Braxton v. District of Columbia

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTHONY BRAXTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 23-01000 (UNA) ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint against

the District of Columbia and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will

grant the application and dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts

that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead such

facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the D.C. Jail. He has submitted a cryptically worded complaint

that refers to his “existing civil suit” in D.C. Superior Court against St. Elizabeths Hospital.

Plaintiff seeks $20 million “in damages for abuse of process” and “a stay away order between”

himself and “the defendant (DBH),” Compl. at 1, which is not a named party in this case.

Plaintiff has not pleaded a basis for federal court jurisdiction, which is reason enough to

dismiss the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”). To the extent that Plaintiff is “requesting” a transfer of his

civil suit filed in D.C. Superior Court, Compl. at 1, only “the defendant” may remove a “ civil

action brought in a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Conner v. Salzinger, 457 F.2d 1241,

1243 (3d Cir. 1972) (“It is settled that the . . . removal statutes confine the right of removal from a

state court to a federal district court to a defendant or defendants.”) (emphasis in original)). To

the extent that Plaintiff is seeking review of a Superior Court judge’s order, which he contends

was “abusive” and issued “spitefully,” Compl. at 1, this federal district court lacks jurisdiction to

review another court’s decisions and order it to take any action. See Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113,

1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing

cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.”) (citing Dist. of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413 (1923)); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (district courts “generally

lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus

over other courts.”) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)).

For the foregoing reasons, this case will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A separate

order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

_________/s/____________ BERYL A. HOWELL Date: June 1, 2023 United States District Judge