NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY WRIGHT, No. 20-56046
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00566-PLA
v. MEMORANDUM* JEFF MACOMBER, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Paul L. Abrams, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 3, 2024 Pasadena, California
Before: SANCHEZ and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,** Chief District Judge.
Bradley Wright (“Petitioner”) appeals the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon. As he did below, Petitioner argues that the state trial court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. violated his right to due process by excluding his expert’s testimony and denying
his request for a continuance to find a replacement. See Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588–91 (1964).
We review a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition de novo.
Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), when, as here,
a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits, we may grant relief
only if “the state court's decision was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Sherman v.
Gittere, 92 F.4th 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2))
(quotation marks omitted). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
and 2253(a). We affirm.1
1. Petitioner contends that the California Court of Appeals (“CCA”)
based its decision to affirm the state trial court’s ruling on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in his case. We must
review the decision using the same framework used by the CCA. Brumfield v.
1 We grant Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice of his expert’s proposed presentation and transcript of his expert’s testimony in a prior case.
2 Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313 (2015). “We may not characterize . . . state-court factual
determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [we] would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.’” Id. at 313–14 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). If “‘[r]easonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas
review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.’”
Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
333, 341–342 (2006)).
A state court may make an unreasonable determination of the facts by
neglecting to make a finding of fact when it should have done so, making factual
findings under a misapprehension as to the correct legal standard, engaging in a
defective fact-finding process, or ignoring evidence that supports the petitioner’s
claim. See Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Taylor v.
Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by
Murray, 745 F.3d at 999–1000). Here, the CCA made reasonable factual
determinations when it upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of
Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Bruce Krell (“Dr. Krell”). It accurately described Dr.
Krell’s detailed testimony regarding his training and experience. The CCA noted
that Dr. Krell had a PhD in applied mathematics, taught a ballistics class at a
Marine sniper school, and had testified 25 or 30 times as an expert, including 15 or
3 20 times as a ballistics expert. Unlike the state court in Kipp, the CCA did not
ignore evidence that supported Petitioner’s claim. See 971 F.3d at 955.
Petitioner’s disagreement is with the conclusions the CCA made based on the facts
of his case rather than with its determination of the facts themselves.
Petitioner’s contention that the CCA made an unreasonable determination of
the facts when it upheld the trial court’s decision to deny his request for a
continuance is similarly mistaken. The CCA recounted that Dr. Krell was
appointed from the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s criminal expert panel
while Petitioner was pro se and that the prosecution never challenged Dr. Krell’s
qualifications at Petitioner’s first trial. The CCA found that the prosecution
expressed concerns about Dr. Krell to defense counsel several months before
Petitioner’s second trial while noting that the prosecution and defense disagreed
about the nature of these concerns. The CCA correctly stated that Petitioner never
suggested that he could find a qualified expert who would have shared Dr. Krell’s
opinion. Petitioner’s disagreement is with the CCA’s conclusions, such as its
determination that he would not have benefited from a continuance, rather than
with the facts it relied upon to reach its conclusions.
2. Petitioner also argues that the CCA’s decision was contrary to, and an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court. “A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established
4 Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court confronts a set
of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the
Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent.”
Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). “[U]nder the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. We cannot
grant a petition “simply because [we] conclude[] in [our] independent judgment
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY WRIGHT, No. 20-56046
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00566-PLA
v. MEMORANDUM* JEFF MACOMBER, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Paul L. Abrams, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 3, 2024 Pasadena, California
Before: SANCHEZ and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,** Chief District Judge.
Bradley Wright (“Petitioner”) appeals the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon. As he did below, Petitioner argues that the state trial court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. violated his right to due process by excluding his expert’s testimony and denying
his request for a continuance to find a replacement. See Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588–91 (1964).
We review a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition de novo.
Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Pursuant to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), when, as here,
a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits, we may grant relief
only if “the state court's decision was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Sherman v.
Gittere, 92 F.4th 868, 875 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2))
(quotation marks omitted). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
and 2253(a). We affirm.1
1. Petitioner contends that the California Court of Appeals (“CCA”)
based its decision to affirm the state trial court’s ruling on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in his case. We must
review the decision using the same framework used by the CCA. Brumfield v.
1 We grant Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice of his expert’s proposed presentation and transcript of his expert’s testimony in a prior case.
2 Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313 (2015). “We may not characterize . . . state-court factual
determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [we] would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.’” Id. at 313–14 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). If “‘[r]easonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas
review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.’”
Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 (alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S.
333, 341–342 (2006)).
A state court may make an unreasonable determination of the facts by
neglecting to make a finding of fact when it should have done so, making factual
findings under a misapprehension as to the correct legal standard, engaging in a
defective fact-finding process, or ignoring evidence that supports the petitioner’s
claim. See Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Taylor v.
Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by
Murray, 745 F.3d at 999–1000). Here, the CCA made reasonable factual
determinations when it upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of
Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Bruce Krell (“Dr. Krell”). It accurately described Dr.
Krell’s detailed testimony regarding his training and experience. The CCA noted
that Dr. Krell had a PhD in applied mathematics, taught a ballistics class at a
Marine sniper school, and had testified 25 or 30 times as an expert, including 15 or
3 20 times as a ballistics expert. Unlike the state court in Kipp, the CCA did not
ignore evidence that supported Petitioner’s claim. See 971 F.3d at 955.
Petitioner’s disagreement is with the conclusions the CCA made based on the facts
of his case rather than with its determination of the facts themselves.
Petitioner’s contention that the CCA made an unreasonable determination of
the facts when it upheld the trial court’s decision to deny his request for a
continuance is similarly mistaken. The CCA recounted that Dr. Krell was
appointed from the Los Angeles County Superior Court’s criminal expert panel
while Petitioner was pro se and that the prosecution never challenged Dr. Krell’s
qualifications at Petitioner’s first trial. The CCA found that the prosecution
expressed concerns about Dr. Krell to defense counsel several months before
Petitioner’s second trial while noting that the prosecution and defense disagreed
about the nature of these concerns. The CCA correctly stated that Petitioner never
suggested that he could find a qualified expert who would have shared Dr. Krell’s
opinion. Petitioner’s disagreement is with the CCA’s conclusions, such as its
determination that he would not have benefited from a continuance, rather than
with the facts it relied upon to reach its conclusions.
2. Petitioner also argues that the CCA’s decision was contrary to, and an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court. “A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established
4 Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court confronts a set
of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the
Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent.”
Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). “[U]nder the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. We cannot
grant a petition “simply because [we] conclude[] in [our] independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
Petitioner maintains that the CCA’s decision was contrary to Chambers
because it failed to consider the impact of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in
total. 410 U.S. at 298. Petitioner asks that we consider whether the trial court’s
decisions, in conjunction, “denied him a trial in accord with traditional and
fundamental standards of due process.” Id. at 302.
However, the trial court’s decision to deny his request for a continuance was
not an evidentiary ruling. Petitioner fails to identify another evidentiary ruling that
5 the CCA should have considered along with the trial court’s decision to exclude
Dr. Krell’s testimony. Chambers does not clearly establish that a trial court’s
evidentiary ruling, when considered with its decision to deny a request for a
continuance, may amount to a violation of an individual’s right to due process.
The CCA’s application of Chambers was also reasonable. The CCA relied
upon evidence in the record, such as Dr. Krell’s lack of formal training in bullet
trajectory and crime scene reconstruction, to uphold the trial court’s decision. That
jurists may disagree whether it was correct to uphold the trial court’s exclusion of
Dr. Krell’s testimony and not delay trial further does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden
under AEDPA. See Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508–09 (2013) (“It is settled
that a federal habeas court may overturn a state court’s application of federal law
only if it is so erroneous that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.’”
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011))).
AFFIRMED.