Brant v. United States

597 F.2d 716, 220 Ct. Cl. 65, 1979 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 18, 1979
DocketNo. 20-77
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 597 F.2d 716 (Brant v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brant v. United States, 597 F.2d 716, 220 Ct. Cl. 65, 1979 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127 (cc 1979).

Opinion

COWEN, Senior Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs are all retired officers or noncommissioned officers who were employed pursuant to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2031(d), and are presently serving or have formerly served as junior ROTC instructors at American high schools operated by the Department of Defense (DOD) on military bases in Europe. Prior to July 1975, each of them received as compensation an amount, which when added to his retirement pay, equaled the pay and allowance he would have received had he been on active duty; this amount included a Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ). In addition, each was furnished Government housing at no expense, or if none was available, was paid a Living Quarters Allowance (LQA).

On July 3, 1975 [55 Comp. Gen. 44], the Comptroller General issued a decision holding that under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2031(d), plaintiffs were not entitled to receive the Basic Allowance for Quarters if they were occupying rent-free Government-furnished quarters. As a result of that decision, the DOD stopped the inclusion of BAQ or LQA in the compensation received by the junior ROTC instructors . occupying Government housing. Also, the [68]*68Department discontinued the payment of a combination of LQA and BAQ paid to those plaintiffs who were not assigned to Government housing — thereafter they received only BAQ.

In this suit, plaintiffs seek recovery of the additional allowances which they had received prior to the decision of the Comptroller General. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment present only questions of law, and since we have concluded that the Comptroller General’s decision is a correct interpretation of the applicable statute, we hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.

I.

The statutory authority under which plaintiffs were employed as junior ROTC instructors, is contained in 10 U.S.C. 2031 (1970) and provides:

§ 2031. Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.
* * * * *
(c) The Secretary of the military department concerned shall, to support the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program—
(1) detail officers and noncommissioned officers of an armed force under his jurisdiction to institutions having units of the Corps as administrators and instructors;
* * * * *
(d) Instead of, or in addition to, detailing officers and noncommissioned officers on active duty under subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of the military department concerned may authorize qualified institutions to employ, as administrators and instructors in the program, retired officers and noncommissioned officers * * * whose qualifications are approved by the Secretary and the institution concerned and who request such employment, subject to the following:
(1) Retired members so employed are entitled to receive their retired or retainer pay and an additional amount of not more than the difference between their retired pay and the active duty pay and allowances which they would receive if ordered to active duty, and one-half of that additional amount shall be paid to the institution concerned by the Secretary of the military [69]*69department concerned from funds appropriated for that purpose.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such a retired member is not, while so employed, considered to be on active duty or inactive duty training for any purpose. [Emphasis added.]

As shown, 10 U.S.C. 2031(d)(1) expressly prescribes a limitation on the amount of compensation which such instructors may be paid. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. To prevail, plaintiffs must show that if they had been called to active duty, they would have been entitled to BAQ and at the same time to free Government housing. The conditions under which the payment of BAQ to active-duty personnel is made are set forth in 37 U.S.C. 403 (1970). That section specifically provides that where a member of the uniformed services is assigned to quarters appropriate to his grade, rank or rating, and adequate for himself and his dependents, he is not entitled to a Basic Allowance for Quarters.

Plaintiffs’ second contention, that when not assigned to free quarters, they are entitled to both BAQ and LQA, is likewise contrary to the language of the statute. LQA is the civilian counterpart to BAQ, and is provided to reimburse Federal civilian employees serving overseas for housing costs when not assigned to Government quarters. 5 U.S.C. 5923(2). In essence, plaintiffs maintain they were entitled to a double housing allowance — the allowance provided for military personnel, as well as a similar allowance provided for civilian Government employees.

Generally, the language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent. Congress often expresses its purpose in the customary meaning of the language employed. When the requirements of a statute are detailed and specific, as they are in this case, they must be applied with precision. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 91, 92 (1968). Here, the limitation on the amount of allowances which plaintiffs were entitled to receive is couched in emphatic, mandatory language. In the face of such clarity, we cannot understand plaintiffs’ contention that the statute does not set a ceiling on the allowances to which they were entitled.

[70]*70II.

Normally, in a situation where the governing statute is as clear and explicit as it is here, there is no occasion to resort to the legislative history. However, plaintiffs have advanced an argument based on the provisions of 20 U.S.C. 905 and 5 U.S.C. 5923, both relating to allowances in lieu of free public housing for civilian teachers and other civilian employees working abroad. 20 U.S.C. 905 provides:

(a) Under regulations which shall be prescribed by or under authority of the President, each teacher (other than a teacher employed in a substitute capacity) shall be entitled, in addition to basic compensation, to quarters, quarters allowance, and storage as provided by this section.
(b) Each teacher (other than a teacher employed in a substitute capacity) shall be entitled, for each school year for which he performs services as a teacher, to quarters or a quarters allowance equal to those authorized by the Act of June 26, 1930. [Emphasis added.]

5 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
597 F.2d 716, 220 Ct. Cl. 65, 1979 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brant-v-united-states-cc-1979.