Boyd v. AWB LTD.

544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24006, 2008 WL 793633
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 25, 2008·No. 07 Civ. 3007(GEL)·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD E. LYNCH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, who are wheat farmers in the United States, bring this putative class action alleging that defendants AWB Limited and AWB (U.S.A.) Limited (collectively, “AWB”), 1 who exported Australian-grown wheat to Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food Program, participated in a bribery and money laundering conspiracy “to achieve, maintain, and exploit a monopoly on wheat sold in Iraq,” and “to foreclose the market to U.S.-grown wheat.” (ComplY 2.) Although none of the named plaintiffs claim to have sold or attempted to sell wheat to or in Iraq, plaintiffs allege that AWB’s conduct injured them and other similarly situated wheat farmers by causing a “decrease in the prices at which U.S. wheat farmers were able to sell their wheat in the United States.” (Id.) The complaint alleges that AWB violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). (Compl.f 3.) Defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. The motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint, except where noted. All factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. See Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 245 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir.2001).

I. The Global Wheat Market

The world wheat trade is dominated by the United States, Australia, the European Union, Canada, and Argentina, which together supply approximately 80% of the 100 million metric tons (“mmt”) of wheat traded globally each year. (Compilé 43, 50.) The United States, the world’s largest exporter of wheat, produces a number *240 of different wheat types, including hard red winter wheat. (Id. ¶ 52.) From 1996— 2000, the United States exported approximately 31.1 mmt of wheat annually, of which 13.8 mmt was hard red winter wheat. (Id.) The primary competitor of U.S.-grown hard red winter wheat in the export market is a hard wheat grown in Australia. (Id. ¶ 53.) The major export markets for both U.S.-grown hard red winter wheat and its Australian equivalent are countries in the Middle East and Asia. (Id.)

The complaint alleges that, “[bjecause of the global nature of the wheat trade, supply and demand forces in any given geographic sub-market are interrelated with those in every other sub-market.” (Id. ¶ 54.) Wheat prices in the United States are thus “directly affected by market conditions and events in those sub-markets around the world into which the U.S. exports its wheat.” (Id. ¶ 55.) According to the complaint, the “main determinant” of domestic wheat prices is the projected “Ending Stocks” — ie., “the supply of wheat in the U.S. that remains unsold at the end of a current crop year.” (Id. ¶ 57.) When Ending Stocks are lower because of higher exports of U.S.-grown wheat, the prices of wheat futures contracts traded on commodity exchanges rise, 2 and because the “prices paid to U.S. farmers for their wheat move in parallel to prices on the commodity exchanges,” the prices paid to U.S. wheat farmers also increase. (Id. ¶¶ 56-58.) Conversely, when exports of U.S.-grown wheat decline in a particular export market, excess Ending Stocks “cannot simply be diverted to another export market because of a number of factors, including the lack of substitution between wheat classes, the inelasticity of demand, and transportation costs.” (Id. ¶ 59.) Higher Ending Stocks thus result in lower prices for wheat futures contracts, and correspondingly lower prices paid to domestic farmers for their wheat. (Id. ¶ 58.) The complaint thus asserts that “where market conditions dictate an increase or decrease in the amount of U.S.-grown wheat purchased in a particular export market, wheat prices in the U.S. are directly, proximately, and foreseeably affected.” (Id. ¶ 60.)

II. The Iraqi Wheat Market

Iraq imports approximately 3 mmt of wheat per year and, historically, its purchases of wheat have been limited to hard red winter wheat from the United States and its primarily Australian equivalents. (Id. ¶ 61.) During the 1980s, U.S.-grown wheat comprised 29% of the Iraqi wheat market, second only to Australian-grown wheat, which had a 38% share. (Id. ¶ 62.) Because of U.S. sanctions on Iraq, U.S.grown wheat was not sold to Iraq from 1990 to 1997. (Id. ¶ 63.) In the absence of competition from U.S.-grown wheat, Australian-grown wheat came to dominate the Iraqi wheat market, with its market share rising to 73%. (Id.) In 1997, however, U.S.-grown wheat re-entered the market under the United Nations Oil for Food Program (“OFFP”), and by 1998, had regained a 6% share in the market. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 67.) According to the complaint, U.S.-grown wheat was “the only real competitive threat to the Australian wheat monopoly” in Iraq. (Id. ¶ 68.)

III. AWB’s Alleged Conspiracy to Monopolize the Iraqi Wheat Market

The allegations against AWB in this action are based largely on reports doeu- *241 menting the Iraqi government’s manipulation of the OFFP. 3 Under the terms of the OFFP, the Iraqi government was permitted to sell oil and use the proceeds to purchase food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods. (Id. ¶ 63.) Because direct financial transactions with the Iraqi government were prohibited, Iraqi proceeds from the sale of oil were deposited into a U.N.-controlled escrow account in New York, which the Iraqi government could then use to pay suppliers for food and other approved goods. (Id. ¶ 64.) With regard to Iraq’s wheat purchases, the Iraq Grain Board (“IGB”) advertised tenders for contracts and forwarded bids to the Ministry of Trade, which invited bidders to Baghdad to negotiate contracts with the IGB. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 71.) The wheat contracts would then be submitted to the U.N. for approval. (See id. ¶ 81.) Wheat shipped into Iraq under the OFFP was inspected and certified at the border by U.N. inspectors. (Id. ¶ 66.) Upon certification, the U.N. would issue a letter of credit in favor of the wheat supplier to be drawn from the U.N.-controlled escrow account. (Id.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Boyd v. AWB LTD., 544 F. Supp. 2d 236, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24006, 2008 WL 793633 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

544 F. Supp. 2d 236 (Boyd v. AWB LTD.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litigation
261 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D. New York, 2017)
Spinelli v. National Football League
96 F. Supp. 3d 81 (S.D. New York, 2015)
Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.
753 F.3d 395 (Second Circuit, 2014)
Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG
920 F. Supp. 2d 517 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Procel v. United States Trustee (In Re Procel)
467 B.R. 297 (S.D. New York, 2012)
Global Reinsurance Corporation-U.S. Branch v. Equitas Ltd.
82 A.D.3d 26 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Estate of Ungar v. Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E.
578 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D. New York, 2008)