Brenner v. Johnson

328 F. Supp. 149, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13889
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 5, 1971
DocketNo. 69-C-410
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 328 F. Supp. 149 (Brenner v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brenner v. Johnson, 328 F. Supp. 149, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13889 (E.D. Wis. 1971).

Opinion

OPINION

TEHAN, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff in this action to recover short-swing profits pursuant to § 16(b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) ) has moved for summary judgment. The defendants agree that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the issue of liability, asserting that the only question [150]*150is a legal one — is the transaction complained of exempt from § 16(b) by reason of Rule 16b-92 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. (17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9)

At all times material hereto, the defendant, Fred W. Johnson, was a corporate insider, an officer-director, of defendant Career Academy, Inc., a company the stock of which is registered on a national securities exchange. In July of 1967, he filed a Form 3, Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, pursuant to § 16(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) ) revealing his ownership of 35,528 shares of Career’s common stock. In November of 1967, also pursuant to § 16(a), he filed a Form 4, Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities, revealing the purchase on October 12, 1967, of 6000 shares of Career’s common stock as a result of exercise of a non-transferable qualified stock option and a sale of 20,-000 shares as a part of a public offering described in a prospectus dated September 28, 1967.3 (Affidavit attached to motion). The shares sold were actually transferred on or about October 6, 1967 and were subject to no restrictions. The shares purchased were subject to restrictions contained in Career’s option plan and its agreement with Johnson under that plan prohibiting transfer for three years. As computed prior to the stock split, the shares sold were sold for $49.25 a share and those purchased pursuant to the' option were purchased for $6.585 a share.

On July 18, 1969, the plaintiff, Donald Brenner, purchased 25 shares of Career’s common stock and on August 25, [151]*1511969 he commenced this action asking that Johnson account for and pay over to Career profits realized from the above described sale and purchase. The parties apparently agree that the fact that the plaintiff did not own Career stock at the times of the purchase and sale is of no import, and the defendants have not pressed a defense of failure of the plaintiff to request Career to bring suit before commencing this action.

The sole question presented with respect to liability is whether the exercise by the defendant Johnson of his option is a § 16(b) purchase of stock which, when coupled with a sale within six months resulting in a profit, renders him accountable to Career for that profit or whether it was a conversion of an equity security, concededly at less than 15% of the value of the stock received, exempt under Rule 16b-9. In resolving that question, it is helpful to consider the following statement of general principles applicable in § 16(b) cases contained in the recent case of Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970):

“Section 16(b) was designed to prevent speculation in corporate securities by ‘insiders’ such as directors, officers and large stockholders. Congress intended the statute to curb manipulative and unethical practices which result from the misuse of important corporate information for the personal aggrandizement or unfair profit of the insider. Congress hoped to insure the strict observance of the insider’s fiduciary duties to outside shareholders and the corporation by removing the profit from short-swing dealings in corporate securities. Conversely, Congress sought to avoid unduly discouraging bona fide long-term contributions to corporate capital. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 514-516 (2d Cir. 1966), certiorari denied, 385 U.S. 1002, 87 S.Ct. 707, 17 L.Ed.2d 542; Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), certiorari denied sub nom. Blau v. Petteys, 385 U.S. 1006, 87 S.Ct. 712, 17 L.Ed.2d 545; Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1965), certiorari denied, 382 U.S. 892, 86 S.Ct. 180, 15 L.Ed.2d 150; Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231, 237-239 (2d Cir. 1943), certiorari denied, 320 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct. 56, 88 L.Ed. 446.
In order to achieve its goals, Congress chose a relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy administration. The objective standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict liability upon substantially all transactions occurring within the statutory time period, regardless of the intent of the insider or the existence of actual speculation. This approach maximized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing difficulties in proof. Such arbitrary and sweeping coverage was deemed necessary to insure the optimum prophylactic effect. See Petteys v. Butler, supra, 367 F.2d at pp. 532-533; Smolowe v. Delendo, supra, 136 F.2d at pp. 236-237; Blau v. Lamb, supra, 363 F.2d at 515. The harshness of the rule was mitigated, however, by confining its coverage to a period of six months, thereby ensuring the minimum adverse effect upon valuable, long-term investments and at the same time facilitating easy and certain compliance with the strictures of Section 16(b). The thrust of the statutory scheme thus placed responsibility for meticulous observance of the provision upon the shoulders of the insider. He was deemed capable of structuring his dealings to avoid any possibility of taint and therefore must bear the risks of any inadvertent miscalculation. Cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F.Supp. 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y.1962); see generally, II Loss, Securities Regulation, Ch. 6C, pp. 1040, et seq. (2d ed. 1961.)”

It is also important to remember that an exercise of a stock option has been ruled a purchase under § 16(b), (Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F.Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.1968) ) and that a former Commission rule exempting acquisitions of stock pursuant to restricted stock options from the op[152]*152eration of § 16(b) was held invalid as inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. (Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F.Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.1959)).

Faced with this authority, the defendant Johnson contends that his purchase of stock pursuant to his option was an acquisition involved in the conversion of an equity security exempt from § 16(b) under Rule 16b-9. Assuming that a stock option is an “equity security” within the meaning of the rule, it would seem that the rule, to the extent it exempts the exercise of stock options from § 16(b), is invalid for the same reasons as that dealt with in Perlman v. Timberlake, supra.

While conceding the correctness of the Perlman

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
328 F. Supp. 149, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brenner-v-johnson-wied-1971.