25CA1806 Bradford v Hacienda 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1806 Douglas County District Court No. 25CV29 Honorable Robert Lung, Judge Honorable Stacy Guillon, Judge
Julio Amado Bradford, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Hacienda Investments, LTD, a Colorado limited liability company; Jose Daniel Castillo Sr.; and Mary Gatito Castillo,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Yun, J., concurs
Lipinsky, J., concurs in part and dissents in part
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 3, 2026
Julio Amado Bradford, Pro Se
Frascona, Joiner, Goodman and Greenstein, P.C., Patrick Fitz-Gerald, Caroline W. Young, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1 This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of claims brought by plaintiff, Julio Amado Bradford, against defendants, Hacienda Investments, LTD; Jose Daniel Castillo Sr. (J. Castillo); and Mary Gatito Castillo (collectively, the defendants), and its dismissal of “this matter” with prejudice. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
I. Background
¶2 Bradford signed a residential lease agreement (the lease) with J. Castillo. As the lease required, Bradford provided a $2,295 security and damage deposit. The lease specified that the security deposit could be used to address “any breach by [Bradford] of the terms, covenants and conditions of this agreement, including — without limitation — . . . the condition of the premises on termination of [the lease].” After Bradford and his family moved out of the leased premises, J. Castillo retained $2,129 of the security deposit and returned $166 to Bradford, along with a letter addressing the reasons for retaining the remainder of the deposit.
¶3 In the first claim of his original complaint, Bradford alleged that the defendants had unlawfully deducted money from the security deposit to pay for damages that Bradford did not cause and
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retained part of the deposit for reasons prohibited by section 38-12-103, C.R.S. 2026. Specifically, Bradford alleged:
• On December 29, 2024, Defendants mailed a fraudulent “Deposit Disposition Letter”
stating that the retained funds were used to pay:
• $1,750 for “water damage” that Bradford did not cause.
• $449 for blinds replacement, which is normal wear and tear.
• $180 for unauthorized cleaning charges.
¶4 Bradford also alleged in his original complaint other state and federal claims against the defendants, including fraud, wire fraud, “cyber harassment and obscene material,” violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and electronic fraud.
¶5 The same day that he filed his original complaint, Bradford filed a motion to amend the complaint to add a “claim” for punitive damages.
¶6 The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), asserting that Bradford failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Before the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, however, Bradford filed his second and third motions to amend the complaint. The second amended complaint
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was apparently intended to provide additional factual and legal bases for his claims against the Castillos and to add new claims for fraudulent business practices and unjust enrichment; the third amended complaint sought to add an expanded unjust enrichment claim against all defendants.
¶7 Without addressing any of Bradford’s motions to amend, the district court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed all of Bradford’s original claims and “this matter” with prejudice. The court largely adopted the proposed order submitted by the defendants. The image below shows the court’s order in its entirety:1
¶8 Shortly after the court entered the dismissal order, Bradford filed a fourth motion to amend his complaint and a C.R.C.P. 59 motion to reconsider the dismissal of the case. Bradford argued
1 The court crossed out eleven words at the end of the proposed
order, which originally stated, “[A]nd Plaintiff is further ORDERED to pay Defendants’ reasonable attorney fees.”
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that the district court had not considered his previous motions to amend his complaint, the court had not found that amendment would be futile, and he had adequately alleged facts to support one or more of his proposed new claims.
¶9 About three months later, a different judge was assigned to the case. The court then issued an order formally denying Bradford’s motion to reconsider, explaining that more than sixty-three days had elapsed since Bradford filed the motion. See C.R.C.P. 59(j) (“Any post-trial motion that has not been decided within the 63-day determination period shall, without further action by the court, be deemed denied for all purposes . . . .”).
II. Analysis
¶ 10 Bradford contends that the district court erred by (1) dismissing his claims and “this matter” with prejudice; (2) denying him leave to amend; and (3) failing to substantively address his motion for reconsideration.
¶ 11 We agree, in part, with Bradford’s first contention and therefore do not reach the merits of his second and third contentions.
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A. Standard of Review
¶ 12 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. “Like the district court, we must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 11. And we draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co., 170 P.3d 854, 857 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 13 Like the district court, we may consider the facts alleged in the complaint; any documents attached as exhibits to, or incorporated by reference in, the complaint; and any documents referenced in the complaint that are essential to the plaintiff’s claim. Norton, ¶ 7; Titan Indem. Co. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 181 P.3d 303, 306 (Colo. App. 2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must state ‘a plausible claim for relief.’” Brooks v. City & County of Denver, 2026 COA 42M, ¶ 18 (quoting Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9). In other words, “[t]he complaint’s factual allegations must be ‘enough to raise a right to relief “above the speculative level.”’” Id. (quoting Warne, ¶ 9).
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¶ 14 We liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se parties. Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. Still, “pro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by attorneys.” Id. And we will not make arguments for pro se parties. Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21.
¶ 15 In cases such as this, in which a district court has adopted a proposed order prepared by counsel, we “scrutinize the order more critically.” Chostner v. Colo. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2013 COA 111, ¶ 26.
B. Discussion
¶ 16 Bradford argues that the district court reversibly erred by dismissing his claims and the case with prejudice. We agree that the court erred by dismissing Bradford’s first claim for relief and the matter with prejudice, but we affirm the court’s dismissal with prejudice of the remaining claims in Bradford’s original complaint.
¶ 17 Because we review the dismissal order de novo, we are in the same position as the district court to evaluate Bradford’s claims. See Norton, ¶ 7.
¶ 18 The order does not identify which of Bradford’s complaints or the specific claims the court analyzed. The defendants’ dismissal
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motion addressed only the claims pleaded in Bradford’s original complaint; it did not address — or even acknowledge — the punitive damages “claim” in the first amended complaint.
¶ 19 C.R.C.P. 15(a) states, in relevant part, that “[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is filed.” Although Bradford filed his second, third, and fourth motions to amend after the defendants appeared and filed their motion to dismiss, a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. See Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 36; C.R.C.P. 7(a) (defining a “pleading” as “a complaint,” an “answer,” a “reply to a counterclaim,” “an answer to a cross-claim,” a “third-party complaint,” “a third-party answer,” and “a reply to an affirmative defense”); C.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) (defining a “motion” as an “application to the court for an order”). Given this procedural posture, the district court had the discretion to allow Bradford’s second, third, and fourth amended complaints. See C.R.C.P. 15(a) (“Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”); see also Grear v. Mulvihill, 207 P.3d 918, 921-22 (Colo. App. 2009) (“We conclude that the [district]
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court erred in dismissing the claim without considering plaintiffs’ amended complaint . . . .”).
¶ 20 But because the district court did not rule on the motions to amend, we address only the original complaint and the first amended complaint. See C.R.C.P. 15(a) (a plaintiff may amend their complaint once as a matter of course). But see § 13-21-102(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2026 (“A claim for exemplary damages in an action governed by this section may be allowed by amendment to the pleadings only after the exchange of initial disclosures pursuant to [C.R.C.P. 26] and the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.”).
¶ 21 We conclude that Bradford’s claim for wrongful withholding of a portion of his security deposit in his original complaint contains minimally sufficient factual allegations to survive dismissal. Bradford alleged in such claim that the defendants improperly retained from the security deposit “$1,750 for ‘water damage’ that [he] did not cause[;] $449 for blinds replacement, which is normal wear and tear[; and] $180 for unauthorized cleaning charges.”
¶ 22 The original complaint also cited section 38-12-103(1)(a), which provides, in relevant part, that “[a] landlord shall not retain the security deposit to cover normal wear and tear or for any
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damage or defective condition that preexisted the tenancy.” Id. Relatedly, the statute states:
A landlord retains a security deposit or any portion of it in bad faith if the amount retained by the landlord:
(I) Unreasonably exceeds the amount of actual damages the landlord incurred;
(II) Is retained without actual cause existing for the retention of the amount; [or]
(III) Is an amount the landlord knew or should have known exceeded the actual damages the landlord incurred or would incur . . . .
§ 38-12-103(3.5)(a).
¶ 23 Assuming, as we must, that the factual allegations in the original complaint are true, Bradford alleged a plausible claim for wrongful retention of the security deposit. Given that such claim was plausible, the court erred by dismissing that claim and “this matter” with prejudice.
¶ 24 But we agree with the district court that the remaining claims in the original complaint — those for fraud, wire fraud, cyber harassment and obscene material, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and electronic fraud — do not state plausible claims for relief. See Warne, ¶ 9. The allegations
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supporting those claims are conclusory, lack any meaningful factual detail, rely on inapplicable federal authority, and fail to address the elements necessary to establish such claims. See id. at
¶ 18 (allegations are insufficient to state a claim if they “merely [assert] a theory without alleging facts which, if proved, would satisfy the elements of the claim”). For this reason, the district court did not err by dismissing those claims, with prejudice.2
¶ 25 We acknowledge that Bradford’s first amended complaint added a “claim” for punitive damages. In the first instance, we note that the punitive damages statutes do not create a claim for relief but rather a remedy that is available in limited circumstances. See Kirk v. Denv. Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 213 (Colo. 1984). In any event, the district court did not take the necessary step of assessing whether Bradford’s request for punitive damages was properly filed. See § 13-21-102(1.5)(a).
¶ 26 Thus, on remand, the district court must determine whether Bradford may pursue a punitive damages remedy. Likewise, on
2 Bradford did not reassert these claims in his second, third, and fourth amended complaints.
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remand, the district court must decide whether to grant Bradford’s pending second, third, and fourth motions to amend. See In re Estate of Blacher, 857 P.2d 566, 569 (Colo. App. 1993) (a motion to amend is committed to the district court’s sound discretion).
III. Disposition
¶ 27 We reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing Bradford’s claim for breach of the security deposit statute but otherwise affirm its dismissal of Bradford’s other claims. And we remand with instructions to resolve Bradford’s pending motion to assert a request for punitive damages; his pending second, third, and fourth motions to amend; and any other issues that may arise consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE YUN concurs.
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JUDGE LIPINSKY, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 28 I join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion with one exception: In my view, plaintiff, Julio Amodo Bradford, neither has a pending motion for leave to file an amended complaint that requests an award of punitive damages, nor faces a pending motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For this reason, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s instruction to the district court “to resolve Bradford’s pending motion to assert a request for punitive damages.” Supra ¶ 27.
I. Procedural History
¶ 29 As the majority accurately notes, on February 12, 2025, “[t]he same day that he filed his original complaint, Bradford filed a motion to amend the complaint to add a ‘claim’ for punitive damages.” Supra ¶ 5. Bradford’s amended complaint contained no new claims or prayers for relief other than a request for punitive damages.
¶ 30 Bradford filed his motion to amend before defendants, Hacienda Investments, LTD; Jose Daniel Castillo Sr.; and Mary Gatito Castillo (collectively, the defendants), submitted a responsive pleading.
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¶ 31 On March 6, 2025, the defendants moved to dismiss Bradford’s original claims for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The defendants’ motion to dismiss did not refer to the amended complaint, much less ask the district court to dismiss it.
¶ 32 Bradford filed a second motion for leave to amend on March 11, 2025.
¶ 33 Seventeen days later, the defendants submitted a “Response to Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend and Notice of Objection” (the response). In the response, the defendants asked the district court to deny both of Bradford’s motions to amend.
¶ 34 In the section of the response addressing the first motion to amend, the defendants, citing section 13-21-102(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2026, asserted that Bradford’s request for punitive damages was premature. That statute, in relevant part, states:
A claim for exemplary damages in an action governed by this section may not be included in any initial claim for relief. A claim for exemplary damages in an action governed by this section may be allowed by amendment to the pleadings only after the exchange of initial disclosures pursuant to [C.R.C.P. 26] and the plaintiff establishes prima facie proof of a triable issue.
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§ 13-21-102(1.5)(a). There is no dispute that Bradford filed the amended complaint before the parties exchanged their initial disclosures under C.R.C.P. 26.
¶ 35 The defendants concluded their argument regarding the first motion to amend with this prayer for relief: “[T]his court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint to Include Punitive Damages.” The defendants did not acknowledge that Bradford had filed his amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a) or ask the district court to dismiss the amended complaint.
¶ 36 On May 17, 2025, the district court granted the defendants’ dismissal motion, ordering that “this matter be dismissed with prejudice.”
¶ 37 The district court never ruled on any of Bradford’s motions to amend.
II. Analysis
¶ 38 As a matter of law, the district court could not deny Bradford’s first motion to amend even if it agreed with the defendants’ section 13-21-102(1.5)(a) argument.
¶ 39 The first clause of C.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that “[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
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responsive pleading is filed.” Under that rule, Bradford required neither a court order nor the defendants’ consent to file his amended complaint. Cf. C.R.C.P. 15(a) (If a party does not file an amended pleading as a matter of course, “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”). Bradford could have filed his amended complaint as a separate document without tendering a separate motion for leave to amend.
¶ 40 The district court could not deny Bradford’s first motion to amend because, under C.R.C.P. 15(a), Bradford was not required to seek leave of court before filing his amended complaint. The amended complaint became the operative complaint when Bradford filed it, and the court was therefore powerless to reject the amended complaint by denying Bradford leave to submit it.
¶ 41 The procedural posture of the case would have been materially different if the defendants had subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Under that scenario, the district court would have possessed the authority to dismiss Bradford’s amended complaint if it concluded that his request for punitive damages failed under section 13-21-102(1.5)(a). See Adams v. Corr. Corp. of
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Am., 187 P.3d 1190, 1197-98 (Colo. App. 2008) (affirming dismissal of premature claim for punitive damages).
¶ 42 But the defendants never moved to dismiss the amended complaint. As noted above, the defendants’ sole attack on Bradford’s amended complaint was their request that the district court deny Bradford’s first motion to amend, which the court could not do because Bradford had already filed the amended complaint as a matter of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a). The rules of civil procedure are binding on litigants and courts alike; they are not mere suggestions. See Antero Res. Corp. v. Strudley, 2015 CO 26, ¶¶ 1, 36, 347 P.3d 149, 151, 159 (holding that Colorado courts lack the authority to “require plaintiffs in toxic tort cases to provide evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of injury, exposure, and causation, or else face dismissal of their claims” because the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for such procedures); see also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 736 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that courts cannot “disregard the commands” of the rules of civil procedure).
¶ 43 I acknowledge that “there are cases where dismissal of a claim may be proper even where no motion requesting dismissal has been
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filed.” Schwartz v. Owens, 134 P.3d 455, 457 (Colo. App. 2005). But courts cannot dismiss claims at will. “If the court is inclined to dismiss a complaint sua sponte, it should, as a matter of fundamental fairness, if not due process, give the plaintiff an opportunity to persuade the court that dismissal is not proper.” Id.
¶ 44 At no time did the district court advise Bradford that it was considering dismissing his amended complaint or allow him to “persuade the court that dismissal [wa]s not proper.” Id. Dismissal of Bradford’s amended complaint sua sponte, in the absence of a pending motion to do so or advance notice to Bradford, would, in my view, raise fundamental fairness and due process concerns regardless of the amended complaint’s lack of merit.
¶ 45 For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s direction to the district that “on remand, [it] must determine whether Bradford may pursue a punitive damages remedy” and its instruction to “resolve Bradford’s pending motion to assert a request for punitive damages.” Supra ¶¶ 26-27. I conclude that the district court must await the defendants’ submission of a motion to dismiss Bradford’s amended complaint before the district court may consider whether his request for punitive damages runs afoul of
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13-21-102(1.5)(a). Alternatively, the district court may dismiss the amended complaint sua sponte, but only if it first provides Bradford with the required opportunity to argue why dismissal would be improper.
III. Conclusion
¶ 46 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s instruction to the district court to “resolve Bradford’s pending motion to assert a request for punitive damages.” Supra ¶ 27. I join the remainder of the majority opinion.