1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Bradley Wealth LLC, No. CV-25-03659-PHX-MTL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Brandon Scott, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is a discovery dispute regarding Plaintiff’s request seeking a 16 forensic examination of Defendants’ electronic devices. (Doc. 72.) The Court construes 17 this filing as Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. The Court will deny the Motion. 18 I. 19 Plaintiff Bradley Wealth, LLC is a Scottsdale-based financial advisory firm that has 20 provided investment and financial planning services since 2009. (Doc. 2 at 1.) On 21 September 9, 2025, three employees—Brandon Scott, Alex Cohen, and Jacob 22 Hall—abruptly resigned. (Id. at 4.) Less than a month later, on October 2, 2025, Plaintiff 23 filed this action against Scott, Cohen, Hall, and their new firm, 3Roots Wealth Partners, 24 LLC. (Doc. 1.) The complaint asserts numerous claims, including trade secret 25 misappropriation under federal and state law, computer fraud, breach of contract, breach 26 of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, tortious interference, conversion, civil conspiracy, 27 and unjust enrichment. (Id.) 28 On October 7, 2025, the Court granted a narrow injunction prohibiting Defendants 1 from using Plaintiff’s trade secrets or confidential information to contact clients. (Doc. 12.) 2 A few weeks later, the Court entered the parties’ stipulated preliminary injunction on 3 similar terms. (Doc. 26.) 4 In November 2025, Defendants filed an amended answer and counterclaims against 5 Bradley Wealth, LLC, Michael Bradley, and several related entities. (Doc. 33.) The 6 counterclaims assert breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied 7 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and 8 declaratory relief. (Id.) Defendants also seek relief under A.R.S. § 29-3701, as well as 9 accounting and indemnification. (Id.) The Court has since adjudicated two discovery 10 disputes: a motion to intervene from a nonparty who sought clarity on the terms of the 11 injunction (Doc. 43) and a motion to quash subpoenas (Doc. 54). 12 II. 13 District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. 14 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), 15 a party may request another party to produce, and permit it to inspect, sample, test, and 16 copy electronically stored information (“ESI”) so long as it is within the scope of Rule 17 26(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. This is not meant to create a “routine right of direct access to 18 a party’s electronic information system.” Juul Labs, Inc. v. Chou, No. 19 2:21-CV-03056-DSF-PDX, 2022 WL 2161062, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2022) (citation 20 modified). Instead, “‘[a] forensic examination of an opposing party’s computer is 21 considered an extraordinary remedy.’” Id. at *2 (quoting MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat’l Prods. 22 Ltd., No. CV 10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 WL 12886446, at *2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 23 2012)). 24 “The Ninth Circuit has not provided a specific standard for when a Court should 25 order a forensic examination.” P&B Franchise, LLC v. Dawson, No. 26 CV-23-00784-PHX-SMB, 2024 WL 326956, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2024). “However, 27 several courts within the Circuit have only found forensic imaging warranted where there 28 is more than a suspicion that the opposing party has intentionally destroyed evidence or 1 committed other discovery misconduct.” Id. (collecting cases). 2 Courts also “consider whether the examination will reveal relevant information that 3 is proportional to the needs of the case given any possible privacy or confidentiality 4 concerns.” Citizens Bus. Bank v. Mission Bank, No. 5:22-CV-01473-FLA (SPX), 2024 WL 5 3363593, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2024). “The party seeking to compel the forensic 6 examination must also demonstrate that the benefit outweighs the burden.” Id. 7 III. 8 Plaintiff requests a Court order compelling a forensic examination of Defendants’ 9 electronic devices using the following framework. The requested order reads as follows: 10 (1) Defendants shall identify all electronic devices used during the period of September 1, 2025, through October 31, 2025. 11 (2) The Parties shall agree upon a neutral forensic examiner to conduct the 12 examination of the identified devices. (3) The Parties shall enter into a protocol reasonably designed to protect 13 attorney-client communications and the confidentiality of 3Roots customers 14 who were not formerly customers of Bradley Wealth. The temporal scope of the examination shall be limited to data existing on Defendants’ devices 15 between September 1, 2025, and October 31, 2025. 16 (Doc. 72 at 4.) 17 Plaintiff argues that this framework will not provide “unrestricted access to 18 Defendants’ devices.” (Id.) Plaintiff notes that “Defendants admit they maintained Bradley 19 Wealth customer contact information on their personal cellphones.” (Id. at 3 (citing 20 Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) Defendants kept “a Tops Down report created by Defendant 21 Scott in June 2025 containing the name and approximate AUM of every Bradley Wealth 22 customer.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 38, 46-47 ¶¶ 21, 78-79).) Plaintiff further argues that 23 Defendants gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s systems after resigning and through 24 September 29, 2025, resulting in thousands of allegedly deleted or modified documents 25 and emails and hundreds of accessed emails and attachments. (Id.) 26 Defendants respond that those points do not justify compelled forensic imaging of 27 their personal devices. Although they admit that they maintained customer contact 28 information on their cellphones, they contend Plaintiff “encouraged employees to use their 1 personal devices for work and did not treat client contact information as confidential.” (Id. 2 at 6 (citing Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) They further assert that the “Tops Down Report is 3 similarly not confidential and was created by Defendants themselves in the event Bradley 4 or Bradley Wealth lost their licenses.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 14-15, 38-39 ¶¶ 18-25).) And 5 they dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of the post-resignation access evidence, arguing 6 Plaintiff’s supporting declaration is “misleading” because it “(1) references files that were 7 already on their computers and accessed as part of their normal workday on September 9, 8 2025, and (2) does not include any allegation that Scott, Cohen or Hall downloaded or 9 transferred any confidential Bradley Wealth files (and they did not).” (Id.) 10 The Court agrees with Defendants that compelled forensic imaging of their personal 11 electronic devices is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not warranted on this record. 12 See Moser v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., No. 17cv1127-WQH(KSC), 2018 WL 6735710, 13 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (“Forensic examination is generally regarded as a drastic 14 step.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff’s proposed protocol narrows the request in some 15 respects, but it does not solve the basic problem: Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing 16 that searching Defendants’ personal devices is likely to uncover relevant evidence 17 unavailable through less intrusive means. 18 To begin, Plaintiff has not identified what confidential or trade secret information it 19 believes remains on Defendants’ personal devices, as opposed to information already 20 available from other sources.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Bradley Wealth LLC, No. CV-25-03659-PHX-MTL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Brandon Scott, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is a discovery dispute regarding Plaintiff’s request seeking a 16 forensic examination of Defendants’ electronic devices. (Doc. 72.) The Court construes 17 this filing as Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. The Court will deny the Motion. 18 I. 19 Plaintiff Bradley Wealth, LLC is a Scottsdale-based financial advisory firm that has 20 provided investment and financial planning services since 2009. (Doc. 2 at 1.) On 21 September 9, 2025, three employees—Brandon Scott, Alex Cohen, and Jacob 22 Hall—abruptly resigned. (Id. at 4.) Less than a month later, on October 2, 2025, Plaintiff 23 filed this action against Scott, Cohen, Hall, and their new firm, 3Roots Wealth Partners, 24 LLC. (Doc. 1.) The complaint asserts numerous claims, including trade secret 25 misappropriation under federal and state law, computer fraud, breach of contract, breach 26 of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, tortious interference, conversion, civil conspiracy, 27 and unjust enrichment. (Id.) 28 On October 7, 2025, the Court granted a narrow injunction prohibiting Defendants 1 from using Plaintiff’s trade secrets or confidential information to contact clients. (Doc. 12.) 2 A few weeks later, the Court entered the parties’ stipulated preliminary injunction on 3 similar terms. (Doc. 26.) 4 In November 2025, Defendants filed an amended answer and counterclaims against 5 Bradley Wealth, LLC, Michael Bradley, and several related entities. (Doc. 33.) The 6 counterclaims assert breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied 7 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and 8 declaratory relief. (Id.) Defendants also seek relief under A.R.S. § 29-3701, as well as 9 accounting and indemnification. (Id.) The Court has since adjudicated two discovery 10 disputes: a motion to intervene from a nonparty who sought clarity on the terms of the 11 injunction (Doc. 43) and a motion to quash subpoenas (Doc. 54). 12 II. 13 District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v. 14 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), 15 a party may request another party to produce, and permit it to inspect, sample, test, and 16 copy electronically stored information (“ESI”) so long as it is within the scope of Rule 17 26(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. This is not meant to create a “routine right of direct access to 18 a party’s electronic information system.” Juul Labs, Inc. v. Chou, No. 19 2:21-CV-03056-DSF-PDX, 2022 WL 2161062, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2022) (citation 20 modified). Instead, “‘[a] forensic examination of an opposing party’s computer is 21 considered an extraordinary remedy.’” Id. at *2 (quoting MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat’l Prods. 22 Ltd., No. CV 10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 WL 12886446, at *2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 23 2012)). 24 “The Ninth Circuit has not provided a specific standard for when a Court should 25 order a forensic examination.” P&B Franchise, LLC v. Dawson, No. 26 CV-23-00784-PHX-SMB, 2024 WL 326956, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2024). “However, 27 several courts within the Circuit have only found forensic imaging warranted where there 28 is more than a suspicion that the opposing party has intentionally destroyed evidence or 1 committed other discovery misconduct.” Id. (collecting cases). 2 Courts also “consider whether the examination will reveal relevant information that 3 is proportional to the needs of the case given any possible privacy or confidentiality 4 concerns.” Citizens Bus. Bank v. Mission Bank, No. 5:22-CV-01473-FLA (SPX), 2024 WL 5 3363593, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2024). “The party seeking to compel the forensic 6 examination must also demonstrate that the benefit outweighs the burden.” Id. 7 III. 8 Plaintiff requests a Court order compelling a forensic examination of Defendants’ 9 electronic devices using the following framework. The requested order reads as follows: 10 (1) Defendants shall identify all electronic devices used during the period of September 1, 2025, through October 31, 2025. 11 (2) The Parties shall agree upon a neutral forensic examiner to conduct the 12 examination of the identified devices. (3) The Parties shall enter into a protocol reasonably designed to protect 13 attorney-client communications and the confidentiality of 3Roots customers 14 who were not formerly customers of Bradley Wealth. The temporal scope of the examination shall be limited to data existing on Defendants’ devices 15 between September 1, 2025, and October 31, 2025. 16 (Doc. 72 at 4.) 17 Plaintiff argues that this framework will not provide “unrestricted access to 18 Defendants’ devices.” (Id.) Plaintiff notes that “Defendants admit they maintained Bradley 19 Wealth customer contact information on their personal cellphones.” (Id. at 3 (citing 20 Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) Defendants kept “a Tops Down report created by Defendant 21 Scott in June 2025 containing the name and approximate AUM of every Bradley Wealth 22 customer.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 38, 46-47 ¶¶ 21, 78-79).) Plaintiff further argues that 23 Defendants gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s systems after resigning and through 24 September 29, 2025, resulting in thousands of allegedly deleted or modified documents 25 and emails and hundreds of accessed emails and attachments. (Id.) 26 Defendants respond that those points do not justify compelled forensic imaging of 27 their personal devices. Although they admit that they maintained customer contact 28 information on their cellphones, they contend Plaintiff “encouraged employees to use their 1 personal devices for work and did not treat client contact information as confidential.” (Id. 2 at 6 (citing Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) They further assert that the “Tops Down Report is 3 similarly not confidential and was created by Defendants themselves in the event Bradley 4 or Bradley Wealth lost their licenses.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 14-15, 38-39 ¶¶ 18-25).) And 5 they dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of the post-resignation access evidence, arguing 6 Plaintiff’s supporting declaration is “misleading” because it “(1) references files that were 7 already on their computers and accessed as part of their normal workday on September 9, 8 2025, and (2) does not include any allegation that Scott, Cohen or Hall downloaded or 9 transferred any confidential Bradley Wealth files (and they did not).” (Id.) 10 The Court agrees with Defendants that compelled forensic imaging of their personal 11 electronic devices is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not warranted on this record. 12 See Moser v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., No. 17cv1127-WQH(KSC), 2018 WL 6735710, 13 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (“Forensic examination is generally regarded as a drastic 14 step.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff’s proposed protocol narrows the request in some 15 respects, but it does not solve the basic problem: Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing 16 that searching Defendants’ personal devices is likely to uncover relevant evidence 17 unavailable through less intrusive means. 18 To begin, Plaintiff has not identified what confidential or trade secret information it 19 believes remains on Defendants’ personal devices, as opposed to information already 20 available from other sources. That matters because the Stipulated Preliminary Injunction 21 prohibits Defendants from “[c]ontacting or soliciting, in any way, form, or manner, any 22 current or former Bradley Wealth client or potential client using Bradley Wealth’s 23 Confidential Information.” (Doc. 26 at 1.) Yet Plaintiff’s Motion does little more than 24 broadly assert that Defendants had client information and allegedly accessed Plaintiff’s 25 systems after resigning. (See Doc. 72 at 3-4.) 26 Nor has Plaintiff made the stronger showing of misconduct that courts typically 27 require before ordering forensic imaging. Plaintiff points to Defendants’ possession of 28 client contact information, the Tops Down report, and evidence of post-resignation system 1 activity. But those facts, even taken together, do not amount to specific, concrete evidence 2 that Defendants concealed, destroyed, or wrongfully withheld discoverable ESI on their 3 personal devices. At most, they support Plaintiff’s suspicion that relevant information may 4 exist there. That is not enough. See Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles, Inc., No. 5 12cv2472-AJB(KSC), 2013 WL 5212013, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sep., 13, 2013) (“[A]bsent 6 specific, concrete evidence of concealment or destruction of evidence, courts are generally 7 cautious about granting a request for a forensic examination of an adversary’s computer.” 8 (citation modified)). 9 Defendants, for their part, offer an alternative explanation—that the activity reflects 10 access to files already on their work computers during the ordinary course of September 9, 11 2025, and does not show that any confidential Bradley Wealth files were downloaded or 12 transferred. (Doc. 72 at 5-6.) At this stage, the Court need not resolve that factual dispute. 13 It is enough that Plaintiff’s evidence does not clearly establish the kind of intentional 14 spoliation or discovery misconduct that would justify direct forensic access to an 15 adversary’s personal devices. See Juul Labs, 2022 WL 2161062, at *2. 16 Proportionality and privacy concerns further weigh against the request. Even with a 17 neutral examiner and a time limitation, compelled imaging of personal phones and other 18 personal devices risks exposure of substantial private material. See Jones v. Riot Hosp. 19 Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that in the context of a motion to 20 compel a forensic examination of phones, “there is a strong privacy interest in the contents 21 of mobile phones”); Henson v. Turn, Inc., No. 15-CV-01497-JSW (LB), 2018 WL 22 5281629, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2018) (collecting cases considering privacy in the 23 proportionality analysis). Plaintiff has not shown that the likely benefit of that intrusion 24 outweighs the burden here. 25 That is especially so because Plaintiff already has Defendants’ work laptops in its 26 possession. (See Doc. 72 at 6.) Those devices are the more obvious and less intrusive source 27 for determining what Defendants accessed, retained, or used while employed by Plaintiff 28 and around the time of their departure. Plaintiff has not adequately explained why 1 || examination of those work laptops, together with ordinary document discovery and other 2|| available discovery tools, is insufficient before resorting to imaging personal devices. 3 For these reasons, Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden to show sufficient misconduct 4|| to justify the “extraordinary” and “drastic step” of compelled forensic examination of 5 || Defendants’ personal devices. The Court, in its discretion, will therefore deny the request 6 || to compel this discovery. 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 8 || (Doc. 72). 9 Dated this 1st day of April, 2026. 10
Michael T. Liburdi 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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