Dupar v. Pingel

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 26, 2024
Docket2:21-cv-01058
StatusUnknown

This text of Dupar v. Pingel (Dupar v. Pingel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dupar v. Pingel, (E.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DERRICK DUPAR, JR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-CV-1058-JPS v.

TROY A. PINGEL, NICHOLAS J. PROTECTIVE WODAK, and JOHN W. BIRDYSHAW, ORDER Defendants.

On March 22, 2024, the parties in the above-captioned matter stipulated to and requested the entry of a protective order, and also submitted a proposed protective order. ECF Nos. 60, 61. The parties request that the Court enter such an order because they anticipate that the exchange of sensitive information may cause unnecessary damage and injury to the parties or others. ECF No. 61 at 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) allows for an order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” including “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G); see also Civ. L.R. 26(e). Protective orders are an exception to the general rule that pretrial discovery must occur in the public eye. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945–46 (7th Cir. 1999). Litigation must be “conducted in public to the maximum extent consistent with respecting trade secrets . . . and other facts that should be held in confidence.” Hicklin Eng’r, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, the Court can enter a protective order if the parties have shown good cause and that the order is narrowly tailored to serve that cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Citizens First, 178 F.3d at 945; Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (even when parties agree to the entry of a protective order, they still must demonstrate the existence of good cause). The Court can find that even broad, blanket orders are narrowly tailored and permissible when it finds that two factors are satisfied: (1) that the parties will act in good faith in designating the portions of the record that should be subject to the protective order; and (2) that the order explicitly allows the parties to the case and other interested members of the public to challenge the sealing of documents. Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 740 (7th Cir. 2006). The Court finds that the parties have requested the protective order in this action in good faith. The parties report that this case will entail the disclosure of sensitive information that may cause unnecessary damage and injury to the parties or others ECF No. 61 at 1. Thus, the Court is satisfied that there exists a sufficient basis for the requested protective order. Because the parties’ proposed protective order adequately complies with the standards set forth above, the Court will enter an order based on the parties’ submission. The Court makes two minor modifications to the parties’ proposed protective order: (1) to clarify the difference between a “restricted” document and a “sealed” document, and that both are options for motions filed under General Local Rule 79(d), see infra Paragraph (C)(2); and (2) to allow both parties and interested members of the public to challenge the designation of confidentiality by motion, see infra Paragraph (D). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ stipulation for a protective order, ECF No. 60, be and the same is hereby ADOPTED; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and Civil L.R. 26(e): A. Information Subject to this Protective Order

1. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(b), this Stipulated Protective Order governs the access to, use, and distribution of information designated as “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” under this Protective Order. For purposes of this Protective Order, “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” information includes documents, pleadings, interrogatory responses, deposition testimony, and all other discovery materials. This Protective Order shall apply to all information and materials produced or disclosed during the course of the above-captioned action by any party or non-party, including information disclosed in the course of discovery. 2. If a party or third party, in response to formal or informal discovery, produces information that it deems should be given the protection of this Protective Order, said party or third party may mark such information “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” and the information shall thereafter be subject to this Protective Order’s terms. 3. A document may be marked “Confidential” when the document contains information concerning the plaintiff’s own personal information. 4. A document may be marked “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” when the document contains information, the distribution of which within the inmate population could endanger the safety of persons in and the security of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and its institutions. A document may also be marked “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” when the document contains personal information concerning inmates other than the plaintiff, or current or former staff of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 5. If a party or third party, in response to formal or informal discovery, produces information that it deems should be given the protection of this Protective Order but fails to mark such information “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” at the time of production, the producing party may subsequently notify the receiving party in writing of the inadvertent failure to properly designate the information, and the information shall thereafter be subject to this Protective Order’s terms. To facilitate the inspection of large volumes of documents without the need to first affix a “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation to the face of each, the producing party also may, at its option, permit counsel for the receiving party to initially inspect the documents for the purpose of designating those to be copied, and thereafter affix the “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” designation to the copies of the documents designated to be copied. 6. All information derived from documents marked or testimony designated “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only,” such as extracts, summaries, copies, reproductions, memoranda and correspondence, shall also be considered and marked as “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” consistent with the designation of the underlying material from which they were created. 7. If any party disagrees with the designation of any information as “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” pursuant to Paragraphs 2 –4 above, said party shall meet and confer with the producing party in an effort to resolve the disagreement.

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