OPINION OF THE COURT
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge:
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court grew troubled by the frequency of meritless professional malpractice claims filed in the state system. To address that concern, the Court amended the Pennsyl[115]*115vania Rules of Civil Procedure to require malpractice plaintiffs or their attorneys to file a certifícate of merit (“COM”) within sixty days of bringing suit. Failure to comply conferred upon a defendant the right to have the action dismissed. Five years after the COM regime was enacted, however, Justices of the Supreme Court grew concerned that it had the unintended consequence of requiring the dismissal of meritorious claims due to technical oversights by plaintiffs or their attorneys. Thus, the Court amended the Rules again, setting a number of conditions that had to be met before a defendant could seek dismissal of an action for failure to comply.
We have previously held that the COM requirement is substantive state law that must be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity. See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir.2011). In this appeal, we consider whether one of Pennsylvania’s conditions precedent to dismissing an action for failure to comply with the COM requirement, fair notice to a plaintiff, is also substantive law. We conclude that it is, and thus will reverse the judgment of the District Court.
I. Facts and Procedural History1
In 2010, Appellee Dr. Miroslav Uchal performed laparoscopic adjustable gastric band surgery, a procedure intended to place a band around a person’s stomach to limit his food intake and help him lose weight, on Appellant Brian Schmigel. The surgery went awry, however, and the band was left “free floating in his abdomen.” App. 20a. As a result, Schmigel not only failed to lose weight; he suffered internal scarring, limiting his options for similar surgeries into the foreseeable future.
With the benefit of the discovery rule, Schmigel filed suit against Uchal just inside Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for professional malpractice actions. Between the surgery and the initiation of the suit, Uchal had moved to Florida so that Schmigel, a resident of Pennsylvania, was able to sue in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Schmigel’s attorney asked Uchal to accept service of the complaint,2 but Uchal declined. Instead, realizing that no COM had been filed with the Complaint, Uchal waited out the sixty-day window in which a plaintiff may file a COM after initiating suit to sustain a malpractice action under Pennsylvania law, see Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1042.2-1042.10, and on day sixty-nine, filed a motion to dismiss.
The next day, Schmigel’s counsel filed an “answer” to the motion, which included the missing COM and an affidavit explaining that counsel had timely consulted with a doctor but, due to an oversight, had not prepared a COM. In the briefing that followed, the parties disputed, among other things, whether Schmigel had substantially complied with the COM requirement, whether his failure should have been excused, and — because Uchal had not waited thirty days after giving notice of the deficiency to allow for cure before filing his motion to dismiss, which is one of the conditions precedent to dismissal under Pennsylvania law — whether Uchal had the [116]*116right to seek dismissal in the first place.3
The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the claim. Schmigel v. Uchal, No. 14-358, 2014 WL 3397669, at *7 (W.D.Pa. July 11, 2014). First, the District Court held, under our precedent, that Pennsylvania’s COM requirement was substantive law that a federal court must apply when sitting in diversity. Id. at *3. Second, the District Court found that neither of Pennsylvania’s equitable exceptions for allowing a late-filed complaint — substantial compliance and justifiable excuse — applied here. Id. at *5-7. • The District Court did not address at all Schmigel’s final argument, that Pennsylvania’s notice requirement as a condition of dismissal applied in federal court, so that Uchal’s failure to satisfy that condition precluded dismissal. This appeal followed.4
II. Discussion
A. Pennsylvania’s Certificate of Merit Requirement
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recounted in Womer v. Hilliker, 589 Pa. 256, 908 A.2d 269 (2006), the Supreme Court adopted the COM regime “in January of 2003, having determined that malpractice actions were being commenced in the Pennsylvania courts more frequently.” Id. at 275. With that recognition came concern that state courts would be overburdened with “malpractice claims of questionable merit.” Id. Thus, the Court “devise[d] an orderly procedure that would serve to identify and weed non-meritorious malpractice claims from the judicial system efficiently and promptly.” Id. The COM requirement was born.
Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the centerpiece of the COM regime, requires that within sixty days of filing “any action based upon an allegation that a licensed professional deviated from an acceptable professional standard,” a plaintiff file a COM that states (1) “an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge” of the defendant “fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm”; (2) the claim is “based solely on allegations that other licensed professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated from an ae[117]*117ceptable professional standard”; or (3) “expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.3(a)(l)-(3). The purpose of the requirement is to create a reasonable, early barrier that all malpractice plaintiffs must meet:
On the one hand, the presence in the record of a COM signals to the parties and the trial court that the plaintiff is willing to attest to the basis of his malpractice claim; that he is in a position to support the allegations he has made in his professional liability action; and that resources will not be wasted if additional pleading and discovery take place. On the other hand, the absence from the record of a COM signals to the parties and the trial court that none of this is so and that nothing further should transpire in the action, except for the lawsuit’s termination.
Womer, 908 A.2d at 275-76 (internal footnote and citations omitted).
That ultimate consequence of the failure to comply — termination of the suit — is effectuated in state court upon the filing of a praecipe with a prothonotary, who in turn enters a judgment of non pros.5 Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1042.6-7. As originally written, the ability to seek dismissal for failure to file a COM had but one explicit condition: No dismissal could be entered if a plaintiffs timely motion seeking to extend the sixty-day window was pending. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6(a) (West 2003) (amended 2008).6
B. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Identifies a Problem
In Womer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court encountered a situation substantially similar to the one we face today. There, a plaintiff initiated a medical malpractice suit only months after the COM regime began and, within sixty days, served the defendant with an expert report from a doctor that stated the claim was meritorious. 908 A.2d at 273. The plaintiff or his counsel did not, however, actually file a COM. Id. Accordingly, as soon as the sixty-day deadline passed, the defendant filed a praecipe to dismiss the claim, and the prothonotary entered a judgment of non pros. Id. As here, the statute of limitations had run, and thus a presumptively meritorious claim came to a precipitous end. Id. at 274.
Two days after the filing of the praecipe, the plaintiff sought to reopen his case, arguing that, among other things, his failure to submit the COM was a result of his counsel’s “oversight or mistake.” Id. at 273. Included with that filing was a COM that his lawyer had written the previous day. The motion was denied, but on appeal the Superior Court reversed the trial court and reinstated the case. Womer v. Hilliker, 860 A.2d 1144 (Pa.Super.Ct.2004) (unpublished table decision). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted allocatur and reversed the Superior Court, terminating the plaintiffs claim.
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the consequence of failing to comply with the COM requirement was a harsh one — the lawsuit’s demise. 908 [118]*118A.2d at 276. Thus, because the Court “always understood that procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and that the rigid application of [Pennsylvania] rules does not always serve the interests of fairness and justice,” it adopted two equitable exceptions to the requirement: substantial compliance and justifiable excuse. Id. at 276, 279.7 The Court found, however, .that neither exception was met in that case because the plaintiffs counsel “did not [timely] file a COM, even one that was defective.” Id. at 277. As a result, while the plaintiff had a presumptively meritorious complaint supported by an expert report, and despite his attachment of the COM two days after receiving notice of the deficiency, his case was terminated.
Justice Baer, joined by Justice Castille, dissented, citing a number of cases for the proposition that “the courts of [Pennsylvania] have historically been loathe to put a litigant out of court on a potential meritorious claim for missing a filing deadline due to lawyer oversight,” and observing “there is also ample law in Pennsylvania abhorring the practice of entering a snap judgment in response to such a mistake.” Id. at 282-83 (Baer, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that dismissal was in error because “within hours of being put on notice that he mistakenly did not meet all the technical requirements of the rule, [the plaintiff] moved to rectify that mistake and supplied the technically missing COM.” Id. at 282.
Justice Baer’s rationale-quickly transitioned from dissent to rule, as it became the backbone of a significant change to the COM regime. Specifically, in 2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Rules of Civil Procedure to add additional conditions precedent to a defendant’s dismissal of a case.8 As a result of those changes, a Pennsylvania malpractice defendant now may dismiss an action only if four conditions are met: (1) there is not a pending motion (a) for a determination that a COM is unnecessary in the first place or (b) seeking to extend the time to file a COM; (2) a COM was not filed before dismissal was sought; (3) the defendant has attached proof that he served notice of the deficiency upon the plaintiff; and, as is relevant here, (4) thirty days has elapsed between the notice of deficiency and the defendant’s attempt to terminate the action. Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.7(a)(l)-(4).9 The purpose of the changes to Rules 1042.6 and 1042.7 was to, among other things, “address concerns that the ... rules ... provide[d] for the entry of a judgment of non pros where there has been no notice of intent to enter such a judgment.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6 explanatory cmt. (2008).
Justice Baer reflected upon the change in a later opinion:
While my personal sentiments did not carry the day in Womer, the injustice sought to be remedied was accomplished via a subsequent amendment to the civil [119]*119procedural rules requiring a defendant to give a plaintiff a thirty-day written notice of intention to file a praecipe for a judgment of non pros for failure to file a COM. Once notice was provided, the amended rules afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to seek a determination by the court as to the necessity of filing a COM. Thus, the harsh consequence arising from a plaintiffs failure to file a COM was ameliorated with a fair rule of process.
Anderson v. McAfoos, 618 Pa. 478, 57 A.3d 1141, 1154 (2012) (Baer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also Keel-Johnson v. Amsbaugh, No. 07-200, 2009 WL 648970, at *6 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 10, 2009) (explaining that the new rules “severely limit[ ] the availability of non pros by permitting judgment only after ample notice to plaintiffs”).
In sum, Rule 1042.7 was specifically intended to codify Justice Baer’s dissenting view in Womer and to prevent the exact situation that confronts us today. That is, were this ease in state , court, Schmigel’s claim would not have been dismissed because his attorney filed the COM as soon as he was notified of the deficiency and well within the thirty-day window for cure. We now must decide whether that condition precedent to dismissal applies equally to malpractice actions filed in federal court.
C. Choice of Law Analysis
Pursuant to the Erie doctrine, “[a] federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir.2000). “This substantive/proeedural dichotomy of the ‘Erie rule’ must be applied with the objective that ‘in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court [will] be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.’” Id. at 158-59 (alteration in original) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945)). This outcome determinative test, however, “should not produce a decision favoring application of the state rule” unless it furthers one of Erie’s “ ‘twin aims’: ‘discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’ ” Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)).
Consistent with these aims, we apply a three-part test to decide whether a state law or rule is substantive or procedural for Erie purposes. See Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262 (citing Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 158-61). First, we “determine whether there is a direct collision between a federal rule and the state law or rule that the court is being urged to apply.” Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262. If there is a direct conflict, and the federal rule is “constitutional and within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act,” we apply the federal rule and end our analysis. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 159. Second, “[i]f there is no direct collision,” we examine “whether the state law is outcome-determinative and whether failure to apply the state law would frustrate the twin aims of the Erie Rule to discourage forum shopping and avoid inequitable administration of the law.” Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262. Finally, we consider “whether any countervailing federal interests prevent the state law from being applied in federal court.” Id.
As set forth below, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s notice requirement, like the COM requirement itself, is sub[120]*120stantive state law under Erie and therefore must be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity. We base this conclusion on (1) our precedent addressing Pennsylvania’s COM rules and New Jersey’s analogous Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”) statute; and (2) an independent application of our three-part test under the Erie doctrine. We address each rationale in turn.
1. Our History with Pennsylvania’s COM Regime and New Jersey’s AOM Statute
This is not the first time we have addressed the requirement that a malpractice plaintiff provide a certificate or affidavit of merit, and we are guided by our precedent in Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 158-61 and Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 300-10, analyzing New Jersey’s AOM statute; and Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d 258, addressing Pennsylvania’s COM regime. That precedent supports the notion that the COM regime’s notice requirement should be construed as substantive law.
In Chamberlain, we examined New Jersey’s AOM statute, which, like Pennsylvania’s COM requirement, provides that if an AOM is not filed within sixty days of filing a malpractice suit that action may be dismissed with prejudice. N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, 29; Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 157-58.10 After conducting our three-step Erie analysis, we held that the AOM statute did “not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity.” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 157. We also concluded that a failure to apply the statute would be contrary to the twin aims of Erie because a meritless malpractice claim in federal court could not be ended at the same early stage as in state court, thus encouraging forum shopping by plaintiffs and unfairly exposing professionals to meritless claims. Id. at 161. Having identified no countervailing federal interest preventing the law’s application in federal court, we applied the AOM requirement as substantive law. Id. Most importantly for today’s purposes, however, we did not apply the requirement untethered from its conditions. Instead, we applied the primary condition precedent to dismissal, i.e., that sixty days (or 120 days for good cause shown) must have passed from the time of suit without the production of an AOM, see id. at 163, as well as New Jersey’s four exceptions to dismissal with prejudice, see Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 305.
As one would expect, when faced with Pennsylvania’s COM rule soon thereafter in Liggon-Redding, we concluded that it also did not conflict with any Federal Rule, including Rules 7, 8, 9, 11 or 41(b); that it was outcome determinative; that failing to apply it would encourage forum shopping and result in inequitable administration of the law; and that no countervailing federal interest prevented its application in federal court. 659 F.3d at 262-65. And, as in New Jersey, because enforcing the rule without its consequence would be a rather pointless exercise, we also enforced Pennsylvania’s own penalty for failing to comply, along with its primary condition precedent — that a defendant may move to dismiss an action without prejudice only when sixty days have passed from the time of suit without the production of a COM. See id. at 263.
Because we reversed on the ground that the pro se plaintiff in Liggon-Redding in fact had complied with the COM requirement, we had no need to consider Pennsylvania’s equitable exceptions of substantial [121]*121compliance or justifiable excuse, nor did we determine whether the other conditions precedent to dismissing an action, including the notice requirement, were substantive law. In fact, all of those additional conditions, save one — that a timely motion for an extension of time could not be pending — were not enacted until after the plaintiff in Liggon-Redding initiated her suit. See id. at 260 (stating the plaintiffs COM was due on January 18, 2008); Pa. R.C.P. No. 1042.6 (noting amendments adopted and effective on June 16, 2008).11
What Chamberlain, Nuveen, and Liggon-Redding reflect is that we have already applied as substantive law the COM requirement and its New Jersey analogue, along with each state’s consequence of failing to comply, and at least one associated condition precedent to dismissal. Uchal, moreover, does not argue that we should ignore all the substance of Rule 1042.7, for it is that Rule which vested him with the right to dismissal in the first place. Instead, he seeks to enforce only that portion of Rule 1042.7 that is favorable to him. That is, he would have us apply a defendant’s right to dismissal for a plaintiffs non-compliance with the COM requirement, but ignore the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vested a defendant with that right only when a plaintiff receives thirty days’ notice.12 Neither our case law nor common sense supports that approach. Instead, they counsel that the notice requirement, as a condition precedent to dismissal, is substantive law to be applied, along with the COM requirement itself, by federal courts sitting in diversity.
2. The Notice Requirement is Substantive Law
Uchal argues that, whatever we may glean from our precedent, the application of our three-part Erie test requires us to hold that Rule 1042.7’s notice requirement is procedural. Specifically, he argues that (1) it is in direct conflict with the Federal Rules; (2) it is outcome determinative only in the most limited sense; and (3) the failure to apply it in federal court would not frustrate Erie’s twin aims. Our independent analysis under this test leads us to the opposite conclusion.
First, we discern no conflict whatsoever between the substance of Rules 1042.6-7 and Federal Rules 7(b) and 12(b). Rule 7(b) “governs the application to the court for an order and requires that any application to the court be by motion.” Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262. Uchal argues that applying the notice requirement from Rule 1042.7 means that we must apply the procedure by which dismissal is accomplished in state court, that is, a filing of a praecipe with the prothonotary, and that because Rule 7 provides for motions and not praecipes, the federal and state rules irreconcilably conflict.
We have already* resolved this alleged conflict, however, and not in Uchal’s favor. For when we held in Liggon-Redding that [122]*122the COM requirement was substantive law that provided a defendant with a right to seek dismissal and did not present any conflict with Rule 7, we implicitly rejected the argument that the differences in the mechanism to accomplish that dismissal, i.e., a praecipe filed with a prothonotary in state court versus the filing of an appropriate motion in federal court, gave rise to any conflict. Id. at 265; see also Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 303 n. 13 (concluding it was appropriate to file a motion for summary judgment to effectuate dismissal pursuant to the New Jersey AOM requirement). The “conflict” urged by Uchal is therefore a false one, as the availability of motions practice in federal court to accomplish dismissal is unaltered by a requirement that federal courts adhere to Pennsylvania’s notice requirement as a condition precedent to that dismissal. Yet again, “state policy can be effectuated without compromising any of the policy choices reflected in” Rule 7. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160.
Nor is there a conflict with Rule 12(b), which tests the sufficiency of pleadings. As we have made clear, the COM requirement “does not have any effect on what is included in the pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof.” Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 263 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the COM “is not part of the complaint, nor does it need to be filed with the complaint.” Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 303. Rather, the COM requirement and its conditions are facts that can form the basis for a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 303 n. 13 (“That the [New Jersey] affidavit is not a pleading requirement counsels that a defendant seeking to ‘dismiss’ an action based on the plaintiffs .failure to file a timely affidavit should file a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, and not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”). Because a motion for summary judgment can be filed whenever appropriate, there is no conflict between the timelines of the COM requirement, including thirty days’ notice, and a defendant’s right to terminate a plaintiffs case for the failure to comply. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 (“Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.”).13 Uchal’s argument for a conflict with Rule 12, based on the twenty-one day deadline for filing a motion to dismiss, is therefore a non-starter. Rather, “these Federal Rules and the [Pennsylvania Rules] can exist side by side,’ ‘each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’ ” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752, 100 S.Ct. 1978, 64 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980)).
Second, failing to require notice is plainly outcome determinative, as it was for Schmigel here. Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court altered the COM Rules specifically because the Court wished to avoid the termination of meritorious ac-' tions when, “within hours of being put on notice that he mistakenly did not meet all the technical requirements of the rule, [a [123]*123plaintiff] move[s] to rectify that mistake and supplie[s] the technically missing COM.” Womer, 908 A.2d at 282 (Baer, J., dissenting). While Uchal concedes, as he must, the conclusive effect on Schmigel’s case of his failure to provide thirty days’ notice and opportunity to cure, Uchal argues that the COM Rules would be outcome determinative only in the rare case.14 The frequency with which this issue has arisen in district courts, however, belies Uchal’s argument.15
Finally, consistent application of the COM requirement will ensure equitable administration in both federal and state courts and will prevent forum shopping by discouraging defendants from removing to federal court when faced with actions filed near the end of the statute of limitations. Conversely, it would not only be inequitable, but irrational, to dismiss meritorious claims based solely on a state rule, when that very same rule, specifically amended as a result of a virtually identical scenario to this one, prevents dismissal in state court. And while we generally look to concerns that a plaintiff will forum shop, visiting the consequences of inequitable administration of the law upon a defendant, we may consider the reverse as well, where the equities require. See Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 304-05 (considering whether applying a New Jersey rule would provide a defendant “incentive to remove a case from state to federal court”).16
[124]*124Because there is no federal interest weighing against applying the same notice requirement as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, our Erie decision is a clear one:17 The condition of thirty days’ notice prior to seeking dismissal of an action for failure to comply with the COM regime is substantive and must be applied in federal court. Uchal was therefore required to provide Schmigel with notice before he had a right to dismiss this action, and his failure to do so requires reinstatement of this action in the District Court.18
III. Conclusion
States are free to vest defendants with a mechanism to swiftly terminate unmeritorious malpractice actions, as Pennsylvania did. But in Pennsylvania, that right does not vest unless at least one condition is met: thirty days’ notice to a plain[125]*125tiff. That right and its attendant condition of fair notice are each substantive law. Accordingly, the District Court erred in dismissing Schmigel’s claim, and we will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.