Brett Thomas Baird v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 11, 2006·No. 07-05-00404-CR·Published

Opinion

NO. 07-05-0404-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL C


AUGUST 11, 2006

______________________________


BRETT THOMAS BAIRD, APPELLANT


V.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________


FROM THE COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT OF DENTON COUNTY;


NO. 2004-09096-C; HONORABLE DAVID D. GARCIA, JUDGE
_______________________________


Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and HANCOCK, JJ.

OPINION

Appellant, Brett Thomas Baird, appeals his conviction for violation of duty upon striking a fixture or landscaping legally on or adjacent to a highway. Appellant was sentenced to 120 days incarceration in the Denton County Jail, probated for 15 months, and fined $1,000. We affirm.



Background

At or about 12:30 a.m., on Saturday, October 30, 2004, appellant lost control of the vehicle he was driving, jumped a curb, and struck a fence. The accident caused significant damage to the fence and appellant's vehicle. Following the accident, appellant made a brief inspection of the area and then moved his car down the street. As the accident occurred near appellant's home, appellant abandoned his car and walked to his house. Soon after appellant arrived at his home, a police officer knocked on his door. When appellant answered the door, he immediately acknowledged that he had been involved in an accident and informed the officer where his car was located.

On Sunday afternoon, appellant phoned the owner of the fence and provided the owner with his name, address, and phone numbers. Appellant later reported the incident to his insurance company, who paid to repair the damage to the fence.

Subsequently, appellant was charged with committing the offense of violation of duty upon striking a fixture or landscaping legally on or adjacent to a highway. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.025 (Vernon 1999). (1) Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to declare section 550.025 unconstitutionally void for vagueness and a motion to set aside the information. Appellant's contention in support of his constitutional challenge was that section 550.025, by indicating only that reasonable steps must be taken to provide the owner of the damaged property certain information, failed to provide fair notice of the conduct that was required. Appellant's contention in support of his motion to set aside the information was that the information omitted the word "only" and, therefore, failed to state an offense. The trial court denied each of these motions. Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of the charged offense.

By three issues, appellant appeals. In the order that we will address these issues, appellant contends that (1) the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to set aside the information, and (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to declare section 550.025 unconstitutional.

Factual Sufficiency

Appellant contends that the evidence presented at his trial was factually insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant alleges that the evidence failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he failed to take "reasonable steps" to provide the owner of the damaged property with the statutorily required information. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the other elements of the offense.

In a factual sufficiency review, we must determine whether, considering all the evidence in a neutral light, the jury was rationally justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). There are two ways in which the evidence may be factually insufficient. First, when considered by itself, the evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Second, considering all of the evidence, the contrary evidence may be so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Id. at 484-85. However, the court reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence must give proper deference to the fact finder's determinations and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Id. at 481-82. If we conclude that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the conviction, we must address appellant's main argument and explain why we are not persuaded by it. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

Appellant contends that the evidence showed that his actions on the night of the accident were motivated by an attempt to take reasonable steps to report the accident to the police. This contention was hotly contested by the State. However, whether appellant took reasonable steps to cooperate with or provide information as part of the police investigation is not relevant to whether the evidence was factually sufficient to establish that appellant failed to take reasonable steps to notify the property owner.

The facts of appellant's notification of the property owner are not in dispute. At the time of the accident, appellant made no attempt to contact the owner of the fence. Appellant made no attempt to contact the owner of the fence throughout October 30th. Appellant did contact the owner, by telephone, during the afternoon of October 31st, between 36 and 38 hours after the accident. Appellant's argument acknowledges this evidence and then summarily concludes that this evidence was "clearly not factually sufficient" to prove that he failed to take reasonable steps to notify the property owner. We disagree.

By its verdict, the jury found that appellant failed to take reasonable steps to notify the property owner. As the undisputed evidence was that appellant failed to notify the property owner until 36 to 38 hours after the accident, the jury, by its verdict, impliedly found that a 36 to 38 hour delay was unreasonable. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that there was a 36 to 38 hour delay in his notification to the property owner; rather, appellant's contention is that notification within 36 to 38 hours constitutes "reasonable steps" under section 550.025. Clearly the evidence was sufficient to prove the delay. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury as to whether a 36 to 38 hour delay constitutes "reasonable steps." We overrule appellant's issue.

Information

Section 550.025 makes it a criminal offense to fail to take reasonable steps to notify a property owner or the person in charge of property after an operator of a vehicle is "involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a fixture or landscaping legally on or adjacent to a highway . . . ." § 550.025(a).

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