Brenda Stumbo v. Karen Lovejoy Roe

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 5, 2020
Docket353695
StatusPublished

This text of Brenda Stumbo v. Karen Lovejoy Roe (Brenda Stumbo v. Karen Lovejoy Roe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brenda Stumbo v. Karen Lovejoy Roe, (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

BRENDA STUMBO and LARRY DOE, FOR PUBLICATION June 5, 2020 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 9:00 a.m.

v No. 353695 Washtenaw Circuit Court KAREN LOVEJOY ROE, LC No. 20-000443-CZ

Defendant,

and

HEATHER JARRELL ROE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and MARKEY and BOONSTRA, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J.

Our Supreme Court instructs that a candidate for elected office must strictly comply with the pre-election form and content requirements identified in the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq., in the absence of any statutory language expressly indicating that substantial compliance with the statute’s requirements suffices. Stand Up For Democracy v Secretary of State, 492 Mich 588, 594, 600-608, 619; 822 NW2d 159 (2012) (opinion by Mary Beth Kelly, J.); id. at 620 (opinion by Young, C.J.); id. at 637, 640-641 (opinion by Markman, J.). The failure to supply a facially proper AOI, i.e., an affidavit that conforms to the requirements of the Election Law, is a ground to disqualify a candidate from inclusion on the ballot. Berry v Garret, 316 Mich App 37, 43-45; 890 NW2d 37 (2016). Relying on Stand Up For Democracy and Berry, the Washtenaw Circuit Court ordered defendant Heather Jarrell Roe disqualified from placement on the August 4, 2020 primary election ballot for the office of Ypsilanti Township Clerk. The trial court predicated its disqualification of Roe’s candidacy on the finding that the Affidavit of Identity [“AOI”] filed by Roe was “facially defective” because Roe had failed to strictly comply with the

-1- attestation instructions issued by the Secretary of State under MCL 168.31. We granted leave1 to address whether a fatal defect exists in an AOI required by MCL 168.558 where the candidate’s signature date differs from the notarization date.2 We conclude that a fatal defect does not exist under such circumstances. Rather, we hold that as long as the AOI has been signed by the candidate and notarized in a manner allowed under MCL 168.31, the AOI strictly complies with the attestation requirements implicit in MCL 168.558 and the clerk has a legal duty to certify the affiant to the board of election commissioners for placement on the ballot. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.

I

Roe currently serves as a Ypsilanti Township Trustee. On March 2, 2020, Roe filed the necessary paperwork to be placed on the August 4th primary ballot as the incumbent candidate for the office of Ypsilanti Township Trustee. On April 21, 2020, however, Roe withdrew her candidacy for that elected office. She immediately thereafter filed paperwork to run for the office of Ypsilanti Township Clerk.

Under MCL 168.558(1), a candidate filing a nominating petition or a filing fee in lieu of nominating petition must also file an AOI, containing the candidate’s name and address, among other information useful to establishing the candidate’s identity. The Secretary of State provides

1 Defendant Heather Roe initiated this appeal by filing a claim of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party from “[a] final judgment or order of the circuit court” as defined in MCR 7.202(6), MCR 7.202(A)(1), or from “[a] judgment or order of a court or tribunal from which appeal of right to the Court of Appeals has been established by law or court rule,” MCR 7.203(A)(2). MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i) defines a final order in a civil case as “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” The May 29, 2020 order struck Roe’s name from the primary election ballot. It did not resolve any of the other requests for relief set forth in the complaint, however. Because the order did not dispose of all the claims and adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the parties, it is not a final order under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i). The fact that the May 29, 2020 order contains language indicating that it “is entered pursuant to MCR 2.602 and closes this case” is not controlling of this Court’s jurisdiction. Faircloth v Family Independence Agency, 232 Mich App 391, 400; 591 NW2d 314 (1998). In lieu of dismissing the claim of appeal, we treat the claim of appeal as an application for leave to appeal and grant the application. 2 The question we address in this opinion is one of law. We have not looked to extrinsic evidence to explain away the obvious facial deficiency in Roe’s AOI, as asserted by the dissent. Rather, we looked to the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 168.558 and found no express or implicit requirement that the candidate affiant must date the AOI before a notary. We do not believe, as the dissent does, that Roe may be held to strict compliance with a dating requirement imposed by the Secretary of State that requires more of the candidate than MCL 168.558 requires. Consequently, whether Roe predated the affidavit or simply misdated the affidavit is wholly irrelevant to a determination whether the affidavit facially complies with the notarization requirement implicitly imposed by MCL 168.558(1).

-2- a form AOI for use by candidates. This form AOI includes a space designated for the candidate’s signature. To the immediate right of the signature space is a space designated for the candidate to record the date he or she signed the AOI. The form AOI also provides space for a notary to attest to the identity of the affiant signing the AOI. The AOI filed with the township clerk by Roe bears Roe’s signature and a signature date of “04/20/2020.” Her AOI was notarized by Brent W. Royal on “the 21st day of April, 2020.”3

The township clerk accepted Roe’s AOI for filing and qualified Roe as a candidate for the office of Ypsilanti Township Clerk.

Plaintiffs Brenda Stumbo, a Ypsilanti Township Supervisor, and Larry Doe, the Ypsilanti Township Treasurer, then commenced the underlying proceedings in the Washtenaw Circuit Court, seeking, in part, a declaration that Roe was disqualified from placement on the August 4, 2020 primary election ballot because Roe had filed a facially-improper AOI where her signature date differed from the notarization date. Plaintiffs also sought an order striking Roe’s name from the primary ballot. The trial court granted this requested relief.

II

This appeal involves the application and construction of § 558 of the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.558. We review de novo issues concerning the application and construction of a statute. Berry v Garret, 316 Mich App 37, 41; 890 NW2d 37 (2016).

This Court’s primary task in interpreting and applying a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). The words of the statute are the most reliable evidence of the Legislature’s intent and this Court must give each word its plain and ordinary meaning. Krohn v Home-Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 156; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). “In interpreting the statute at issue, [this Court] . . . consider[s] both the plain meaning of the critical words or phrase as well as ‘its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.’” Sun Valley Foods Co, 460 Mich at 237, quoting Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 145; 166 S Ct 501; 133 L Ed 2d 472 (1995). When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute

3 On April 8, 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-41 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Related

Bailey v. United States
516 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Stand Up for Democracy v. Secretary of State
822 N.W.2d 159 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2012)
Kevin Krohn v. Home-Owners Ins Co
802 N.W.2d 281 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2011)
People v. Sloan
538 N.W.2d 380 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1995)
Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency
591 N.W.2d 314 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1999)
Holmes v. Michigan Capital Medical Center
620 N.W.2d 319 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2000)
Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward
596 N.W.2d 119 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1999)
LaFleche v. Ybarra
619 N.W.2d 738 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2000)
People v. Wager
594 N.W.2d 487 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1999)
Berry v. Garrett
890 N.W.2d 882 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2016)
Ronnisch Construction Group, Inc v. Lofts on the Nine, LLC
886 N.W.2d 113 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2016)
Rataj v. City of Romulus
858 N.W.2d 116 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Brenda Stumbo v. Karen Lovejoy Roe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brenda-stumbo-v-karen-lovejoy-roe-michctapp-2020.