Judgment rendered September 25, 2019. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 52,884-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
BRENDA LEWIS Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
CITY OF BASTROP Defendant-Appellant
Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana Trial Court No. 2014-085
Honorable Robert C. Johnson, Judge
HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, L.L.P. Counsel for Appellant By: Johnny R. Huckabay, II Robert M. Baldwin L. Casey Auttonberry
HALES & STRICKLAND Counsel for Appellee By: Myrt T. Hales, Jr. Joshua L. Strickland
Before MOORE, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ. THOMPSON, J.
This matter arises from an incident in which Plaintiff, Brenda Lewis
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a spectator attending the t-ball game of her
grandson at the City of Bastrop’s Carter Park recreational complex, tripped
on an above ground support brace of a fence at one of the playing fields and
was injured. Defendant, City of Bastrop (hereinafter “Defendant”), appeals
the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff, asserting in part that
Defendant is entitled to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2795, the Recreational
Use Immunity Statute. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 29, 2013, Plaintiff was injured while attending her
grandson’s t-ball game at Carter Park in Bastrop, Louisiana. Plaintiff
arrived at Carter Park in the late afternoon that day, around 5:30-6:00 p.m.
under good weather conditions. She was walking with her daughter-in-law,
Ms. Aubrey Allen (hereinafter “Ms. Allen”), as they approached the field
where Plaintiff’s grandson would be playing. Plaintiff walked alongside a
significant distance of fencing on the way to her grandson’s game. Plaintiff
admitted at trial she was inattentive while walking, talking with Ms. Allen,
and looking for her grandson. Plaintiff testified she tripped and fell, injuring
her right foot. After hitting the ground and injuring her foot, she looked
back to see what caused her to trip and noticed the above ground pipe
stander and securing rebar partially driven into the ground. Plaintiff suffered
a fractured foot that required surgery. Joint Exhibit 3 from the trial appears below, which depicts the pipe
stander and rebar on which Plaintiff allegedly tripped.
Figure 1: Trial Court - Joint Exhibit 3
On February 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit in the 4th Judicial District
Court requesting damages from Defendant. As for her damages Plaintiff
maintained that, in addition to her medical expenses, she is unable to
participate in the activities she enjoyed before the accident and experiences
discomfort due to the multiple screws and swelling in her foot.
Carter Park is a recreational facility that is owned, operated, and
managed by Defendant. The city employees perform preparation work at
Carter Park for visitors they know will utilize the Park for a variety of
recreational activities, including participants and spectators of softball and t-
ball games. The city employees are employed by Defendant. Preparation
work performed at Carter Park by the city employees includes cleaning and
mowing the grounds for various activities, and moving and securing the
portable fencing that are necessary for the scheduled activities.
The fence is composed of portable/moveable fence panels that can be
positioned into different configurations to accommodate different needs for
2 various sporting events, such as baseball, softball, t-ball, and football games.
The ten-foot moveable fence panels each have stabilizing “L” shaped pipe
standers that are fastened to the back of the fence which allow the fence
panel to stand erect. The “L” shaped pipe stander is above ground and each
is anchored by a rebar stake inserted through a pre-drilled hole and driven
into the ground. A sledgehammer or piece of equipment is used to drive the
rebar stakes through the pipe stander and into the ground. The fence at
Carter Park is comprised of fence panels connected by pipe standers and
securing rebar at ten-foot intervals.
A motion for summary judgment was filed by Defendant on June 29,
2015. In Defendant’s motion, Defendant argued recreational immunity
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2795 and that, in the alternative, it was not liable
under ordinary negligence principles. See La. R.S. 9:2800(C). On
September 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary
judgment claiming willful or malicious failure to warn and gross negligence.
La. R.S. 9:2795(B)(1), (E)(2)(d). The motion was heard on December 22,
2015, and the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
without issuing reasons. The matter then proceeded to trial.
Bench Trial
The bench trial of this matter was held on October 10-13, 2016. The
trial court heard testimony from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law (Ms.
Allen), Plaintiff’s husband, the Mayor of Bastrop, Plaintiff’s safety expert,
and various city employees who testified they worked with the fence panels
at Carter Park.
3 Plaintiff testified that immediately before tripping and falling she was
not watching where she was going because she was looking for her
grandson. Plaintiff walked into the area immediately adjacent to the fence
panel where the pipe stander and securing rebar was located and she tripped
and fell injuring herself. She commented that if she had been paying
attention she would not have tripped. Plaintiff also testified that there were
no warning signs or anything keeping visitors from walking in the area.
Plaintiff claimed that the pathway was the only entrance to get to the t-ball
fields.
Dr. Timothy Spires of Monroe, Louisiana, performed surgery on
Plaintiff’s foot and to this day Plaintiff maintains that her foot constantly
hurts, swells, and limits her activities. Plaintiff’s husband, Mr. George
Lewis, who was not present during the accident, testified to Plaintiff’s
discomfort and inability to enjoy certain activities after her fall.
Also testifying at trial was the Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law, Ms. Allen,
who accompanied Plaintiff to Carter Park that day to watch her son,
Plaintiff’s grandson, play t-ball. Ms. Allen testified she was not certain if, at
the time of Plaintiff’s fall, Plaintiff was talking with her or looking for her
grandson (child of Ms. Allen). Ms. Allen provided testimony that she had
seen someone else trip over a different rebar stake on a different day, but
provided no other evidence to support her claim.
Testimony from city employees at trial established the moveable
fence panels were built in 1976 or 1977, and had been configured at Carter
Park weeks before the date of the accident in preparation for t-ball and
softball seasons. The Mayor of Bastrop, Mr. Arthur Jones, who worked in
4 the parks and recreation division for the City of Bastrop for decades prior to
his election as Mayor, testified that there had never been an accident at
Carter Park in the 40 years it has been open.
The exact condition of the specific pipe stander and rebar on which
Plaintiff tripped was disputed at trial. Plaintiff asserted that the rebar
extended above the pipe stander created a situation which would more likely
cause someone to trip and fall. The trial court was faced with making
credibility determinations regarding the pipe on which Plaintiff tripped as
the testimony of city employees and that of Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law, Ms.
Allen, were irreconcilable.
The city employees who testified at trial described the accident site as
though it were an anomaly to other pipe standers for the remainder of the
fence. Each city employee testified that the rebar stake in the fence was not
sticking up when they left Carter Park and that, if they had known it was
sticking up, they would have driven it into the ground. One of the
employees, Mr. Anthony Robinson, confirmed on the day of the accident he
inspected Carter Park before the recreational activities began. The
employees’ supervisor, Mr. Samuel Robinson, testified that he checked the
work of the employees. He also testified that the place of the accident was
an area behind the field that people were not supposed to walk. There was
testimony the city employees used tape to direct people away from the area.
Mr. Samuel Robinson noted that the pipe stander works as a lever when
someone leans against the fence which can cause the end of the horizontal
portion of the pipe stander to come up, pulling the rebar stake out of the
5 ground. Whether or not someone leaned against the fence is unknown and is
in dispute between the parties.
Ms. Allen, however, testified this particular pipe stander and
stabilizing rebar was not unique, and that “almost every piece of pipe there
had rebar sticking in it sticking up.” Regarding Plaintiff’s fall, Ms. Allen
testified “[a]ll I could think about was seeing that other piece of pipe, you
know, because like I said there were pipes like every six feet or so holding
the fence up.”
The trial court rejected the testimony of the city employees regarding
whether the particular pipe stander and rebar had ever been completely
driven into the ground. It therefore apparently concluded the pipe stander
and rebar constantly remained protruding above ground as depicted in the
photograph above identified as Figure 1.
The trial court also heard from Plaintiff’s safety expert, Mr. Dennis
Howard (hereinafter “Mr. Howard”).1 Mr. Howard found that there were
two holes drilled into the galvanized pipe stander used to serve as a brace for
the fencing system, and only one “L” shaped rebar was used to attempt to
secure the brace at the site of the accident. Mr. Howard testified that the
rebar should have been lying flat on the pipe, noting that it was “an
incomplete condition that created a dangerous tripping hazard.” He opined
that the rebar stake was likely left in that position by the city employee who
attempted to anchor it down. Mr. Howard did note, however, that he did not
believe that the “employees wanted somebody to get hurt or a hazard to be
1 Mr. Howard is a certified safety professional in comprehensive general practice with a subspecialty in hazard recognition, slips, trips, and falls. Mr. Howard also is a recognized expert in inspection protocol, safety management, and loss control. The trial court found him qualified as an expert in these fields.
6 left unaddressed” or that there was “any kind of malice or intent in that
way.” He testified that he did not definitively know when the inspection
occurred or when the rebar pulled up.
Trial Court’s Decision
On November 15, 2018, the trial court issued written reasons for
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, attributing 70% fault to Defendant and 30%
fault to Plaintiff. In its analysis the trial court briefly addressed the
provisions of La. R.S. 9:2795, the Recreational Use Immunity Statute, and
then focused its attention exclusively to La. R.S. 9:2800, limitation of
liability for public bodies.
La. R.S. 9:2795. Recreational Use Immunity Statute
The trial court first considered whether Defendant was afforded
immunity under La. R.S. 9:2795. It found that Carter Park is a recreational
facility that falls within the scope of La. R.S. 9:2795, the Recreational Use
Immunity Statute, and thus, the case is governed by that law.
The trial court next apparently concluded the pipe stander and
protruding rebar constituted a defective condition in the fence and that
Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of its defective fence. The
trial court noted that Defendant did not produce any written records showing
that any follow-up work was done to address any issues that may have arisen
in the interim time period between the date of the initial work of setting up
the fence and the date of accident in this case. Defendant did not present
any expert testimony to counter the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Mr.
Howard, that the rebar stake was “an incomplete condition that created a
dangerous tripping hazard.”
7 The trial court held “the city created the hazardous condition that
ultimately led to the plaintiff’s trip and fall . . . [and] the city had actual
and/or constructive knowledge of this harmful condition and failed to take
corrective action within a reasonable period of time to correct the
condition.” The trial court opined “the city failed to warn the public of the
harmful condition in this case and this was a contributing cause of the
plaintiff’s trip and fall.” Therefore, the trial court determined that
Defendant’s conduct was “willful and grossly negligent.”
With an apparent finding by the trial court of the requisite “willful or
malicious failure to warn against a dangerous condition” as required by La.
R.S. 9:2795, Defendant was then deprived of the immunity afforded for
landowners of property offered for public use for recreational purposes. The
trial court next addressed the provisions of La. R.S. 9:2800 for an analysis
under the facts of any possible limitation of liability for public bodies.
La. R.S. 9:2800. Limitation of Liability for Public Bodies
The trial court considered the four factors a party must prove in a
claim against a public entity for negligence: (1) the entity owned or had
custody of the thing that caused the damage; (2) the thing was defective and
that it created an unreasonable risk of harm to others; (3) the entity had
actual or constructive knowledge of the defect or unreasonable risk of harm
and failed to take corrective action within a reasonable time; and (4) the
defect was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff’s injuries. Hubbard v. Jefferson Parks
& Recreation, 10-24 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/25/10), 40 So. 3d 1106, 1110, writ
denied, 10-1486 (La. 10/01/10), 45 So. 3d 1102 (citing Butkiewicz v. Evans,
8 06-236 (La. App. 5 Cir. 09/26/06), 943 So. 2d 509, 513). The trial court
analyzed each of the four factors as it applies to this case.
The trial court determined that all the evidence and testimony at trial
proved that Defendant owned, operated, and managed Carter Park and that
the rebar stake that was alleged to have caused Plaintiff’s injuries was in the
custody of Defendant. The trial court further found that the rebar stake was
defective and created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. It noted the
city employees’ testimony that Carter Park was in good condition and free
from any hazards, but rejected such testimony as unreliable. It also cited to
Mr. Howard’s findings that the rebar stake was in “an incomplete condition
that created a dangerous tripping hazard.” Furthermore, the trial court noted
that, according to Mr. Howard, it appeared the job of securing the rebar
completely was interrupted at some point and never completed.
Reviewing photographs of the rebar stake admitted by the parties, the
trial court concluded “it did not appear that the pipe was properly driven
down into the ground. Moreover, no evidence was ever introduced . . . that
anyone had leaned on or in any way applied any force or pressure to the
fence brace that would cause the one re-bar that was used to help brace the
fence to become dislodged and stick up for any reason.” The trial court
acknowledged Defendant’s argument that the area where Plaintiff tripped
and fell was open and obvious, but did not comment on it further.
In conclusion, the trial court determined that Carter Park contained a
defect in the form of a defective fence brace that posed an unreasonable risk
of harm to the general public. In its determination, the trial court weighed
the credibility of the witnesses, finding Mr. Howard’s testimony credible
9 that the area where Plaintiff tripped was a hazard and no one should have
been allowed to traverse in that area. The trial court did not accept or credit
the testimony of the city employees.
The trial court concluded the pipe stander and protruding rebar was
defective and was the cause in fact of Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court
noted that, prior to Plaintiff’s fall, the Plaintiff’s “attention was drawn
elsewhere” and that if she had seen the rebar she may have avoided it.
Nonetheless, the trial court found general damages in the amount of
$300,000 and special damages in the amount of $58,180.53. The trial court
also found Defendant 70% at fault and attributed 30% fault to Plaintiff for
apparently being inattentive.
DEFENDANT’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving liability under La. R.S. 9:2795, the Recreational Use Immunity Statute;
2. The facts do not support the trial court’s ruling showing actual or constructive knowledge of the defective fence by Defendant under La. R.S. 9:2800; and
3. The trial court erred by finding damages in the excessive amount of $300,000 for a fractured foot.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in the
absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Henderson v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 03-606 (La. 02/06/04), 869 So. 2d 62, 68 (citing
Stobart v. State, Through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 (La.
04/12/93)). The issue to be resolved by the appellate court is not whether
the trial court was right or wrong, but whether its conclusion was a
10 reasonable one. Stobart, supra at 882. Reasonable evaluations of credibility
and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where
conflict exists in the testimony. Id. Where two permissible views of the
evidence exist, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong. Carr v. Oake Tree Apartments, 34,539 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 05/09/01), 786 So. 2d 230, 235, writ denied, 2001-1682 (La.
09/21/01), 797 So. 2d 675 (citing Stobart, supra at 883).
Assignment of Error Number One:
Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of proving liability under La. R.S. 9:2795, the Recreational Use Immunity Statute
Defendant argues it was entitled to immunity and that the trial court
should have analyzed the case under the standards of La. R.S. 9:2795, the
Recreational Use Immunity Statute. The purpose of the Recreational Use
Immunity Statute is to encourage owners of land to make land and water
areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their
liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes. Monteville v.
Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Gov’t, 567 So. 2d 1097, 1101 (La. 1990);
Reed v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 741 So. 2d 1285, 1287 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1999), writ denied, 752 So. 2d 864 (La. 01/07/00). When a suitable tract is
properly dedicated to one or more of the specific recreational purposes, as
defined under La. R.S. 9:2795(A)(3), the landowner’s exposure to liability to
a person who enters or uses the premises for such a recreational purpose is
drastically limited. Monteville, supra at 1101; Reed, supra at 1287. In such
cases, the owner owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe or to give
warnings of hazards, use, structure, or activity on the premises. Monteville,
supra at 1101; Reed, supra at 1287.
11 The Recreational Use Immunity Statute is designed to induce the
owners of “urban or rural land” to open them for public recreational
purposes by limiting the liability of such owners to recreational users to
situations in which injury results from (1) the owner’s willful or malicious
failure to warn of a dangerous condition or (2) intentional or grossly
negligent acts by an employee of the public entity. La. R.S. 9:2795(B)(1),
(E)(2)(d).
La. R.S. 9:2795 provides immunity to an owner of land being used for
recreational purposes against liability for injuries to persons caused by a
defect in the land, whether naturally occurring or man-made. La. R.S.
9:2795 states in relevant part:
B. (1) Except for a willful or malicious failure to warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, an owner of land . . . who permits with or without charge any person to use his land for recreational purposes as herein defined does not thereby:
(a) Extend any assurances that the premises are safe for any purpose.
(b) Constitute such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.
(c) Incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any defect in the land regardless of whether naturally occurring or man-made.
(emphasis added).
Additionally, La. R.S. 9:2795(E)(2)(a) provides that “[t]he limitation
of liability provided in this Section shall apply to any lands . . . which are
owned, leased, or managed as a public park by the state or any of its political
subdivisions and which are used for recreational purposes.” The statute
defines “recreational purposes” under La. R.S. 9:2795(A)(3), but the parties
12 do not dispute that Carter Park is a recreational facility that is owned,
operated, and managed by Defendant.
In this assignment of error, Defendant contends that there was no
“willful or malicious failure to warn against a dangerous condition.” See La.
R.S. 9:2795(B)(1). In support, Defendant argues that the testimony shows
that it had no knowledge of any potentially dangerous condition of the fence.
In general, mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk does not
constitute intent, and reckless or wanton conduct does not constitute
intentional wrongdoing. Stanley v. Airgas-Southwest Inc., 2015-0274 (La.
04/24/15), 171 So. 3d 915, 917; Crump v. Lake Bruin Recreation & Water
Conservation District, 52,559 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/10/19), 267 So. 3d 1229,
1236; Sibert v. National Oilwell Varco, 48,789 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/26/14),
136 So. 3d 283, 288. The duty to warn does not extend to a potentially
dangerous condition which should have been observed by a person in the
exercise of reasonable care or which is just as obvious to the property owner
as to a visitor. Wood v. State, Through the Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries,
43,457 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/13/08), 989 So. 2d 280, 288, writ denied, 08-
2192 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1094; Price v. Exxon Corp., 9-0392 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 11/09/95), 664 So. 2d 1273, 1277.
Once a defendant establishes that it was entitled to immunity under
La. R.S. 9:2795, the burden of establishing a malicious or willful failure to
warn of a dangerous condition shifts to the plaintiff. Doyle v. Lonesome
Dev., L.L.C., 17-0787 (La. App. 1 Cir. 07/18/18), 254 So. 3d 714, 725, writ
denied, 2018-1369 (La. 11/14/18), 256 So. 3d 291 (citing Richard v.
13 Louisiana Newpack Shrimp Co., Inc., 11-309 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 82
So. 3d 541, 547-48).
In Lambert v. State, 40,170 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/30/05), 912 So. 2d
426, 433-34, writ denied, 05-2310 (La. 04/17/06), 926 So. 2d 509 and 05-
2311 (La. 04/17/06), 926 So. 2d 509), this Court was confronted with the
question of whether the warnings provided at the Bayou D’Arbonne Lake
Spillway/Dam were inadequate, and whether this inadequacy was willful or
malicious. While Lambert was factually different from the case before us, it
provides a detailed analysis of the La. R.S. 9:2795(B)(1) care and notice
requirements incumbent on property owners with known dangers:
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2795(B)(1) imposes a duty to warn of a dangerous condition upon the owner of land open to any person for recreational use. The degree of care which satisfies this duty varies with the danger which will be incurred by negligence and must be commensurate with the danger involved. In regard to this duty as imposed by the recreational use statute, a failure to warn of a dangerous condition connotes a conscious course of action, and is deemed willful or malicious when action is knowingly taken or not taken, which would likely cause injury, with conscious indifference to consequences thereof.
Lambert, supra at 433-34 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, Defendant claims that its employees did not have
knowledge that the rebar was in fact sticking up. Defendant notes that
Plaintiff’s own expert stated that he saw no indication of intentional or
malicious acts by the city employees. Even if the city employees had
knowledge, Defendant argues that there is still no evidence that it took a
conscious course of action likely to cause injury with conscious indifference
to the consequences. See Lambert, supra at 434. We agree.
14 Plaintiff testified in open court that she was not watching where she
was walking because she was looking for her grandson. She commented
that if she had been paying attention she would not have tripped. Further,
photographs of the t-ball field reveal that the pipe standers were in plain
view. Below are the photos comprising Joint Exhibit 6 from trial, which
depict the configuration of the fencing on the day of the accident and its
supporting mechanism, the pipe standers.
Figure 2: Trial Court - Joint Exhibit 6 (emphasis added by addition of red arrow depicting one of the pipe standers)
While the pipe standers and rebar may be considered to pose a
dangerous condition for visitors to Carter Park, there is no willful or
malicious failure to warn against it. The pipe standers and securing rebar are
plainly visible as depicted above, with nine pipe standers visible at the
junction of the fence panels. Plaintiff simply failed to exercise reasonable
care. La. R.S. 9:2795(B)(1); Wood v. State, supra at 288; Price, supra at
1277. Likewise, the Mayor of Bastrop testified that there have been no
reported accidents at Carter Park in 40 years. While the Court relies on
Price, Lambert, and other jurisprudence to guide us in this decision, we note
that the case before us is factually distinguishable and unrelated to prior
cases.
Defendant next argues that the exception in La. R.S. 9:2795(E)(2)(d),
which precludes immunity from “intentional or grossly negligent acts by an
15 employee of the public entity,” applies because the evidence shows that the
city employees inspected Carter Park on the date of the accident and left
caution tape in place. Defendant also states that the employees would have
driven the rebar stake into the ground if they had known about it.
Gross negligence is the “want of even slight care and diligence” and
“want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to
exercise.” Foshee v. La. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 41,842 (La. App. 2 Cir.
01/31/07), 948 So. 2d 1171, 1178, writ denied, 2007-0483 (La. 04/20/07),
954 So. 2d 169. Taking into account the trial court’s findings, the city
employees’ actions regarding putting up caution tape near the location of the
fall is not tantamount to determining whether Defendant was grossly
negligent. Even if the city employees had knowledge and appreciation of
the risk, this does not show intentional or grossly negligence conduct. La.
R.S. 9:2795(E)(2)(d).
The photographs in Figure 2 above depict the narrowing pathway for
participants and spectators to walk between the two adjacent fields. The
condition of the fence panels, pipe standers, and rebar as described by Ms.
Allen would have been visible to all spectators, including Plaintiff. An
inattentive person, scanning the crowd of players for her grandson or
looking away during a conversation, could wander into the line of the pipe
standers and supporting rebar that otherwise are plainly visible. That
appears to be what happened to Plaintiff.
In review of the facts and trial court’s decision, we find that imposing
liability on the Defendant was manifestly erroneous and would dilute the
legislative purpose in enacting the statute and deter landowners from
16 offering property for recreational use thus diminishing quality of life
opportunities across the state. The pipe stander and rebar stake were in plain
view, there had not be any confirmed prior tripping incidents, and Plaintiff
admitted she would have avoided tripping if she had been paying attention.
Thus, the trial court erred in its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and we
therefore reverse.
Having reversed the trial court regarding the City of Bastrop’s
entitlement to recreational use immunity, we pretermit any discussion of
Defendant’s other assignments of error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court’s judgment is reversed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff.
REVERSED.