Boyle v. Commonwealth
This text of 617 A.2d 70 (Boyle v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
Before us in our original jurisdiction is a Petition for Review in the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment filed by Robert Boyle (Boyle), the plaintiff in a civil action against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (DOT). In opposition thereto, DOT has filed Preliminary Objections.1
Boyle filed suit against DOT in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, at 85-CIV-2786, on June 13, 1985, by which he sought recovery of damages for injuries he received as the result of an automobile accident which occurred on June 15,1983. By answer and new matter, DOT denied the material allegations of Boyle’s complaint and asserted the affirmative defenses of immunity from suit pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 23102 and furthermore claimed that Boyle’s cause of action does not fall within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b).3 DOT further averred that, should liability be found on its part, damages are limited to the [433]*433amount and type set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528.4 The case is still pending in the trial court.
In Boyle’s petition for declaratory judgement, he seeks a declaration that 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310 (sovereign immunity) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 8528 (limitation on damages) are “violative of and offensive to” his constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the Federal constitution and Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 (Petition, paragraph 17.) Boyle alleges that these statutes deny him interests, liberties, rights and benefits that are enjoyed by victims of private tortfeasors by precluding recovery of damages in an amount commensurate with his loss.
DOT, in its Preliminary Objections, counters that there has been no final appealable order of the trial court in the underlying action, which we interpret to mean that Boyle lacks standing to bring this action.6 DOT seeks dismissal of Boyle’s petition for declaratory judgment.
In addressing Boyle’s petition and DOT’s objections thereto, we must determine whether the relief Boyle seeks can be granted and under what circumstances it can be granted. We look to the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541, and case law.
Declaratory relief is not available unless an actual controversy exists or is imminent or inevitable. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Hafer, 142 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 502, 597 A.2d 754 (1991). Declaratory judgment is not appro[434]*434priate to determine rights in anticipation of events that may never occur, but is appropriate where there is imminent and inevitable litigation. Id. Section 7537 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 7537, provides:
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, ...
It is a fundamental principle of law that a party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy in this Commonwealth must establish that he has standing to maintain the action. D'Amelio v. Blue Cross of Lehigh Valley, 414 Pa. Superior Ct. 310, 606 A.2d 1215 (1992). As our Supreme Court stated in William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (1975):
The core concept, of course, is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not “aggrieved” thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge.
Boyle seeks a declaration that sovereign immunity, if applicable in the underlying litigation, as well as the statutory limitation on damages recoverable, if he receives a verdict against DOT, are violative of his constitutional rights. By his own pleading, Boyle admits that he has not yet received a verdict reduced to final judgment against DOT; thus, the relief he seeks here is not within the purview of immediacy required. Such relief is sought in anticipation of events that may never occur.
In order for Boyle to be adversely affected by the statutes which he alleges are unconstitutional, he must receive a verdict against DOT, then be aggrieved by the statutory limitation on damages. Any of the following events may occur upon completion of the litigation: (1) a verdict is rendered for DOT; (2) a verdict is rendered for Boyle but in an amount less than the statutory cap, in which event Boyle is not affected by the limitation on liability and is not aggrieved. Only if Boyle receives a final judgment against DOT in an amount greater than the statutory cap will he be aggrieved and have standing [435]*435to challenge the statutes which affect him so. Accordingly, we will sustain DOT’s Preliminary Objections and dismiss Boyle’s Petition for Review in the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment.7
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of November, 1992, the Preliminary Objections of the Department of Transportation are sustained, the Petition for Review in the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment is dismissed without leave to amend, and the Application for Summary Relief is dismissed as moot.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
617 A.2d 70, 151 Pa. Commw. 430, 1992 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyle-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-1992.