Bozelko v. Milici
This text of 57 A.3d 762 (Bozelko v. Milici) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[537]*537 Opinion
The plaintiff, Ronald Bozelko, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant, Michael Milici, to dismiss the plaintiffs petition for a new trial for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant. In 2006, the plaintiff commenced an underlying action entitled Bozelko v. D’Albero, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-5009158, against, inter alia, the defendant.1 In July, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed an objection. On August 25, 2008, the court granted the motion for summary judgment “absent objection or opposition.”
On April 13, 2009, the plaintiff assigned his interest in the action to Edward Jacobs by way of an assignment agreement that states in relevant part: “I, Ronald D. Bozelko ... in consideration of $1.00 and other valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, paid to me by Edward Jacobs, Executor of the Estate of Antonina Cap . . . assign to [Jacobs] all of my right, title and interest in certain causes of action and claims, asserted or not asserted, which causes of action are now in suit and are pending in the Superior Court at New Haven, specifically, [D’Albero]
In August, 2011, in the present action, the plaintiff filed a petition for a new trial in D ’Albero. In his petition, he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because he never received notice of the order granting the motion for summary judgment and because there was reasonable cause to grant a new trial, as the matter had [538]*538not been adjudicated on the merits. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition for a new trial because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the petition for a new trial. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that, pursuant to the assignment agreement, the plaintiff assigned his right, title and interest in the underlying action to Jacobs and that the plaintiff no longer had a specific, personal and legal interest in the matter. The court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the petition for a new trial.
“The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. . . . Because a determination regarding the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, [the standard of] review is plenary. . . . Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213-15, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).
[539]*539The plaintiff claims that he has standing to bring a petition for a new trial regarding the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in D’Albero.
Although at the time of the assignment agreement and substitution, summary judgment already had been rendered in D ’Albero in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a petition for a new trial regarding any claims against the defendant in DAlbero. Pursuant to the assignment agreement, the plaintiff assigned to Jacobs “all of my right, title and interest in certain causes of action and claims, asserted or not asserted,” in DAlbero. This necessarily included the claim — yet unasserted at the time of the assignment — of a petition for a new trial.
As a result of the assignment, the plaintiff lacks standing to bring apetition for a new trial. “A valid assignment transfers to the assignee exclusive ownership of all of the assignor’s rights to the subject assigned and extinguishes all of those rights in the assignor.” Mall v. [540]*540LaBow, 33 Conn. App. 359, 362, 635 A.2d 871 (1993), cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642 A.2d 1208 (1994). As assignee, Jacobs stepped into the shoes of his assignor, the plaintiff. See Leonard v. Bailwitz, 148 Conn. 8, 13, 166 A.2d 451 (1960). Jacobs was substituted as the plaintiff in D’Albero.3 Because the plaintiff assigned his rights and interests in D’Albero to Jacobs, he has not demonstrated that he has a specific, personal and legal interest in the petition for a new trial that has been specially and injuriously affected.4 Accordingly, the court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs petition for a new trial for lack of standing.
The judgment is affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
57 A.3d 762, 139 Conn. App. 536, 2012 Conn. App. LEXIS 589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bozelko-v-milici-connappct-2012.