Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 508 Reason: I attest to the ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-19 13:10:04 DIVISION I No. CV-20-374 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: 9.7.5
Opinion Delivered: November 4, 2020
BRADLEY SNIDER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FJV-17-412] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT, APPELLEES JUDGE AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
The Sebastian County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of appellant
Bradley Snider to his daughter, D.S. (DOB: 9-16-2017).1 His counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d
739 (2004), and Rule 6–9(i) of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, arguing that there is no
merit to an appeal. Snider was notified of his right to file pro se points for reversal. He has
chosen not to file any points in connection with this appeal. We affirm the termination of
Snider’s parental rights to D.S. and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
1 The termination of Bradley’s rights as to his other children, C.S. and K.S., has been addressed by this court in Snider v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2020 Ark. App. 502, 612 S.W.3d 199. I. Background
In September 2017, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect as to D.S. At the time, DHS had
an open case on D.S.’s siblings, R.R., C.S., and K.S. In an affidavit attached to the petition,
a family-service worker attested that DHS was notified by Mercy Hospital that Snider’s wife
had given birth to D.S. and that the infant had tested positive for methamphetamine. The
trial court later adjudicated D.S. dependent-neglected. Snider was ordered to comply with
the case plan and court orders. The trial court further noted that the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) applied because D.S.’s mother is a member of the Choctaw Nation.
Several review orders and two permanency-planning orders were subsequently
entered. Initially, Snider was incarcerated. When he was released from prison, he was slow
to comply with the case plan and court orders. He violated the court’s order that he have
no contact with his wife. At times, Snider partially complied with the case plan in that he
had visited D.S. and had stable income, transportation, and housing. Snider did not complete
many of the services offered by DHS, but he attended parenting classes and maintained
contact with DHS. The trial court found that DHS had complied with the case plan by
providing services, including referrals for nurturing parenting classes, parenting-without-
violence classes, domestic-violence classes, drug-and-alcohol assessments with co-occurring
therapy, inpatient drug treatment, counseling, intensive family services, drug screens, and
psychological evaluations. In January 2020, DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a joint
petition for termination of parental rights. In a subsequent permanency-planning order, the
trial court found that Snider had not complied with the case plan and court orders and was
2 again incarcerated. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated Snider’s parental rights
on three grounds and found that termination was in D.S.’s best interest.
II. Standard of Review
The termination of parental rights involves a two-step process in which the trial court
must find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the child’s best interest,
considering the likelihood of adoption and the potential for harm if the child is returned to
his or her parent’s custody. Holland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 205. In
determining the best interest of the child, a trial court must take into consideration (1) the
likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the
potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused
by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Id. We will reverse a trial court’s findings
only if they are clearly erroneous, i.e., if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. Id.
In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,
appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then
counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. Murphy v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465 (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)). The petition
must include an argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the
trial court level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal.
Id. (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(A)). The petition must also include an abstract and
addendum containing all rulings adverse to the appealing parent that were made during the
hearing from which the order on appeal arose. Id. (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(B)).
3 III. Discussion
Although the trial court found three statutory grounds for termination, only one
ground is necessary to support the termination. Westbrook v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258. Counsel discusses the aggravated-circumstances
ground. Specifically, the trial court determined that there was little likelihood that services
to the family will result in successful reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(B)(i) (Supp. 2019). There was evidence that D.S.’s older siblings had
already been in foster care at various times for extended periods. During the course of all of
those cases, Snider had been offered numerous services. With D.S.’s case, Snider was again
offered services by DHS, but he had completed few of them at the time of the termination
hearing. We agree with counsel’s assertion that there can be no meritorious challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of Snider’s parental rights.
There was evidence from which the trial court could consider adoptability and
potential harm. A family-service worker testified that D.S.’s current placement wants to
adopt her. A caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an
adoptability finding. Duckery v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 358. The trial
court also considered the potential harm in placing D.S. in Snider’s custody. Snider had
been unable to sit through his two-hour supervised visits with D.S. and his other children.
In addition, he was in and out of prison and jail and did not obey the trial court’s order to
have no contact with his wife. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future
behavior and may be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm should the child be
returned to the parent’s care and custody. Rickman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark.
4 App. 261, 548 S.W.3d 861. The trial court also made the requisite findings pursuant to the
ICWA based on qualified expert testimony. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
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Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 508 Reason: I attest to the ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-19 13:10:04 DIVISION I No. CV-20-374 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: 9.7.5
Opinion Delivered: November 4, 2020
BRADLEY SNIDER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NO. 66FJV-17-412] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT, APPELLEES JUDGE AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
The Sebastian County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of appellant
Bradley Snider to his daughter, D.S. (DOB: 9-16-2017).1 His counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d
739 (2004), and Rule 6–9(i) of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, arguing that there is no
merit to an appeal. Snider was notified of his right to file pro se points for reversal. He has
chosen not to file any points in connection with this appeal. We affirm the termination of
Snider’s parental rights to D.S. and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
1 The termination of Bradley’s rights as to his other children, C.S. and K.S., has been addressed by this court in Snider v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2020 Ark. App. 502, 612 S.W.3d 199. I. Background
In September 2017, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect as to D.S. At the time, DHS had
an open case on D.S.’s siblings, R.R., C.S., and K.S. In an affidavit attached to the petition,
a family-service worker attested that DHS was notified by Mercy Hospital that Snider’s wife
had given birth to D.S. and that the infant had tested positive for methamphetamine. The
trial court later adjudicated D.S. dependent-neglected. Snider was ordered to comply with
the case plan and court orders. The trial court further noted that the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) applied because D.S.’s mother is a member of the Choctaw Nation.
Several review orders and two permanency-planning orders were subsequently
entered. Initially, Snider was incarcerated. When he was released from prison, he was slow
to comply with the case plan and court orders. He violated the court’s order that he have
no contact with his wife. At times, Snider partially complied with the case plan in that he
had visited D.S. and had stable income, transportation, and housing. Snider did not complete
many of the services offered by DHS, but he attended parenting classes and maintained
contact with DHS. The trial court found that DHS had complied with the case plan by
providing services, including referrals for nurturing parenting classes, parenting-without-
violence classes, domestic-violence classes, drug-and-alcohol assessments with co-occurring
therapy, inpatient drug treatment, counseling, intensive family services, drug screens, and
psychological evaluations. In January 2020, DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a joint
petition for termination of parental rights. In a subsequent permanency-planning order, the
trial court found that Snider had not complied with the case plan and court orders and was
2 again incarcerated. Following a hearing, the trial court terminated Snider’s parental rights
on three grounds and found that termination was in D.S.’s best interest.
II. Standard of Review
The termination of parental rights involves a two-step process in which the trial court
must find that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the child’s best interest,
considering the likelihood of adoption and the potential for harm if the child is returned to
his or her parent’s custody. Holland v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 205. In
determining the best interest of the child, a trial court must take into consideration (1) the
likelihood that the child will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the
potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused
by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Id. We will reverse a trial court’s findings
only if they are clearly erroneous, i.e., if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. Id.
In dependency-neglect cases, if, after studying the record and researching the law,
appellant’s counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious basis for appeal, then
counsel may file a no-merit petition and move to withdraw. Murphy v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 426, 560 S.W.3d 465 (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)). The petition
must include an argument section that lists all adverse rulings that the parent received at the
trial court level and explain why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal.
Id. (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(A)). The petition must also include an abstract and
addendum containing all rulings adverse to the appealing parent that were made during the
hearing from which the order on appeal arose. Id. (citing Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(B)).
3 III. Discussion
Although the trial court found three statutory grounds for termination, only one
ground is necessary to support the termination. Westbrook v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258. Counsel discusses the aggravated-circumstances
ground. Specifically, the trial court determined that there was little likelihood that services
to the family will result in successful reunification. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(B)(i) (Supp. 2019). There was evidence that D.S.’s older siblings had
already been in foster care at various times for extended periods. During the course of all of
those cases, Snider had been offered numerous services. With D.S.’s case, Snider was again
offered services by DHS, but he had completed few of them at the time of the termination
hearing. We agree with counsel’s assertion that there can be no meritorious challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of Snider’s parental rights.
There was evidence from which the trial court could consider adoptability and
potential harm. A family-service worker testified that D.S.’s current placement wants to
adopt her. A caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an
adoptability finding. Duckery v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 358. The trial
court also considered the potential harm in placing D.S. in Snider’s custody. Snider had
been unable to sit through his two-hour supervised visits with D.S. and his other children.
In addition, he was in and out of prison and jail and did not obey the trial court’s order to
have no contact with his wife. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future
behavior and may be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm should the child be
returned to the parent’s care and custody. Rickman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark.
4 App. 261, 548 S.W.3d 861. The trial court also made the requisite findings pursuant to the
ICWA based on qualified expert testimony. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
Counsel notes only one adverse evidentiary ruling at the termination hearing when
Snider’s trial attorney objected to the recommendation made in a CASA report for
termination of his parental rights and adoption. The basis for Snider’s objection is unclear,
but we note that the trial court did not rely solely on the recommendation in the CASA
report in terminating Snider’s parental rights. Moreover, the trial court had received the
same recommendation from multiple other sources without objection. Tadlock v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 821, 373 S.W.3d 361 (recognizing that we will not reverse
when hearsay evidence is merely cumulative to other evidence admitted without objection).
We agree with counsel that there would be no merit to an appeal of this adverse ruling.2
Having examined the record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that counsel has
complied with our no-merit rules and that this appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly,
we affirm the order terminating Snider’s parental rights and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
VAUGHT and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
One brief only.
2 Counsel then discusses “other potential adverse issues”; however, potential arguments that could have resulted in adverse rulings are not preserved and would not constitute reversible error. Byrd v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 32 n.4.