Bowles v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bowles v. City of New York

154 A.D.2d 324, 545 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12244

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 2, 1989

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 154 A.D.2d 324 (Bowles v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bowles v. City of New York, 154 A.D.2d 324, 545 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12244 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).

Pincite

Opinion

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Seabrook Holding Corp. appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), dated January 13, 1989, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it and the cross claim against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the plaintiffs, the motion is granted, and the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the cross claim asserted against it are dismissed, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The defendant Seabrook Holding Corp. (hereinafter Sea-brook), a real estate investment corporation, obtained title to the property in question, essentially as a mortgagee. Pursuant to an agreement with the mortgagor, Bessie Kelly, Seabrook was to retain title to the premises as security for the mortgage indebtedness until such time as Ms. Kelly brought her debt current. Ms. Kelly, in her capacity as landlord, held herself out as owner of the property, and maintained, leased, collected rents for and made any repairs upon, the premises. Further, she was responsible for compliance with local regulations, and listed herself as owner of the building with the New York City Department of Buildings. Seabrook established that it was merely an out-of-possession titleholder to the premises. It [325]*325neither maintained, controlled nor reserved any rights to reenter the premises. The plaintiffs failed to offer evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Trails W. v Wolff 32 NY2d 207, 221; Hecht v Vanderbilt Assocs., 141 AD2d 696). Therefore, Seabrook is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against . it and the cross claim as against it (see, Bellen v Lomanto, 125 AD2d 905; Oquendo v Mid Mem Corp., 103 AD2d 705). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Kunzeman and Rubin, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Seabrook Holding Corp. appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), dated January 13, 1989, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it and the cross claim against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the plaintiffs, the motion is granted, and the complaint insofar as asserted against it and the cross claim asserted against it are dismissed, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The defendant Seabrook Holding Corp. (hereinafter Sea-brook), a real estate investment corporation, obtained title to the property in question, essentially as a mortgagee. Pursuant to an agreement with the mortgagor, Bessie Kelly, Seabrook was to retain title to the premises as security for the mortgage indebtedness until such time as Ms. Kelly brought her debt current. Ms. Kelly, in her capacity as landlord, held herself out as owner of the property, and maintained, leased, collected rents for and made any repairs upon, the premises. Further, she was responsible for compliance with local regulations, and listed herself as owner of the building with the New York City Department of Buildings. Seabrook established that it was merely an out-of-possession titleholder to the premises. It [325]*325neither maintained, controlled nor reserved any rights to reenter the premises. The plaintiffs failed to offer evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Trails W. v Wolff 32 NY2d 207, 221; Hecht v Vanderbilt Assocs., 141 AD2d 696). Therefore, Seabrook is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against . it and the cross claim as against it (see, Bellen v Lomanto, 125 AD2d 905; Oquendo v Mid Mem Corp., 103 AD2d 705). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Kunzeman and Rubin, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

154 A.D.2d 324, 545 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowles-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1989.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack