Boyle v. State

2025 Ohio 859

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 14, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-46
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Boyle v. State, 2025-Ohio-859.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

DAVID BOYLE : : Appellant : C.A. No. 2024-CA-46 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 0363 : STATE OF OHIO : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellee : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 14, 2025

DAVID BOYLE, Pro Se Appellant

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

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LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant David Boyle appeals from a judgment of the Greene

County Common Pleas Court dismissing his complaint for declaratory judgment against

the Greene County Prosecutor’s Office (“State”). For the following reasons, the

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History -2-

{¶ 2} This civil action derives from Boyle’s criminal conviction in Greene C.P. No.

2013 CR 0042. In 2013, a Greene County grand jury indicted Boyle on 16 counts of rape

in which his minor daughter was the alleged victim. State v. Boyle, 2014-Ohio-1271, ¶ 2

(2d Dist.). As a result of plea negotiations, Boyle entered a guilty plea to six counts of

rape in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the remaining counts. The trial court

sentenced Boyle to an aggregate prison term of 40 years and designated him a Tier III

sex offender. Boyle’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.

{¶ 3} Subsequently, Boyle unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on multiple

occasions. For an extensive summary of Boyle’s unsuccessful challenges, see State v.

Boyle, 2023-Ohio-3390, ¶ 2-6 (2d Dist.). In that case, we overruled Boyle’s 16

assignments of error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 18.

{¶ 4} Boyle has likewise unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on federal

habeas corpus grounds. See Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 2019 WL 4861929

(S.D.Ohio Oct. 2, 2019); Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 2019 WL 5265316

(S.D.Ohio Oct. 17, 2019); Boyle v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 2020 WL 209086

(S.D.Ohio Jan. 14, 2020); Boyle v. Shoop, 2020 WL 4875322 (6th Cir. June 29, 2020).

{¶ 5} On May 6, 2024, Boyle filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the

Greene County Prosecutor’s Office in the Greene County Common Pleas Court. The

complaint alleged that a controversy existed as to the sufficiency of his 2013 criminal

indictment. Boyle further claimed there was a controversy over the failure of the State

to file a bill of particulars and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for allowing him to

plead guilty to the invalid 2013 criminal indictment. -3-

{¶ 6} On May 15, 2024, the State filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the

complaint, arguing that a declaratory judgment action could not be used to collaterally

attack a criminal conviction. On June 6, 2024, Boyle filed a motion for leave to file an

opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss. Boyle’s motion did not attempt to justify his

untimeliness but merely offered his reasoning in opposition.

{¶ 7} On June 26, 2024, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Boyle timely appeals, pro se, and raises a single assignment of

error.

II. Declaratory Judgment

{¶ 8} Boyle’s sole assignment of error states:

The trial court denied appellant substantial due process and equal

protection of law under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United

States Constitutions where the trial court’s actions in recasting appellant’s

request for declaratory judgment into a collateral attack on his conviction

was an act of/or demonstration of judicial bias.

{¶ 9} “A common pleas court generally has the power under the Declaratory

Judgments Act to ‘declare rights, status, and other legal relations,’ and its ‘declaration

has the effect of a final judgment or decree.’ ” Lingo v. State, 2014-Ohio-1052, ¶ 42,

quoting R.C. 2721.02(A). “[F]or declaratory relief to be considered an appropriate

remedy, the plaintiff must establish the following three essential elements: (1) that a real

controversy exists between the parties; (2) that the controversy is justiciable in nature;

and (3) that the particular situation is one in which speedy relief is necessary to preserve -4-

the rights of the parties.” Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2023-Ohio-4688, ¶

21 (2d Dist.). If a party fails to establish any one of the requisite elements, the court must

dismiss the cause. Moore v. Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 49.

{¶ 10} “A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, pursuant to Civ.R.12(B)(6), tests the sufficiency of a complaint.”

Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.). An appellate

court’s review of a trial court’s decision granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion is de novo.

Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. However, “[j]usticiability is a

threshold requirement for a declaratory judgment.” Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-

4809, ¶ 44, citing Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-3208, ¶ 10. We review a trial court’s

decision regarding justiciability of a declaratory judgment action for an abuse of discretion.

Arnott at ¶ 13. An “abuse of discretion” implies that the trial court's attitude was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157

(1980). “[O]nce a trial court determines that a matter is appropriate for declaratory

judgment, its holdings regarding questions of law are reviewed on a de novo basis.”

Arnott at ¶ 13.

{¶ 11} In dismissing Boyle’s complaint, the trial court concluded that the complaint

for declaratory judgment constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a judgment

issued in Boyle’s criminal case. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Boyle’s complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because “a declaratory

judgment action is not the appropriate vehicle for Boyle to obtain the relief he seeks.”

Judgment Entry (Feb. 20, 2025), p. 3. We agree with the trial court. -5-

{¶ 12} A collateral attack is “ ‘an attempt to defeat the operation of a judgment, in

a proceeding where some new right derived from or through the judgment is involved.’ ”

Fawn Lake Apts. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 85 Ohio St.3d 609, 611 (1999),

quoting Kingsborough v. Tousley, 56 Ohio St. 450, 458 (1897). “The objective of a

collateral attack is to modify a previous judgment because it is allegedly ineffective or

flawed for some fundamental reason.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-

Ohio-5024, ¶ 19. Collateral attacks are disfavored and may succeed only in certain very

limited situations. Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶ 13} “While a declaratory judgment action can be used prospectively to

determine the validity, construction, and application of criminal statutes, it cannot be used

to collaterally attack criminal convictions and sentences.” Patterson v. State, 2024-Ohio-

5704, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), citing Knuckles v. State, 2019-Ohio-1079, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Where

a complaint for declaratory judgment is filed to collaterally attack a criminal conviction, it

does not pose a justiciable controversy and should be dismissed. State ex rel. Jones v.

Tyack, 2024-Ohio-4978, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 14} Boyle argues that his complaint posed questions to the trial court that were

appropriate for declaratory judgment. However, what Boyle sought to obtain from the

trial court was a judgment concluding that his criminal indictment had been defective and

that his trial counsel had been ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to a defective

indictment. Despite Boyle’s protestations to the contrary, it is clear that the issues

presented in Boyle’s complaint amount to an attempt to relitigate postconviction motions

or otherwise raise new errors of law that are alleged to have been committed in Boyle’s -6-

criminal proceedings. This is a collateral attack on his criminal conviction, which may

not be raised in a declaratory judgment proceeding. “Although the purpose of the

[Declaratory Judgments Act] is to declare rights in the face of uncertainty, it is well settled

that declaratory judgment is not a proper vehicle for determining whether rights that were

previously adjudicated were properly adjudicated.” Lingo, 2014-Ohio-1052, at ¶ 44,

citing Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978, 981 (D.C.Cir. 1949); Olney v. Ohio, 341 F.2d 913

(6th Cir. 1965); Shannon v. Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966); Wilson v.

Collins, 2010-Ohio-6538, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); State v. Brooks, 133 Ohio App.3d 521, 525 (4th

Dist. 1999); Moore v. Mason, 2004-Ohio-1188, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); Gotel v. Ganshiemer,

2009-Ohio-5423, ¶ 44 (11th Dist.); Burge v. Ohio Atty. Gen., 2011-Ohio-3997, ¶ 10 (10th

Dist.). “For direct and collateral attacks alike, declaratory judgment is simply not a part

of the criminal appellate or postconviction review process.” Id., citing Wilson at ¶ 9;

Brooks at 525-526; Moore at ¶ 14; Gotel at ¶ 44. “Ohio's Criminal Rules and statutes

provide for the direct review of criminal judgments through appeal, and collateral attacks

through postconviction petitions, habeas corpus, and motions to vacate.” Id., citing Ohio

Pyro, Inc., 2007-Ohio-5024, at ¶ 20. “Regardless of the character or severity of an error

in a judgment entry, and regardless of whether that error renders the judgment void or

voidable, the criminal appellate and postconviction review processes remain the sole

avenues for redress.” Id. at ¶ 45.

{¶ 15} Boyle stated that his complaint “was merely seeking clarification of a

specific law enacted by the Ohio legislatures and whether or not the court’s interpretation

of said law was constitutionally applied correctly if at all in the case at bar.” Appellant’s -7-

Brief, p. 3. The “case at bar” is his 2013 criminal case, and the “clarification” concerns

the validity of his indictment. Any challenge to whether the trial court interpreted or

applied the law correctly in his criminal case could or should have been challenged in a

direct appeal or petition for postconviction relief. Notably, Boyle has previously

challenged the validity of his 2013 criminal indictment on more than one occasion, and it

has been upheld by the trial court and affirmed on appeal. See State v. Boyle, 2018-

Ohio-3284 (2d Dist.) (affirming the trial court’s denial of Boyle’s post-conviction motion

alleging a defect in his indictment); Boyle, 2023-Ohio-3390 (2d Dist.) (affirming the trial

court’s denial of Boyle’s post-conviction motion challenging the validity of his conviction

and sentence). By requesting that the trial court declare his criminal indictment

unconstitutional and his trial counsel ineffective, Boyle’s complaint can be characterized

no other way than as an impermissible collateral attack. A complaint for declaratory

judgment under these circumstances was not proper. As such, we conclude the

complaint did not present a justiciable controversy capable of resolution by declaration

under the declaratory judgment act and, therefore, it was properly dismissed.

{¶ 16} Finally, to the extent Boyle alleges judicial bias, we reject his contentions.

“Judicial bias has been described as ‘a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship

or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed

anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state

of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.’ ” State v. Dean, 2010-Ohio-

5070, ¶ 48, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463 (1956), paragraph

four of the syllabus. -8-

{¶ 17} Boyle bases his bias claim solely on the fact that the trial court recast his

complaint without purportedly allowing him an opportunity to respond. Contrary to

Boyle’s contention, the trial court did not recast his complaint but rather found that it failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court’s dismissal of Boyle’s

complaint did not display bias.

{¶ 18} Having reviewed Boyle’s complaint, we conclude that Boyle was attempting

to use a declaratory judgment to collaterally attack a prior valid order of a court in his

criminal case and, as such, Boyle did not present a justiciable controversy capable of

resolution by declaration under the declaratory judgment act. Accordingly, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Boyle’s complaint for declaratory judgment.

{¶ 19} The sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 20} Having overruled the assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court will

be affirmed.

TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.