Brave Optical Inc. v. Luxottica of America Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 31, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-00793
StatusUnknown

This text of Brave Optical Inc. v. Luxottica of America Inc. (Brave Optical Inc. v. Luxottica of America Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brave Optical Inc. v. Luxottica of America Inc., (S.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

BRAVE OPTICAL, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:23-cv-793 v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE LUXOTTICA OF AMERICA INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Defendant Luxottica of America, Inc., (Luxottica) moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs Brave Optical, Inc.’s (Brave Optical) and Western State Optical, Inc.’s (Western State) Complaint (Doc. 1) or, in the alternative, to strike its class allegations. (Docs. 19, 21). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the former request and DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs’ claims. And because it does so, the Court DENIES the latter request as MOOT. BACKGROUND1 Players in the vision-care industry don’t always see eye-to-eye. At least that seems to be the case between Luxottica, which owns Pearle Vision (PV), a “premium

1 Because this case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the well- pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). “But in reporting the background here based on those allegations, the Court reminds the reader that they are just that—allegations.” Brave Optical, Inc., v. Luxottica of Am., Inc., No. 1:23-cv-793, 2024 WL 3173504, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2024). optical retail brand,” and its franchisees.2 (Doc. 1, #8–9). Luxottica franchises the PV brand to small businesses like Brave Optical and Western State,3 (id. at #10), along with a putative class of other PV franchisees they seek to represent, (Id. at #5 (class

definition)). New PV franchisees believed they were buying into a business “that provide[d] the systems and processes [they] need[ed] to help maintain strong margins and increase sales volume.” (Id. at #9 (second alteration in original)). But Plaintiffs allege that the practice, if not the theory, of being a PV franchisee was bleak. So bleak, in fact, that Luxottica’s treatment of franchisees constituted a variety of contract breaches, antitrust violations, and torts. (See generally id.). A nearly decade-long series of developments between Luxottica, the PV

franchisees, and a third-party vision care provider (more on them later) underlies those allegations. (See id. at #15–23). And those developments revolve around the two documents that govern each PV franchisee’s relationship with Luxottica: the Franchise Agreement (FA) and Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD). (See id.). In broad strokes, Plaintiffs allege that Luxottica progressively changed the terms of the FAs and FDDs, starting around 2014, to the franchisees’ detriment. (Id.). And what’s

more, they allege that Luxottica didn’t live up to its end of the bargain under the various terms it set over the years. (See id. at #39–48).

2 Plaintiffs appear to use “Luxottica” and “Pearle Vision” interchangeably in their Complaint to refer to the same entity: their franchisor. (Doc. 1, #3). To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs’ franchisor solely as Luxottica. 3 A third Plaintiff, DH Retail, Inc., is no longer part of this case. See infra note 5. The specific deficiencies Plaintiffs allege with respect to the franchise terms and Luxottica’s actions fall into three (sometimes interrelated) categories: (1) Luxottica’s increasing control over franchisees’ eyewear selections; (2) Luxottica’s

coordination with a third-party vision care plan provider to deflate franchisees’ insurance reimbursement rates; and (3) Luxottica’s failure to secure franchisees’ customer data. (See generally id.). The Court will describe each in turn. A. Luxottica’s Increasing Assertion of Control over Franchisees’ Inventories. PV franchisees enjoyed, for a time, the “significant discretion” to select their own eyewear suppliers and lens manufacturers (so long as the supplier or manufacturer was on Luxottica’s approved list). (Id. at #23, 18 & n.16). That discretion enabled franchisees to “curate their product selection based on customer

demographics, taste, and demand.” (Id. at #23). In other words, Luxottica allowed franchisees—each of whom might serve different markets from others—to tailor their offerings to their customers’ preferences. And perhaps more significantly, to achieve that tailoring franchisees could stock their shelves with “non-Luxottica frames”—that is, frames not belonging to one of the many brands Luxottica owns—which were “less expensive” and therefore “significant profit drivers for franchisees.” (Id.). That discretion didn’t last. Starting in 2014, Luxottica began phasing in

Eyecon, “an automated supply chain system … [that] would anticipate and provide franchisees with supplies, such as frames, that they were most likely to sell based on the products the franchisee was selling.” (Id. at #23–24). At first blush, that sounds pretty good: PV franchisees would still receive a market-tailored selection of eyewear, but without the hassle of identifying its own suppliers and assembling its own purchase orders. Luxottica’s Eyecon system would handle all of that tedium. (See id. at #24–26).

But there was a catch: “Franchisees on Eyecon were limited to frame brands owned or licensed by Luxottica.” (Id. at #26). That restriction had a double impact. First, it reduced franchisees’ profit margins on a per-frame basis, since Luxottica frames were generally costlier at the wholesale level than non-Luxottica frames. (Id. at #27, 33). Second, Eyecon’s frame selections weren’t particularly marketable, since they were selected based solely on “the franchisees’ location’s socio-economic characteristics” instead of on the franchisees’ own sales history or other more specific

customer demographic characteristics. (Id. at #32–33). Moreover, the frames that Eyecon did select were “older, less fashionable, and sometimes discontinued …, reducing sales of higher-end frame brands whose customers are more style-conscious.” (Id. at #32). And “[s]ome evidence suggests [that] Luxottica is routing newer frames to preferred franchisees or other franchise brands.” (Id.). So at bottom, Eyecon “has not lived up to [Luxottica’s] promises” that it would be a boon to

franchisees. (Id.). Eyecon’s rollout was also a surprise to preexisting franchisees, whose franchise agreements allegedly “did not disclose … that Luxottica could control their supply chain and the assortment of frames they selected.” (Id. at #15). But there were signs. From 2013 to 2017, the FDDs provided to prospective franchisees grew progressively more restrictive. The 2013 FDD allowed franchisees to “buy frame inventory from Luxottica or an approved supplier.” (Id. at #18). But by 2017—and with multiple incrementally more restrictive modifications in between, (see id. at #19–22)—the FDD provided that “Luxottica selected [the franchisee’s] initial frame assortment,

required franchisees to purchase all frames, lenses, and lab services from approved suppliers, and reserved the right to require all frames be purchased from Luxottica … and [to] change the assortment of brands and [frames].” (Id. at #22). Still, the furthest Luxottica went, until 2018, was to “reserve[] the right” to exert continuing unilateral control over franchisees’ inventories. (Id. at #20–22). But then, sometime in 2018, Luxottica “effectively made [Eyecon’s] use mandatory” for franchisees. (Id. at #23–24, 32). That is, Luxottica conditioned franchisees’ renewals

on participation in Eyecon.4 (Id. at #37–38). B. Luxottica’s Coordination with VSP, a Vision Insurer, to Deflate Franchisees’ Reimbursement Rates. Luxottica’s increasing control over franchisees allegedly didn’t stop at inventory management, but extended to franchisees’ ability to contract with third- party vision insurance providers.

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