Brackett v. Faust

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Brackett v. Faust

243 S.E.2d 667, 145 Ga. App. 248, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1935

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 10, 1978

Docket55183

StatusPublished

This text of 243 S.E.2d 667 (Brackett v. Faust) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brackett v. Faust, 243 S.E.2d 667, 145 Ga. App. 248, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1935 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinion

Quillian, Presiding Judge.

A single issue is presented by this appeal from the grant of corporate defendant’s motion for summary judgment; should we continue to follow the rule with regard to a corporation’s liability for slander by one of its agents?

The primordial authority in Georgia is Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213 (1) (27 SE 986), which holds: "A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question.” This principle has been followed by a host of subsequent cases. Any attack on Behre should be addressed to the Supreme Court since it is our duty to follow precedents declared by that court. Bickford v. Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256, 262 (235 SE2d 743). For a recent approval of the Behre rule see Garren v. Southland Corp., 237 Ga. 484, 485 (228 SE2d 870).

Judgment affirmed.

Webb, J., concurs. McMurray, J., concurs in the judgment only.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Quillian, Presiding Judge.

A single issue is presented by this appeal from the grant of corporate defendant’s motion for summary judgment; should we continue to follow the rule with regard to a corporation’s liability for slander by one of its agents?

The primordial authority in Georgia is Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213 (1) (27 SE 986), which holds: "A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question.” This principle has been followed by a host of subsequent cases. Any attack on Behre should be addressed to the Supreme Court since it is our duty to follow precedents declared by that court. Bickford v. Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256, 262 (235 SE2d 743). For a recent approval of the Behre rule see Garren v. Southland Corp., 237 Ga. 484, 485 (228 SE2d 870).

Judgment affirmed.

Webb, J., concurs. McMurray, J., concurs in the judgment only.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

243 S.E.2d 667, 145 Ga. App. 248, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1935, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brackett-v-faust-gactapp-1978.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack