Brad Dawson v. RockTenn Services, Inc., et

674 F. App'x 335
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 27, 2016
Docket16-30112
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 674 F. App'x 335 (Brad Dawson v. RockTenn Services, Inc., et) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brad Dawson v. RockTenn Services, Inc., et, 674 F. App'x 335 (5th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiff-Appellant Brad Dawson worked as a delivery truck driver and was injured while making a sulfuric acid delivery to a paper mill owned and operated by Defendants-Appellees. Dawson and his wife, Plaintiff-Appellant Charlene Dawson, sued Defendants-Appellees, asserting negligence. The magistrate judge, to whom this matter was referred by consent, granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants-Appellees Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., Rock-Tenn CP, L.L.C., and Rock-Tenn Co. (collectively, Rock-Tenn) own and operate a paper mill in Hodge, Louisiana. The mill requires large amounts of sulfuric acid, and Rock-Tenn contracted with Martin Transport to deliver sulfuric acid to the mill twice a day from a third-party. Plaintiff-Appellant Brad Dawson has many years of experience delivering hazardous cargo and was hired by Martin Transport as a truck driver around Febru *337 ary 2013. In the months following his hire, Dawson delivered sulfuric acid to the mill at least daily, sometimes twice daily, without incident.

Under Rock-Tenn’s operating procedures, the first step in the sulfuric acid delivery process entails the driver donning safety gear, including a hard hat, face shield, goggles, rubber gloves, rubber boots, and a full rubber suit. The driver next ensures that all hoses are “free from defects and void of other material.” If the hoses pass the driver’s inspection, the driver connects one of the hoses—an air hose—to his tanker-trailer to build up pressure in the tank. The driver then connects another hose—the delivery hose—to the tanker-trailer. Once the driver opens the valves on the tanker and the mill’s vessel, the acid flows from the tanker into the mill’s vessel through the delivery hose. Each offloading (involving roughly 2,800 to 3,000 gallons of acid) takes about an hour.

When the tanker-trailer is empty, a pressure gauge on the tanker reads zero, and the delivery hose begins to shake, indicating the offload is complete. The valves on the tanker and the mill’s vessel are then closed, and a valve on a pressure-release line is opened to release any pressurized sulfuric acid remaining in the delivery hose. 1 Any remaining pressure in the delivery line is then bled into an underground, plant-wide drainage system roughly 30 to 40 feet from the tanker-trailer. The process usually takes about 10 to 15 seconds. The drainage system is covered by a grate, which impedes the driver’s ability to see whether any pressurized sulfuric acid has actually been bled from the delivery hose.

On June 5, 2013, Jerry Brown, a trainee employed by Martin Transport, accompanied Dawson on his sulfuric acid delivery to Rock-Tenn’s mill. Dawson and Brown made their first delivery to Rock-Tenn’s mill without incident. On their second delivery to the mill, after the tanker was empty and the valves on the tanker and the mill’s vessel were closed, Dawson instructed Brown to open the valve on the pressure-release line. Brown opened the valve and gave Dawson a- thumbs up after the valve had been turned. Dawson then waited 30 seconds before releasing one of the locks connecting the delivery hose to the tanker-trailer. As he did so, his safety shield was blown off, and he was sprayed with pressurized sulfuric acid on his face and head. Brown ran to his assistance and used a nearby hose to wash Dawson. 2 Dawson was rendered disabled as a result of his injuries.

Two days after the accident, Joe Williams, a Martin Transport employee, inspected the tanker-trailer involved in the accident and found glass in the tanker, possibly from a bottle used to sample the acid after loading, and a broken spring in an internal valve of the tanker. After the inspection, Williams requested that a pressure gauge used to measure pressure inside the tank be replaced, probably because it “had a blurred sight- glass,” which made it difficult to see the internal needle’s operation. In his deposition, Williams testified that the faulty spring in the internal valve would have had “[v]ery little” effect on the functionality of the internal valve, and a malfunctioning PSI gauge would only affect the driver’s ability to tell when the tanker was void of pressure “some, [but] not a whole lot.” He also *338 testified that he did not believe that the glass or broken spring had anything to do with the accident.

Based largely, if not wholly, on Williams’s inspection, Steven Nattin, a Martin Transport supervisor, prepared an incident investigation report dated June 10, 2013, and an on-the-job injury investigation report dated June 11, 2013. These reports concluded essentially the same thing as Williams’s inspection: The “[trailer internal valve had a broken spring & the trailer had a sample bottle in it. This resulted in the internal & external valve not being able to seal off completely, allowing pressure to build in hose after initial bleed off.” Similarly to Williams, Nattin testified in his deposition that the internal valve would have operated even with the broken spring, but that he nonetheless identified the spring and bottle as the cause of the accident because “all [he] had to go on was [Martin Transport’s] findings of the tank inspection.”

Rock-Tenn also conducted an investigation of the accident, which consisted of “[b]asically going to the site and talking through [with the Martin Transport personnel present] what they had learned by talking to Mr. Dawson at the emergency room and [to Brown].” The investigation lasted a couple of hours and determined that the accident was caused by “a timing issue as far as opening or closing the vent whenever Mr. Dawson removed the hose from the truck.” Rock-Tenn did not inspect the pressure-release line as part of its investigation.

In the weeks following the accident, Martin Transport continued to make daily sulfuric acid deliveries to the mill without incident. However, on June 27, 2013, Thomas Kelly, another Martin Transport driver, was involved in a similar accident. An investigation concluded that Kelly’s accident was caused by a plugged pressure-release line, and the same day as Kelly’s accident, Rock-Tenn issued a work order instructing that the pressure-release line be “unchoke[d] or change[d] out.” The pressure-release line was subsequently replaced and discarded. At his deposition, Nattin testified that, in light of Kelly’s accident, he believed Dawson’s accident “had nothing to do on our [Martin Transport’s] end.”

On December 30, 2013, Dawson and his wife, Charlene (together, Plaintiffs), filed the instant suit, alleging Rock-Tenn’s negligence caused their damages. The parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge. On May 13, 2015, Rock-Tenn filed a motion for complete summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted. 3 The magistrate judge found that Plaintiffs had failed to show that Rock-Tenn “knew or should have known of any problem (assuming there was one) with the pressure release hose or valve,” as required for liability by section 2317.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code. 4

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674 F. App'x 335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brad-dawson-v-rocktenn-services-inc-et-ca5-2016.