Shannon, J.
This was a declaratory judgment action involving the coverage of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by the named defendant, hereinafter referred to as Aetna, to the plaintiff, covering, for a period of one year beginning September 21, 1958, a 1955 station wagon owned by him. The policy had been procured from Aetna’s New York office by John N. Ledbetter, a relative of the plaintiff, who was, and in the matter acted as, an insurance broker. He was not an Aetna agent. The plaintiff at all times lived with his wife, Marion W. Breen, at their home in Bronxville, New York, where the policy stated that the covered car [636]*636was ordinarily to be garaged. Ledbetter was a resident of Larchmont, New York, at least until September 1, 1958.
In tbe early morning of January 25, 1959, tbe plaintiff was operating the station wagon on the Merritt Parkway, in Greenwich, Connecticut, when he lost control of the car. It overturned, and Mrs. Breen, a passenger in the front seat, died almost immediately as a result of the injuries she sustained. The plaintiff was unhurt, no other car was involved, and there was no property damage except to the plaintiff’s car.
Under Connecticut law, interspousal suits are permitted. Under New York law, they are permitted by statute, but under § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law, liability to a spouse is not covered by a motor vehicle liability insurance poliey “unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.” Since there was no such express provision in the policy, Aetna made the claim that there was no coverage of this particular accident.
The defendant Lloyd W. Anthony was appointed administrator in Connecticut of Mrs. Breen’s estate, and in that capacity, on January 13,1960, instituted an action in this state against the plaintiff under our wrongful death statute. See General Statutes § 52-555. After institution of that action, Aetna, on January 27, 1960, first disclaimed liability, and this declaratory judgment action was then brought.
The trial court held that the policy covered the plaintiff’s liability in the wrongful death action and concluded, as separate and independent grounds for its judgment, (1) that Aetna’s special defense that the contract was made in New York was not proven; (2) that the poliey contract was to have [637]*637its operative effect in Connecticut and, so, would be governed by Connecticut law regardless of where the contract was made; (3) that in any event Aetna had waived, and (4) was estopped from taking advantage of, any exemption from coverage accorded by § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law.
For four or five years prior to September 21, 1958, the plaintiff had purchased, through Ledbetter as his broker, annual motor vehicle liability insurance policies from Aetna. The personal injury limits of the policy in question were $100,000 for injuries to any one person, $300,000 for injuries in any one accident and $10,000 property damage for any one accident. The policy covered liability for personal injuries including death “sustained by any person . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the plaintiff’s car. In the quoted language relevant to this controversy, the policy did not differ from that of the policy before this court in Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 252, 205 A.2d 780. There was no exclusionary provision or any wording even remotely suggesting that inter-spousal actions were not covered, whether occurring in New York or elsewhere. But there was nothing in the policy indicating that it was made elsewhere than in New York. The general rule is that the validity and the construction of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract was made. But if the contract is to have its operative effect or place of performance in a jurisdiction other than the place where it was entered into, our rule is that the law of the place of operative effect or performance governs its validity and construction. See Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 253, and cases cited.
[638]*638In the instant case, in the declarations portion of the policy, the plaintiff stated that his residence was in Bronxville, West, New York, and that his automobile would be principally garaged there. The original automobile insurance policy issued to the plaintiff by Aetna was made up, prepared and written at one of Aetna’s New York offices in 1953. All renewal policies of the original policy were made up, prepared and written by Aetna in New York. The present renewal of the policy was prepared by Aetna at its branch office on Forty-Second Street, in New York City, prior to August 14, 1958, was signed by the printed facsimile signature of Henry Beers, president and secretary of Aetna at Hartford, Connecticut, and was countersigned by one of Aetna’s assistant vice presidents in the state of New York. The policy number and letters indicated that it was a New York policy. The policy was sent by mail from the Forty-Second Street branch office on or about August 14, 1958, to Ledbetter. He, as a broker, represented the plaintiff, who is his brother-in-law. Ledbetter received the policy and mailed it to the plaintiff. The policy was considered “issued” upon its deposit in the mail addressed to Ledbetter. There was no provision in the policy which gave Aetna the power to recall it from the insured or his agent once it had been issued. Aetna never requested either the plaintiff or Ledbetter to return the policy.
In the instant case therefore, the law of New York will apply unless the contract was to have its operative effect elsewhere. The court concluded that the contract (policy) issued to the plaintiff was governed by the law of Connecticut because the parties intended that it was to have its beneficial operative effect and performance here. This claim [639]*639hardly seems consistent with the purpose of the parties in entering into the contract. Presumably, that purpose was to fix in advance their rights and liabilities in the event of an accident, at least so far as the construction and the interpretation of the contract were concerned, rather than to leave them dependent on the fortuitous circumstances of the place of the accident. Indeed, the assumption underlying our applicable conflicts rule is that, when parties enter into a contract, they do so with the law of a specific jurisdiction in mind. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 254, 205 A.2d 780. There is nothing in the instant case to suggest that this assumption is unfounded with respect to this insurance contract. The policy gives no hint that the parties thought of this contract as other than a New York transaction. In the absence of a showing that the place of operative effect of tbis contract was not New York, the validity and the construction of the contract are governed, under our rule, by the law of New York, where the contract was made.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that (1) § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law “is mandated into and made a part of every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in . . . [New York]” and (2) the legislature intended that the statute apply “no matter where the accident occurs.” New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker,
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Shannon, J.
This was a declaratory judgment action involving the coverage of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued by the named defendant, hereinafter referred to as Aetna, to the plaintiff, covering, for a period of one year beginning September 21, 1958, a 1955 station wagon owned by him. The policy had been procured from Aetna’s New York office by John N. Ledbetter, a relative of the plaintiff, who was, and in the matter acted as, an insurance broker. He was not an Aetna agent. The plaintiff at all times lived with his wife, Marion W. Breen, at their home in Bronxville, New York, where the policy stated that the covered car [636]*636was ordinarily to be garaged. Ledbetter was a resident of Larchmont, New York, at least until September 1, 1958.
In tbe early morning of January 25, 1959, tbe plaintiff was operating the station wagon on the Merritt Parkway, in Greenwich, Connecticut, when he lost control of the car. It overturned, and Mrs. Breen, a passenger in the front seat, died almost immediately as a result of the injuries she sustained. The plaintiff was unhurt, no other car was involved, and there was no property damage except to the plaintiff’s car.
Under Connecticut law, interspousal suits are permitted. Under New York law, they are permitted by statute, but under § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law, liability to a spouse is not covered by a motor vehicle liability insurance poliey “unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.” Since there was no such express provision in the policy, Aetna made the claim that there was no coverage of this particular accident.
The defendant Lloyd W. Anthony was appointed administrator in Connecticut of Mrs. Breen’s estate, and in that capacity, on January 13,1960, instituted an action in this state against the plaintiff under our wrongful death statute. See General Statutes § 52-555. After institution of that action, Aetna, on January 27, 1960, first disclaimed liability, and this declaratory judgment action was then brought.
The trial court held that the policy covered the plaintiff’s liability in the wrongful death action and concluded, as separate and independent grounds for its judgment, (1) that Aetna’s special defense that the contract was made in New York was not proven; (2) that the poliey contract was to have [637]*637its operative effect in Connecticut and, so, would be governed by Connecticut law regardless of where the contract was made; (3) that in any event Aetna had waived, and (4) was estopped from taking advantage of, any exemption from coverage accorded by § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law.
For four or five years prior to September 21, 1958, the plaintiff had purchased, through Ledbetter as his broker, annual motor vehicle liability insurance policies from Aetna. The personal injury limits of the policy in question were $100,000 for injuries to any one person, $300,000 for injuries in any one accident and $10,000 property damage for any one accident. The policy covered liability for personal injuries including death “sustained by any person . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the plaintiff’s car. In the quoted language relevant to this controversy, the policy did not differ from that of the policy before this court in Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 252, 205 A.2d 780. There was no exclusionary provision or any wording even remotely suggesting that inter-spousal actions were not covered, whether occurring in New York or elsewhere. But there was nothing in the policy indicating that it was made elsewhere than in New York. The general rule is that the validity and the construction of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract was made. But if the contract is to have its operative effect or place of performance in a jurisdiction other than the place where it was entered into, our rule is that the law of the place of operative effect or performance governs its validity and construction. See Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 253, and cases cited.
[638]*638In the instant case, in the declarations portion of the policy, the plaintiff stated that his residence was in Bronxville, West, New York, and that his automobile would be principally garaged there. The original automobile insurance policy issued to the plaintiff by Aetna was made up, prepared and written at one of Aetna’s New York offices in 1953. All renewal policies of the original policy were made up, prepared and written by Aetna in New York. The present renewal of the policy was prepared by Aetna at its branch office on Forty-Second Street, in New York City, prior to August 14, 1958, was signed by the printed facsimile signature of Henry Beers, president and secretary of Aetna at Hartford, Connecticut, and was countersigned by one of Aetna’s assistant vice presidents in the state of New York. The policy number and letters indicated that it was a New York policy. The policy was sent by mail from the Forty-Second Street branch office on or about August 14, 1958, to Ledbetter. He, as a broker, represented the plaintiff, who is his brother-in-law. Ledbetter received the policy and mailed it to the plaintiff. The policy was considered “issued” upon its deposit in the mail addressed to Ledbetter. There was no provision in the policy which gave Aetna the power to recall it from the insured or his agent once it had been issued. Aetna never requested either the plaintiff or Ledbetter to return the policy.
In the instant case therefore, the law of New York will apply unless the contract was to have its operative effect elsewhere. The court concluded that the contract (policy) issued to the plaintiff was governed by the law of Connecticut because the parties intended that it was to have its beneficial operative effect and performance here. This claim [639]*639hardly seems consistent with the purpose of the parties in entering into the contract. Presumably, that purpose was to fix in advance their rights and liabilities in the event of an accident, at least so far as the construction and the interpretation of the contract were concerned, rather than to leave them dependent on the fortuitous circumstances of the place of the accident. Indeed, the assumption underlying our applicable conflicts rule is that, when parties enter into a contract, they do so with the law of a specific jurisdiction in mind. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 249, 254, 205 A.2d 780. There is nothing in the instant case to suggest that this assumption is unfounded with respect to this insurance contract. The policy gives no hint that the parties thought of this contract as other than a New York transaction. In the absence of a showing that the place of operative effect of tbis contract was not New York, the validity and the construction of the contract are governed, under our rule, by the law of New York, where the contract was made.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that (1) § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law “is mandated into and made a part of every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in . . . [New York]” and (2) the legislature intended that the statute apply “no matter where the accident occurs.” New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 8, 143 N.E.2d 357. As New York law is to govern, the decision of New York’s highest court authoritatively determines the construction of the insurance policy in the light of the statute. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 255; Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, 322, 123 S.E.2d 817.
The claim that the words “any person” in the [640]*640policy satisfies the statute’s requirement of specificity in including coverage in interspousal actions is without merit. Coverage for Mrs. Breen’s injuries and death is excluded by virtue of §167 (3). Nor has the plaintiff shown that it would be contrary to the public policy of Connecticut to apply the law of New York to this particular action, in which a New York resident is the injured party and a Connecticut insurance company, doing business in New York, is the insurer. Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra. Indeed, the law of New York is the same as the law of Connecticut so far as the existence of negligence liability between the spouses, as distinguished from an insurance carrier, is concerned. Suffice it to say that whether the carrier is liable for indemnity has no bearing on the liability of one spouse to the other in tort. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker, supra, 8. As a matter of fact, the premium charged for the policy did not contemplate coverage for suits between spouses. Consequently, the plaintiff is not being deprived of anything for which he contracted or paid.
This determination would be dispositive of the appeal, adversely to the plaintiff’s contentions, but for the plaintiff’s claims that Aetna has waived or is estopped to avail itself of any rights which it might have under § 167 (3). The plaintiff has alleged these claims and consequently has the burden of proving them. The court concluded that (1) even if New York law was applicable, Aetna waived the benefit of § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law by failing to inform the Connecticut commissioner of motor vehicles that it claimed lack of coverage and (2) Aetna, on the facts of this case, is estopped from relying on § 167 (3) of the New York Insur[641]*641anee Law because it failed to inform that commissioner that it claimed a lack of coverage. For a review of the court’s conclusions of estoppel and waiver, further facts are required.
The very day of the accident, Ledbetter wrote Aetna of its occurrence; that it took place on the Merritt Parkway, in Greenwich, Connecticut, at about 5 o’clock in the morning of January 25, 1959; that the plaintiff was operating the car with his wife as a passenger in the front seat; that the plaintiff reached down to pick up his gloves, and his car swerved off the road and turned over; that, although the plaintiff was unhurt, his wife was reported dead on arrival at the Greenwich hospital; that no other car was involved; and that there was no property damage except to the car itself. This letter was received in due course by Aetna.
On January 31, 1959, the plaintiff completed and executed the required Connecticut motor vehicle aceident report, stating, inter alia, that the accident occurred in Connecticut, that the plaintiff’s wife was killed, and that the insurance policy, the number of which was given with the name of the insurer, provided “at least $20,000/20,000 bodily injury and $1,000 property damage liability insurance.” As part of the accident report, the so-called SR-21 form was executed, giving the foregoing information as to insurance coverage. The plaintiff executed the accident report in duplicate and sent both to Ledbetter, who filed the original with the Connecticut motor vehicle commissioner, hereinafter referred to as the commissioner, in Hartford on February 3, 1959, and mailed the duplicate to Aetna at its New York City office, where it was received.
On February 13, 1959, the commissioner, to effectuate the purposes of our financial responsibility [642]*642law and especially §§ 14-116 and 14-117 of tlie General Statutes, sent a letter of transmittal in duplicate to Aetna, wbicb it received at its main office in Hartford. Enclosed was the bottom portion of the SR-21 form, which stated: “Return this form within 15 days if no policy was in effect as alleged by motorist.” The form also contained six questions with boxes for checking.1
The letter of transmittal contained the following: “You are to retain one copy of this SR 21 transmittal sheet for your records. Please return duplicate copy of transmittal sheet to this office immediately. If your records indicate no coverage or coverage less than 20,000/20,000 and 1,000 dollars at the time of the accident please note on the back of SR 21 insurance form and return to this office within fifteen days.”
Aetna promptly returned the duplicate copy of the SR-21 transmittal sheet to the commissioner but did not return the bottom portion of the SR-21 form or otherwise indicate that its records showed any lack, or limitation, of coverage of this inter-spousal accident. On this failure to return the [643]*643bottom portion of the SR-21 form, or otherwise to indicate that there was not at least $20,000 coverage of this particular accident, the plaintiff and the defendant administrator base their claim of waiver, and the court based its conclusions of estoppel and waiver.
There are two essential elements to an estoppel: the party must do or say something which is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do something to his injury which he otherwise would not have done. Estoppel rests on the misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other. In the absence of prejudice, estoppel does not exist. Spear-Newman, Inc. v. Modern Floors Corporation, 149 Conn. 88, 91, 175 A.2d 565, and cases cited. In the instant case, the court found that there was no evidence produced by the plaintiff to show that he, in reliance upon Aetna’s failure to return the bottom portion of the SR-21 form to the commissioner, changed his position to his detriment as a consequence thereof or that he was misled to his prejudice. Consequently, the court erred in concluding that Aetna was estopped from relying on § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law.
The court also concluded that the plaintiff had sustained the burden of proving waiver because Aetna did not indicate to the commissioner that there was no coverage for this accident when it returned the duplicate SR-21 transmittal sheet. Waiver, as distinguished from estoppel, is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Andover v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 153 Conn. 439, 444, 217 A.2d 60; Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. [644]*644Co., 152 Conn. 249, 257, 205 A.2d 780. It is not necessary that it be in express terms. It may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so. DiFrancesco v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 162, 168, 134 A. 789.
In the instant case, Aetna was instructed to “Return this form within 15 days if no policy was in effect as alleged by motorist.” There was, in fact, in effect a policy of insurance issued by Aetna with limits of liability in excess of $20,000/$20,000 bodily injury and $1000 property damage and dated with the same date as reported to the commissioner covering the automobile of the plaintiff which was involved in this accident and which had the same engine number as furnished by the plaintiff in his accident report to the commissioner. Thus, there was no occasion for Aetna to return the bottom portion of the SR-21 form. Greneral Statutes §14-117 (c), which concerns financial responsibility, provides: “This section [14-117] shall not apply . . . (1) to . . . [an] operator or owner [of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in an accident] if such owner had in effect at the time of such accident an automobile liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such accident.” Had there been another car involved in this accident or if there had been passengers other than Mrs. Breen in the plaintiff’s car, the policy would have covered them. There was a policy in effect at the time of the accident, but, under New York law, it afforded no protection to the spouse. The purpose of the question asked by the commissioner in form SR-21 under the provisions of Greneral Statutes § 14-117 (c) was not to ascertain whether the policy covered Mrs. Breen but whether there was liability insurance covering the plaintiff’s car.
[645]*645The court also expressly found that there was no evidence that Aetna knowingly or intentionally relinquished a known right to rely on § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. To constitute waiver “there must be both knowledge of the existence of the right and intention to relinquish it.” Hoxie v. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21, 40. Since Aetna had no occasion to return to the motor vehicle commissioner the bottom portion of the SR-21 form, there is nothing in the record to justify reasonably the court’s conclusion that Aetna’s failure to return it was an intentional relinquishment of the rights asserted in Aetna’s special defense based on § 167 (3) of the New York Insurance Law. Consequently, there was no waiver of these rights.
It is unnecessary to discuss any of the other assignments of error.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment declaring that the policy in question imposes no coverage for an interspousal suit arising in Connecticut and that the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company is neither obliged to defend the civil action brought by the defendant Lloyd W. Anthony, administrator, against the plaintiff nor to pay any judgment which may be rendered therein against the plaintiff.
In this opinion Murphy and House, Js., concurred.