Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.

664 F. Supp. 1193, 41 Educ. L. Rep. 153, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 6, 1987
Docket85 C 357
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 664 F. Supp. 1193 (Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1193, 41 Educ. L. Rep. 153, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

Opinion

*1194 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

Suing as the assignee of Crescent Corporation (“Crescent”), William A. Brandt, Jr. (“Brandt”) charges Schal Associates, Inc. (“Schal”), Richard C. Halpern (“Halpern”) and Evans N. Spileos (“Spileos”) (collectively “Schal Defendants”) and Northwestern University (“Northwestern”) with having violated:

1. the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d) (each further citation to Title 18’s RICO provisions will simply take the form “Section —”); and
2. state common law. 1

Despite the nearly 2V2 year life of this action, it still remains in the pleading stage. 2 Now Schal Defendants and Northwestern have again moved under Fed.R. Civ.P. (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for dismissal of the RICO claims. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, Northwestern’s motion is granted and Schal Defendants’ motion is denied.

Facts 3

Schal manages the construction of highrise buildings (¶ 3). Both Halpern and Spileos are officers, directors, employees and principal shareholders of Schal 01 ¶ 5 and 6). Schal was engaged to act as agent for:

1. M.O.W. in procuring the design and construction of the “One Mag Mile Project” 0124);
2. Northwestern in procuring the design and construction of its law school building (“Northwestern Project”) (¶ 7); and
3. Chicago Board Options Exchange (“CBOE”) in procuring the design and construction of the “CBOE Project” (¶ 29).

One Mag Mile Project

On January 22, 1981 Schal, acting for M.O.W., hired Crescent to furnish and install the window wall system for the One Mag Mile Project for $4,885,000 0018 and 24). After Crescent had begun work on the project, Schal issued numerous directives calling for extra work (¶43), including 26 change orders that added $491,-996.69 to the contract amount (Ilf 26 and 36(g)). Those directives were “coupled with promises to pay Crescent for the goods and services provided” (¶ 36(g)).

In connection with the One Mag Mile Project, Schal also issued six backcharges to Crescent (totaling $9,956.10) between March 17, 1983 and February 1, 1984 (10136(a)-(f)). Each backcharge represented that Schal had incurred additional costs because of Crescent’s actions, so the back- *1195 charge amounts would be deducted from the monies due Crescent upon completion of the project (id.).

Crescent has completed all contract and extra work on the One Mag Mile Project. It is still owed $731,268.59 for that work (Ml 27 and 28).

Northwestern Project

On August 27, 1982 Schal, acting for Northwestern, hired Crescent to furnish and install a complete interior and exterior curtainwall and store front system (the “curtainwall system”) for the Northwestern Project at a cost of $3,855,000 (¶¶ 10 and 14). As it turned out, the structural steel framing for the Northwestern Project had design defects, causing the framing to be inadequate for the curtainwall system (¶ 17). Defendants knew of those defects when they negotiated and executed the contract with Crescent, but they concealed the flaws from Crescent until October 1982 (id.).

At Schal’s request Crescent undertook the redesign of the curtainwall system and assisted Northwestern in finding a satisfactory solution to the engineering and design problems (MI 19-20). Schal and Northwest ern assured Crescent that upon completion of the project change orders would be issued to cover Crescent’s increased costs of $3,639,888 (Ml 20-21 and 35(a)).

Schal also issued 26 backcharges to Crescent (totaling $285,606.51) between October 11, 1983 and November 16, 1984 (MI 35(b)-(aa)). Here too, each backcharge represented that Schal had incurred additional costs because of Crescent’s actions, so the backcharge amounts would be deducted from the monies due Crescent upon completion of the project (¶ 34(a)(3)).

Crescent has also fully performed all contract and extra work on the Northwestern Project. It is still owed $4,086,146.40 for that work (1123).

CBOE Project

On November 2, 1982 Schal, acting as agent for CBOE, hired Crescent to furnish and install the window wall system for the CBOE Project for $700,000 (¶1¶ 8 and 29). After Crescent began that work, Schal issued 18 change orders to the basic contract, covering additional work costing $172,498.37 (¶ 31).

Crescent completed all contract and extra work on the CBOE Project April 23, 1984. It is still owed $8,212.50 (Ml 32 and 33).

RICO Allegations

To some extent the Complaint’s RICO allegations are not only fact-conclusory in nature (something both permissible and desirable under the Rules’ notice-pleading regime) but also legal-conclusory (something that poses problems in meeting the “well-pleaded” standard — see n. 3). This recital will nevertheless credit the allegations as made, without any effort to cull out any that might be viewed as technically deficient:

1. On an unknown date Schal, Halpern and Spileos entered into a contract and association-in-fact (“Schal Enterprise”) “whereby they undertook to use their position as Construction Manager of the Northwestern, One Mag Mile and CBOE Projects and the fact that there were common contractors and subcontractors on many of the same aspects of each of said Projects, so as to exert pressure on subcontractors to accept false and fraudulent backcharges with respect to such projects by the expedient of refusing to pay said contractors monies rightfully due to them on companion projects over which said defendants had control” (¶ 8).
2. Schal Defendants entered into an agreement in connection with the One Mag Mile Project (¶ 34):
(a) to induce Crescent to perform extra work on that project by authorizing the performance of extra work (for which they intended not to pay Crescent), making it economically impossible for Crescent to withdraw from, rather than perform extra work on, the project;
(b) “to attempt to enhance defendants’ bargaining position at the time that the One Mag Mile Project would be completed and the negotiated closeout of the Crescent contract and com *1196 pensation for its extra work become [sic] necessary,” by mailing Crescent false backcharges; and
(c) to coerce Crescent into foregoing its claims for extra compensation and into accepting the false backcharges on the One Mag Mile Project by refusing to pay Crescent money owed it from work on the Northwestern and CBOE Projects unless Crescent accepted the backcharges.

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Bluebook (online)
664 F. Supp. 1193, 41 Educ. L. Rep. 153, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandt-v-schal-associates-inc-ilnd-1987.