Bradley v. Commissioner

1 B.T.A. 111, 1924 BTA LEXIS 242
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedNovember 29, 1924
DocketDocket No. 47.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1 B.T.A. 111 (Bradley v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bradley v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 111, 1924 BTA LEXIS 242 (bta 1924).

Opinion

[115]*115OPINION.

James:

The taxpayer in this case contends that, stripped of all but the essential elements, the series of transactions whereby he acquired 50 shares of the stock of the Delaware Co. represented a mere [116]*116purchase by him of such shares from the Trust Co. for $250. The Commissioner contends that the taxpayer acquired such stock by virtue of participation in the Bankers’ Syndicate, and since the stock was worth $40 per share he thereby realized a gain of the difference between the value of the stock so acquired and the cost of such stock to him.

In our view of the case neither position as actually presented to the Board is sound.

The chronological analysis of the steps taken in the flotation of the stock of the Delaware Co. as set forth in the foregoing findings of fact, discloses the following situation at the time Bradley received his letter from the Trust Co. on August 22d and sent his remittance on the 23d:

1. The Bankers’ Syndicate had been formed and the sale of stock by the Delaware Co. in two lots, one of 83,000 shares at $5 and one of 417,000 shares at $35, had already been determined upon.

2. The option to complete the purchase of the stock of the Georgia Co. did not expire until September 20 and no present obligation to pay therefor existed either on the part of the Bankers’ Syndicate or the Trust Co.

3. The purchase of 417,000 shares at $35 by the Common Stock Syndicate was arranged for with the Trust Co. as syndicate.manager.

4. It was apparent that: (a) The Trust Co. would receive 24,900 shares of the $5 stock; (b) the stockholders of the Trust Co. would participate in the profit of the Trust Co. either directly or indirectly; (o) a distribution in kind of the syndicate stock would not require the registering on the books of the Trust Oo. of a profit on the syndicate stock measured by the difference between its cost and its selling price.

Within five days after the Trust Co. sent its letter to Bradley and the other stockholders, it announced that the public had purchased at $40 a share all the shares of stock allotted to it at $35 a share, and hence the Bankers’ Syndicate was definitely assured that its entire liability under its original commitments was limited to $5 a share on 83,000 shares of stock which was readily salable at $40 per share, as shown by the oversubscription in the Common Stock Syndicate.

It seems to us that we are dealing here, then, not. with a purchase and sale of stock but with a plan arranged to avoid, if possible, two taxable profits under the Revenue Act of 1918, one to the Trust Co. on the sale of its Bankers’ Syndicate stock, and the other to Bradley, if and when a dividend was declared of the extraordinary profit realized by such sale if made. This result was sought to be avoided by a distribution in kind. We are to inquire whether this plan meets the legal tests of avoidance or is merely ineffective evasion.

It is important to note that the Trust Co. on August 2 provided for participation by other parties in the risks and profits of the Bankers’ Syndicate but that the resolution on August 13 and the letter to the stockholders dated August 22, after the allotment of the $5 stock, read together, do not in fact call for syndicate participants but set out quite another and a more attractive proposal. It was then known that the stock of the Bankers’ Syndicate would cost $5 per share. It was proposed to the stockholders that they [117]*117deposit $195 for each share of stock held in the Trust Co., hut “ this company will divide with him the stock of the Coco-Cola Co. * * * in proportion to his holdings * * * returning to said stockholders, upon the termination of said syndicate, the amou/nt of money deposited by him, less the cost of the stock on the basis that this company acquired same.” (Italics ours.)

This offer was dated August 22d; Bradley accepted it August 23d. Three days later the Common Stock Syndicate reported through this same Trust Co. as syndicate manager that the public subscription at $40 per share had been oversubscribed 143,000 shares. The absolute agreement to return the stockholders’ money proffered in the resolution of the 13th and the letter of the 22d, read together, was clearly no empty promise; it was based upon a not surprising foreknowledge of events soon to happen. Not only by specific agreement of the Trust Co. but by the facts surrounding the flotation of the public stock it is clear that Bradley did not place any funds at the risk of the venture and that the deposit of $9,750 was the merest shadow cast in front of the real transaction, which was a distribution in kind of the common stock of the Delaware Co. to the stockholders of the Trust Co. By this plan, if success crowned the effort to avoid the tax, the Trust Co. would escape tax on the sale of the proceeds of its Bankers’ Syndicate operation, and the stockholders could assert the claim made here that they were merely purchasers of securities and had made no profit at all. The stockholders were all offered participation — a natural and significant precaution — since if any were excluded those so excluded could properly and effectively, by virtue of their rights as stockholders to participate pro rata in the profits of the corporation, prevent the successful carrying out of the plan. To make assurance doubly sure the offer was held open until August 27, the day after the Common Stock Syndicate reported on the sale of the 417,000 shares.

It is clear also that, since tire payment for the stock of the Georgia Co. was not required to be made until September 20, and the Common Stock Syndicate would receive the proceeds of the sale of the 417,000 shares long before that time, the Trust Co. was aware on August 22 (and, judging from the resolution, apparently also knew on August 13), that no funds of its own except $5 per share on 24,900 shares would be required for advances or for any other purpose in connection with its participation in the Bankers’ Syndicate.

But, even if the above be so, is the transaction none the less beyond the reach of the tax collector by reason of the fact that Bradley did pay $5 to the Trust Co. on account of e'ach share of Delaware Co. stock received by him? If it be true that this plan is adequate to this purpose, then all income taxation upon corporate dividends or distribution is at an end, for it is only necessary in order to avoid the tax upon the stockholder that the corporation contemplating a dividend purchase a suitable security, susceptible of division among its stockholders, and “ sell ” it to them for an inadequate price.

The law is not so easily defeated. It deals not alone with the form but with the substance of transactions, looks if necessary through the form to the substance, and predicates its findings upon realities rather than upon fictions.

[118]*118Tax evasion is as old as the taxgatherer, and the would-be evader has not infrequently tested in the courts the product of his fertile brain. If his plan really avoids the tax, if he actually conducts his operations outside the scope of its effectiveness, his device is said to be avoidance' and succeeds; if on the contrary he merely screens an operation by making it seem the thing it is not then he fails and suffers the consequences of failure. To this effect are many cases.

In the case of Holly Springs Savings & Insurance Co. v.

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Related

Ramapo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
84 F.2d 986 (Second Circuit, 1936)
Bradley v. Commissioner
1 B.T.A. 111 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
1 B.T.A. 111, 1924 BTA LEXIS 242, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bradley-v-commissioner-bta-1924.