In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 19-3212 BRENDA MITZE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 1:13-c-444 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. ____________________
SUBMITTED JUNE 22, 2020 * — DECIDED JULY 31, 2020 ____________________
Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Years after Brenda Mitze unsuccessfully ap- pealed the denial of her application for social security bene- fits, she moved to seal court decisions and other records,
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 2 No. 19-3212
claiming that their publication violated her right to keep her medical information private. The district court denied the mo- tion and we affirm. I We omit the details that led Mitze to apply for disability benefits in 2009, as they are unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. The Commissioner found she was not disabled and denied her application. Suffice it to say she was unable to establish that a medically determinable impairment pre- cluded her from engaging in past relevant work or other gain- ful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; see also Bird v. Ber- ryhill, 847 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir. 2017). On review the district court upheld the Commissioner’s decision. We did too. See Mitze v. Colvin, 782 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2015). Several years later, Mitze filed a motion to seal her “medi- cal information . . . and all other information pertaining to [her] case.” She complained of “harassing phone calls from solicitors” who knew her personal medical information be- cause the courts had “publicized” it by issuing opinions an- nouncing the affirmance of the ALJ’s decision. The district court denied Mitze’s motion. It first noted that remote electronic access to filings containing Mitze’s medical records already was limited to the parties and their attorneys. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c). (Full access, however, is available to the public at the courthouse. See id.) To the extent that Mitze wished to seal the district and appellate court opinions—both of which recounted her medical facts in detail—the district court determined she offered no reason to overturn the “long-standing tradition” of granting public access to the courts’ decisions. Finally, the district court concluded that it No. 19-3212 3
had no authority to require news outlets to remove articles about those decisions from the internet. On appeal, Mitze renews her concerns that medical sales- people have targeted her because of the publication of the de- tails of her case. She adds not only that she and her children have experienced social stigma, but also that thieves broke into her home to steal pain medication, which publicly avail- able documents revealed that she had been prescribed. Mitze attached to her brief the opinions of this court and the district court, as well as online news articles reporting on those deci- sions, and we understand her objections to pertain to the in- formation in those documents. II A The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to seal its own order affirming the ALJ’s decision. See County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 739 (7th Cir. 2007). As the district court explained, a strong presumption exists in favor of publishing dispositional or- ders. See Hicklin Eng'g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348–49 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, 827 F.3d 689, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2016). Even in cases involving substantial countervailing privacy interests such as state secrets, trade secrets, and attorney-client privi- lege, courts have opted for redacting instead of sealing the or- der or opinion. See Hicklin, 439 F.3d at 349 (“We hope never to encounter another sealed opinion.”); Pepsico, Inc. v. Red- mond, 46 F.3d 29, 30 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., in cham- bers) (noting that even in cases involving issues of national security, a “sealed opinion and order” is barely imaginable). 4 No. 19-3212
Further, to the extent that Mitze asked the district court to seal our opinion, she misdirected her motion, for only we can consider such a request. “[E]very document filed . . . by this court . . . is in the public record unless a judge of this court orders it to be sealed.” UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPERATING PROCEDURE 10(a) (Dec. 1, 2015) (emphasis added). We do not recommend that Mitze re- file her motion at this stage, however, as the same reasoning for denying her request to seal the district court’s decision would apply equally to our opinion. B Balancing the public’s right to transparent court proceed- ings and a litigant’s personal privacy interests is difficult, par- ticularly when it comes to those seeking benefits based on health concerns. We sympathize with a claimant who feels as though her medical information should not be publicized simply because she chooses to avail herself of her right to ju- dicial review. It might be that the existing remedies of pro- ceeding anonymously, requesting redactions, or sealing rec- ords fall short of what is needed in the social security context. To be sure, the public has “a right to know who is using [its] courts.” Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). Under the current standard, a plaintiff wishing to proceed anonymously must rebut the presumption that parties’ identities are public information by showing that her need for anonymity outweighs the harm of concealment. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). But we question whether a uniform practice of social security opinions bearing only claimants’ initials would negatively impact the government or public interest in any meaningful way. No. 19-3212 5
We leave that balancing for another day. All we need to say in the case before us is that it is too late for Mitze. Given everything that has transpired over the years, we cannot re- visit the application of these standard practices regarding the publication of judicial decisions and orders in social security matters. Mitze’s circumstances fall outside the “very few catego- ries” for which we have recognized that confidentiality is ap- propriate. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J., in chambers); see also Kama- kana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.
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In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 19-3212 BRENDA MITZE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 1:13-c-444 — William C. Griesbach, Judge. ____________________
SUBMITTED JUNE 22, 2020 * — DECIDED JULY 31, 2020 ____________________
Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Years after Brenda Mitze unsuccessfully ap- pealed the denial of her application for social security bene- fits, she moved to seal court decisions and other records,
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 2 No. 19-3212
claiming that their publication violated her right to keep her medical information private. The district court denied the mo- tion and we affirm. I We omit the details that led Mitze to apply for disability benefits in 2009, as they are unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. The Commissioner found she was not disabled and denied her application. Suffice it to say she was unable to establish that a medically determinable impairment pre- cluded her from engaging in past relevant work or other gain- ful employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; see also Bird v. Ber- ryhill, 847 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir. 2017). On review the district court upheld the Commissioner’s decision. We did too. See Mitze v. Colvin, 782 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2015). Several years later, Mitze filed a motion to seal her “medi- cal information . . . and all other information pertaining to [her] case.” She complained of “harassing phone calls from solicitors” who knew her personal medical information be- cause the courts had “publicized” it by issuing opinions an- nouncing the affirmance of the ALJ’s decision. The district court denied Mitze’s motion. It first noted that remote electronic access to filings containing Mitze’s medical records already was limited to the parties and their attorneys. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c). (Full access, however, is available to the public at the courthouse. See id.) To the extent that Mitze wished to seal the district and appellate court opinions—both of which recounted her medical facts in detail—the district court determined she offered no reason to overturn the “long-standing tradition” of granting public access to the courts’ decisions. Finally, the district court concluded that it No. 19-3212 3
had no authority to require news outlets to remove articles about those decisions from the internet. On appeal, Mitze renews her concerns that medical sales- people have targeted her because of the publication of the de- tails of her case. She adds not only that she and her children have experienced social stigma, but also that thieves broke into her home to steal pain medication, which publicly avail- able documents revealed that she had been prescribed. Mitze attached to her brief the opinions of this court and the district court, as well as online news articles reporting on those deci- sions, and we understand her objections to pertain to the in- formation in those documents. II A The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to seal its own order affirming the ALJ’s decision. See County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 739 (7th Cir. 2007). As the district court explained, a strong presumption exists in favor of publishing dispositional or- ders. See Hicklin Eng'g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348–49 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, 827 F.3d 689, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2016). Even in cases involving substantial countervailing privacy interests such as state secrets, trade secrets, and attorney-client privi- lege, courts have opted for redacting instead of sealing the or- der or opinion. See Hicklin, 439 F.3d at 349 (“We hope never to encounter another sealed opinion.”); Pepsico, Inc. v. Red- mond, 46 F.3d 29, 30 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., in cham- bers) (noting that even in cases involving issues of national security, a “sealed opinion and order” is barely imaginable). 4 No. 19-3212
Further, to the extent that Mitze asked the district court to seal our opinion, she misdirected her motion, for only we can consider such a request. “[E]very document filed . . . by this court . . . is in the public record unless a judge of this court orders it to be sealed.” UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPERATING PROCEDURE 10(a) (Dec. 1, 2015) (emphasis added). We do not recommend that Mitze re- file her motion at this stage, however, as the same reasoning for denying her request to seal the district court’s decision would apply equally to our opinion. B Balancing the public’s right to transparent court proceed- ings and a litigant’s personal privacy interests is difficult, par- ticularly when it comes to those seeking benefits based on health concerns. We sympathize with a claimant who feels as though her medical information should not be publicized simply because she chooses to avail herself of her right to ju- dicial review. It might be that the existing remedies of pro- ceeding anonymously, requesting redactions, or sealing rec- ords fall short of what is needed in the social security context. To be sure, the public has “a right to know who is using [its] courts.” Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). Under the current standard, a plaintiff wishing to proceed anonymously must rebut the presumption that parties’ identities are public information by showing that her need for anonymity outweighs the harm of concealment. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). But we question whether a uniform practice of social security opinions bearing only claimants’ initials would negatively impact the government or public interest in any meaningful way. No. 19-3212 5
We leave that balancing for another day. All we need to say in the case before us is that it is too late for Mitze. Given everything that has transpired over the years, we cannot re- visit the application of these standard practices regarding the publication of judicial decisions and orders in social security matters. Mitze’s circumstances fall outside the “very few catego- ries” for which we have recognized that confidentiality is ap- propriate. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J., in chambers); see also Kama- kana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]mbarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to fur- ther litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.”). When unsuccessful applicants for disability benefits seek judicial review, they can expect (at least under today’s practices) that the medical basis of the claim will be- come public. In such cases, federal courts have a responsibil- ity to review the decision of an administrative law judge to determine whether there is substantial evidence—primarily medical evidence—in the administrative record to support the decision. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). We do so in reasoned decisions issued to the parties and made available to the public. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure draw a line at pro- tecting medical records themselves, and redaction of personal identifying information such as social security numbers is re- quired. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a), (c); see also 20 C.F.R. § 401.115 (describing Social Security Administration guide- lines for disclosing private information). But mere discussion of the factual basis for a disability claim is not grounds for preventing the publication of judicial decisions. 6 No. 19-3212
III Mitze’s two remaining arguments also fail. News outlets have the right to publish information obtained from public court records, so we cannot order an outlet to remove from its website articles reporting on the decisions in her case. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). And to the extent Mitze argues that the courts or the press making the details of her case public violates the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, tit. II, § 262(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (1996), she has not explained how. The Act regulates the disclosure of information by only health- care providers and their affiliates. See United States v. Bek, 493 F.3d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 2007); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (exclud- ing “government agency . . . collecting protected health infor- mation” to determine eligibility for public benefits). For these reasons, we AFFIRM.