Braymant v. W. H. Weatherly & Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Braymant v. W. H. Weatherly & Co.

165 S.E. 332, 203 N.C. 160, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 335

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 14, 1932

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 165 S.E. 332 (Braymant v. W. H. Weatherly & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Braymant v. W. H. Weatherly & Co., 165 S.E. 332, 203 N.C. 160, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 335 (N.C. 1932).

Pincite

Opinion

Adams, J.

The statement of facts is derived from the admission of the parties and the testimony of the plaintiff, the only witness examined at the hearing. The determinative facts are therefore admitted. The plaintiff was employed to drive a truck. His services in this capacity indicated his sole relation to the business of his employer. His “reporting” at Weatherly’s garage he explained to be the mere act of going there and getting the truck. He stored his bicycle at the garage and drove the truck to the store; when the day’s work was done he returned the truck to the garage and rode home on his two-wheeled vehicle. The fact that he passed the store in the morning is insignificant; his service imposed no duty there until he had arrived with the truck. In fact, two equally accessible ways were open to him in going from his home to the garage.

As used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act “injury and personal injury” mean injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Code, 1931, section 8081 (i), subsection (f). We have held that as a general rule an injury suffered by an employee while going to or returning from his employer’s premises where he is to begin his work does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N. C., 794; Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723; Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733; Davis v. Veneer Co., 200 N. C., 263; Hunt v. State, 201 N. C., 707. The facts are not within any exception to the general rule. Dependents of Phifer v. Dairy, 200 N. C., 65.

*162 The relation of employer and employee is usually suspended wben the servant leaves the place of bis actual employment and is resumed wben be puts bimself in a position wben be can again do the work at the place where it is to be performed. Ibid. At the time of bis injury the plaintiff was on bis way to the garage where be was to resume bis accustomed duties, but be bad not reached the premises or begun the service; hence, under the authorities cited be is not entitled to compensation. The distinction between actual and prospective service may be seen by comparing Baker v. State, 200 N. C., 232 with Hunt v. State, which is herein cited. Judgment

Affirmed.

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Adams, J.

The statement of facts is derived from the admission of the parties and the testimony of the plaintiff, the only witness examined at the hearing. The determinative facts are therefore admitted. The plaintiff was employed to drive a truck. His services in this capacity indicated his sole relation to the business of his employer. His “reporting” at Weatherly’s garage he explained to be the mere act of going there and getting the truck. He stored his bicycle at the garage and drove the truck to the store; when the day’s work was done he returned the truck to the garage and rode home on his two-wheeled vehicle. The fact that he passed the store in the morning is insignificant; his service imposed no duty there until he had arrived with the truck. In fact, two equally accessible ways were open to him in going from his home to the garage.

As used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act “injury and personal injury” mean injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Code, 1931, section 8081 (i), subsection (f). We have held that as a general rule an injury suffered by an employee while going to or returning from his employer’s premises where he is to begin his work does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Wilkie v. Stancil, 196 N. C., 794; Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723; Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733; Davis v. Veneer Co., 200 N. C., 263; Hunt v. State, 201 N. C., 707. The facts are not within any exception to the general rule. Dependents of Phifer v. Dairy, 200 N. C., 65.

*162 The relation of employer and employee is usually suspended wben the servant leaves the place of bis actual employment and is resumed wben be puts bimself in a position wben be can again do the work at the place where it is to be performed. Ibid. At the time of bis injury the plaintiff was on bis way to the garage where be was to resume bis accustomed duties, but be bad not reached the premises or begun the service; hence, under the authorities cited be is not entitled to compensation. The distinction between actual and prospective service may be seen by comparing Baker v. State, 200 N. C., 232 with Hunt v. State, which is herein cited. Judgment

Affirmed.

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165 S.E. 332, 203 N.C. 160, 1932 N.C. LEXIS 335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/braymant-v-w-h-weatherly-co-nc-1932.

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