Bramhall v. Cyprus Credit Union

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-4056
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 23-4056 Document: 010110997715 Date Filed: 02/09/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 9, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court EARL E. BRAMHALL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 23-4056 (D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00477-RJS) CYPRESS CREDIT UNION; (D. Utah) BROOKE BENNION; SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; SIMARJIT S. GILL; ROBERT N. PARRISH; MELANIE M. SERASSIO; STEVEN C. GIBBONS; NATHANIEL J. SANDERS; NATHAN J. EVERSHED; CHOU CHOU COLLINS; THOMAS V. LOPRESTO, II; CRAIG STANGER; JARED W. RASBAND,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

CHRISTINA P. ORTEGA; GREGORY N. FERBRACHE; JARED N. PARRISH,

Defendants. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Appellate Case: 23-4056 Document: 010110997715 Date Filed: 02/09/2024 Page: 2

_________________________________

This appeal grew out of the prosecution of Mr. Earl Bramhall for

making a terroristic threat. After roughly nine years and two trials, Mr.

Bramhall obtained an acquittal. He then sued various individuals and

entities. Only one of these defendants is involved in this appeal: The

district attorney of Salt Lake County.

The claim against the district attorney involves the denial of a speedy

trial. On this claim, the district court granted summary judgment to the

district attorney, concluding that the delays hadn’t violated Mr. Bramhall’s

right to a speedy trial. For this conclusion, the court reasoned in part that

most of the delays had resulted from defense counsel’s motions for

continuances, three changes in defense counsel, and numerous competency

evaluations requested by defense counsel.

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

2 Appellate Case: 23-4056 Document: 010110997715 Date Filed: 02/09/2024 Page: 3

Ten Continuances of the Trial Vacated Trial Reason for Continuance Settings January 6–8, 2009 Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel February 10–12, Petition to determine competency filed by Mr. 2009 Bramhall’s counsel March 30–April 1, Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel 2010 September 14–16, Stipulation for competency evaluation “based 2010 primarily on the concerns of [Mr. Bramhall’s counsel]” April 26–29, 2011 Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel October 4–7, 2011 Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel and Mr. Bramhall’s pro se motion to represent himself January 30– Petition to determine competency filed by Mr. February 3, 2012 Bramhall’s counsel and Mr. Bramhall’s pro se motion to remove his attorneys September 29– Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel October 3, 2014 January 5–9, 2015 Unopposed motion to continue filed by the prosecution to allow Mr. Bramhall to meet the statutory notice requirements for an expert witness he intended to utilize at trial September 19–21, Motion to continue filed by Mr. Bramhall’s counsel 2016

Mr. Bramhall insists that the court disregarded his personal harm

from the 4+ years that he had spent in pretrial detention. According to Mr.

Bramhall, the district court mistakenly assumed that he hadn’t suffered any

harm from his pretrial confinement while his attorneys continued to delay

the trial.

Mr. Bramhall has misinterpreted the district court’s ruling. The court

didn’t overlook Mr. Bramhall’s harm from his pretrial detention; the court

simply applied the appropriate test for the denial of a speedy trial. See

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Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Under that test, the court must

consider the reasons for the delay. Id. at 530–31. These reasons, as Mr.

Bramhall acknowledges, largely involved his attorney’s requests for

continuances and competency evaluations. The court wasn’t disregarding

Mr. Bramhall’s understandable frustration with his pretrial confinement.

Though the delay harmed Mr. Bramhall, the Court couldn’t disregard his

attorneys’ requests for more time and for competency evaluations. See

Vermont v. Brillon, 566 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2009) (stating that the court must

consider whether the defense attorney had requested the continuances

because the attorney is acting as the defendant’s agent in the litigation).

In his reply brief, Mr. Bramhall suggests false imprisonment (p. 19)

and nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence (p. 20). But Mr. Bramhall did

not sue the district attorney for false imprisonment or nondisclosure of

exculpatory evidence. To the contrary, Mr. Bramhall sued the district

attorney for denial of the right to a speedy trial. And in adjudicating that

claim, the district court didn’t overlook or minimize Mr. Bramhall’s

4+ years in pretrial confinement. So we affirm the award of summary

judgment to the district attorney.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge