the supervisory Defendants against whom Williams has not stated a claim, and do not share 9 common issues of law. Accordingly, the Court grants Williams LEAVE TO AMEND his 10 complaint so he can explain why these claims are related or, alternatively, choose the claims he 11 wants to pursue in this lawsuit and voluntarily dismiss the rest so he can pursue them in separate 12 actions. 13 B. Medical Treatment Claims 14 1. Eighth Amendment 15 a. Okeke 16 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement and 17 requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. 18 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 19 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment forbids the government from demonstrating “deliberate 20 indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 21 (1976). To state a claim for deliberate indifference, an incarcerated person must demonstrate, 22 first, a “serious medical need,” and second, that the prison acted or failed to act in such a harmful 23 way that it evidenced deliberate indifference such that it “offend[s] ‘evolving standards of 24 decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 106; see McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 25 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992). 26 Deliberate indifference can be caused by prison medical staff providing inadequate or 27 delayed medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. The circumstances, nature, and duration of 1 grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 2 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). “Under this standard, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 3 care, differences of opinion in medical treatment, and harmless delays in treatment are not enough 4 to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.” Simmons v. G. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2022). 5 Liberally construed, Williams’ allegation that Okeke diagnosed him with chronic kidney 6 disease—a serious medical condition—but failed to inform Williams of the diagnosis or provide 7 treatment for the condition until more than one year later states a cognizable claim against Okeke 8 for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.4 9 b. CCHCS 10 To the extent Williams is attempting to raise a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights 11 were violated by CCHCS, he has not alleged a cognizable § 1983 claim. See City of Cleburne v. 12 Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (9185). As a state entity, CCHCS is not a “person” 13 under § 1983 and is therefore not a proper defendant for this claim. See Bennett v. California, 406 14 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and CDCR not persons within meaning of 15 Section 1983). CCHCS is also subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity for damages claims 16 under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1985) 17 (Eleventh Amendment bars from federal courts suits against a state or its agencies by its own 18 citizens, citizens of another state, or citizens or subjects of any foreign state) (superseded by 19 statute on other grounds). 20 However, Williams may be able to state a claim against individual defendants at CCHCS 21 who were involved in his alleged denial of healthcare. The claim is DISMISSED WITH 22 LEAVE TO AMEND so Williams may attempt to name specific individuals at CCHCS who 23 showed deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and their specific actions, provided he can do 24 so in good faith. Alternatively, if Williams chooses to move forward with a different claim in this 25 matter, he may voluntarily dismiss this claim without prejudice so he can pursue his medical 26 claims in a separate lawsuit. 27 1 2. Bane Act 2 Williams alleges that Okeke’s actions also violated the Bane Act. The Bane Civil Rights 3 Act provides a private right of action for damages against any person who attempts or does 4 interfere “by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual 5 . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or law of the United States, or of the rights secured by the 6 Constitution or laws [of California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). “The essence of a Bane Act claim 7 is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (e.g., threats, intimidation, or coercion), 8 tried to or did prevent a plaintiff from doing something he . . . had the right to do under the law.” 9 Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 956 (2012) (quotations and citations 10 omitted). 11 Williams’ allegation is conclusory only, and he provides no factual allegations to sustain a 12 claim under the Bane Act. If Williams wishes to continue pursuing this claim against Okeke, he 13 must provide further information about how Okeke’s actions amounted to threats, intimidation, or 14 coercion, and how those actions tried to prevent Williams from “doing something he . . . had the 15 right to do under the law.” Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 956. This claim is DISMISSED WITH 16 LEAVE TO AMEND. Alternatively, if Williams chooses to move forward with a different claim 17 in this matter, he may voluntarily dismiss this claim without prejudice so he can pursue his 18 medical claims in a separate lawsuit. 19 C. Rules Violation Claims 20 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 21 accused of a rules violation. See Gathrite v. Diaz, No. 25-cv-02369-RMI, 2025 WL 1616639, *2 22 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 6, 2025); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. 23 Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the claim that Casi violated his due 24 process rights by writing a false report fails to state a cognizable claim. Moreover, Williams has 25 not shown that the criminal laws he cites give rise to a private cause of action against Casi for 26 filing a false report. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“When a criminal 27 statute is violated, the question of whether to prosecute and what criminal charges to file or bring 1 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that criminal statutes generally do not provide any express private cause of 2 action or other basis for civil liability). 3 However, Williams states a claim against Alapisco to the extent that Alapisco allegedly 4 denied Williams procedural due process during Williams’ rules violation hearing. See Hanrahan 5 v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). While prisoners facing disciplinary proceedings 6 are not entitled to the full panoply of rights due to a criminal defendant, they are nevertheless 7 entitled to certain minimum procedural due process protections where serious rules violations are 8 alleged, the sanctions to be applied implicate state statutes or regulations which narrowly restrict 9 the power of prison officials to impose the sanctions, and the sanctions are severe. See Wolff v. 10 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1974); id. at 571–72 n.19. As relevant here, Wolff requires 11 that “the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present 12 documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous 13 to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566. 14 Liberally construing Williams’ allegation that Alapisco refused to allow him to call 15 McPurty as an exculpatory witness during his disciplinary hearing, Williams states a cognizable 16 procedural due process claim against Alapisco.5 17 D. Mail Claims 18 1. Access to Courts 19 Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 20 343, 350 (1996). To establish a claim for a violation of the right of access to the courts, the 21 prisoner must show that there was an inadequacy in the prison’s legal access program that caused 22 him an actual injury. Id. at 350–51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that 23 inadequacy hindered him in presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or 24 conditions of confinement. See id. at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a 25 prisoner whose complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy a technical requirement that, because 26

27 5 If Williams chooses to move forward with a different claim in this matter, he may voluntarily 1 of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; or, a prisoner 2 who had “suffered arguably actionable harm” that he wished to bring to the attention of the court, 3 but was so stymied by the inadequacies of the prison’s services that he was unable to file a 4 complaint. See id. at 351. 5 Even liberally construing Williams’ allegations, Williams has not alleged that Strickland’s 6 actions resulted in an actual injury, and he therefore fails to state a claim for violation of his right 7 to access the courts. This claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND so he may address 8 the deficiency identified above. Alternatively, if Williams chooses to move forward with a 9 different claim in this matter, he may voluntarily dismiss this claim without prejudice so he can 10 pursue his First Amendment claims in a separate lawsuit. 11 2. Retaliation 12 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 13 elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 14 (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled [or could chill] 15 the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance 16 a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) 17 (footnote and citation omitted); accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). Filing 18 a grievance is considered protected conduct for the purposes of the First Amendment. See Bruce 19 v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 Liberally construed, Williams fails to state a claim for retaliation against Strickland 21 because he does not allege that Strickland took adverse action against Williams “because of” 22 Williams’ protected First Amendment conduct. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. This claim is 23 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND so he may address the deficiencies identified above. 24 Alternatively, if Williams chooses to move forward with a different claim in this matter, he may 25 voluntarily dismiss this claim without prejudice so he can pursue his First Amendment claims in a 26 separate lawsuit. 27 E. Federal Claims Against Borla and Macomber 1 supervisors for other Defendants. 2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 3 employees under a theory of respondeat superior. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th 4 Cir. 1979) (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation). “A prison official in 5 a supervisory position may be held liable under § 1983, however, ‘if he or she was personally 6 involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between the 7 supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75 8 (citation omitted). “This causal connection can include: ‘1) [the supervisors’] own culpable action 9 or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the 10 constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or 3) [their] conduct that showed a 11 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” Id. at 1075 (citation omitted). If a 12 plaintiff alleges that a defendant failed to properly train his subordinates, the plaintiff must show 13 that (1) the training program was inadequate “‘in relation to the tasks the particular officers must 14 perform’”; (2) the government officials were deliberately indifferent “‘to the rights of persons with 15 whom the [officials] come into contact’”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “‘actually caused’ 16 the constitutional deprivation at issue.” Merritt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 17 1989); see also Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2016). 18 Here, Williams’ general allegations amount to “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause 19 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As noted, Williams 20 alleges that Borla and Macomber exhibited “indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates” 21 and accused both Defendants of maintaining “an official policy and custom [of] permitting, 22 allowing, ratifying and condoning the occurrence of the types of wrongs and misconducts set forth 23 herein.” ECF No. 1 at 22. Although Williams alleges that Borla and Macomber failed to train 24 correctional officers and healthcare providers, he does not explain how the training was inadequate 25 or allege that either Defendant was aware of the violations at issue. To the extent that Williams 26 also alleges that CDCR has an “official policy and/or customs and practice” that led to his 27 constitutional rights being violated, Williams fails to identify specific policies or practices that led 1 information as to Defendants’ actions and the policies and practices at issue, Williams fails to state 2 cognizable claims against these Defendants. See Guzman v. Newscomb, No. 25-cv-01572-HDV- 3 KES, 2025 WL 3236202, *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (dismissing claim against supervisors 4 where it was unclear “how Plaintiff believe[d] the actions or inactions of these Defendants caused 5 his assault or the lack of proper medical care,” and where the plaintiff failed to allege “any facts 6 showing that these Defendants were present at the [incident] or are aware of it” or explain “who he 7 believes should have been better trained, how they should have been trained, and why these 8 Defendants knew or had reason to know of the lack of training.”). 9 The claims against Borla and Macomber are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 so Williams may address the deficiencies identified above. 11 F. Unlinked Claims 12 Williams also cites several statues and a treaty without providing any factual basis for 13 doing so. ECF No. 1 at 2. 14 He first cites to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Act without 15 specifying which Defendant(s) allegedly violated each Act; moreover, the Court notes that 16 Williams has not made any allegations suggesting he was denied reasonable accommodations or 17 discriminated against due to his disability—or any other protected status—as required to state a 18 claim under these statutes. See Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) 19 (noting elements of claim for damages under Title II of the ADA); see also Barker v. Cal. Dep’t of 20 Corr. and Rehabilitation, No. 13-cv-1793 KJN P, 2015 WL 3913546, *7 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2015) 21 (discussing elements of Unruh Act claims, and collecting cases that have determined that 22 prisoners’ claims under the Unruh Act must be dismissed on basis of Eleventh Amendment and 23 state law immunity). Williams also cites to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 24 Treatment of Prisoners (“Minimum Rules”). It is well-established that the Minimum Rules do not 25 “serve as a source of private rights,” and are therefore not actionable through a lawsuit under 42 26 U.S.C. § 1983. Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010). 27 Accordingly, he fails to state a claim under these provisions. As any attempt to amend the 1 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 2 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be 3 subject to dismissal.”). The ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND so he may 4 explain the factual basis for his claim and explain why it is properly joined in this action, or, 5 alternatively, dismiss the claim from the lawsuit and pursue it separately. 6 G. Official Capacity Claims 7 To the extent Williams asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendants in their 8 “official capacities,” he does not state cognizable claims. Because “a suit against a state official in 9 his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is . . . no different from a suit 10 against the State itself,” such suits cannot proceed unless Eleventh Amendment immunity has 11 been specifically abrogated by federal statute or that the state has waived its immunity. Will v. 12 Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation modified). Moreover, state agencies 13 and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” against whom a civil rights 14 claim for money damages may be asserted. Id. Accordingly, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 15 Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See 16 Wheeler, 894 F.3d at 1059. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 The Court orders as follows: 19 1. Williams states the following cognizable claims: 20 a. Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Okeke; 21 b. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against 22 Alpisco. 23 2. The remaining claims are DISMISSED as specified above. 24 3. If Williams wishes to pursue his cognizable claims in this action, he must provide, 25 in an amended complaint, information about how his cognizable claims are related 26 to each other. Alternatively, he may choose which claims he wishes to pursue in 27 this action and notify the Court by letter or by including only those claims in an ] 4. Any notice of voluntary dismissal of certain claims or amended complaint must be 2 filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed. If Williams 3 elects to file an amended complaint, he must include the caption and civil case 4 number used in this order and the words “Amended Complaint” on the first page. 5 Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original, Jones must 6 include all claims and allegations of fact to support his claims. See Ferdik v. 7 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Williams is cautioned that he may 8 not incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. He must reallege 9 all claims he wants to pursue within the body of his amended complaint, including 10 any cognizable claims. 11 5. Failure to notify the Court which claims he wishes to pursue in this matter or file an 12 amended complaint within the designated time will result in this action’s dismissal 13 without prejudice. 14 6. Itis Williams’ responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court 3 15 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed a 16 “Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court’s orders in a 17 timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure Zz 18 to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 19 7. The Clerk is requested to send a blank prisoner complaint form to Williams with 20 his copy of this order. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: May 19, 2026

Noél Wise 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28