Bowie v. State

494 P.2d 800, 1972 Alas. LEXIS 207
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 13, 1972
Docket1422
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 494 P.2d 800 (Bowie v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowie v. State, 494 P.2d 800, 1972 Alas. LEXIS 207 (Ala. 1972).

Opinions

OPINION

ERWIN, Justice.

On December 24, 1969, three young men, George Ronald Robinson, Benjamin Smith, and appellant, Melvin Bowie, entered the Hilltop Cut Rate Store on Government Hill in Anchorage; the store was then full with customers. One of the men, Robinson, leaped over the counter and pounded on the cash register, demanding that it be opened and the deposited money given to him.

Fortunately for the store’s owners, but unfortunately for the would-be bandits, Ronald Dobson, the son of the proprietors, had come home from medical school for the Christmas holidays and was stationed at his post beside the cash register when Robinson leaped over the counter. When Robinson demanded that he open the cash register, Ronald steeled himself, reached toward the depository, but grabbed instead a canister of a product called “On Guard”. As Ronald later testified, “On Guard” releases a chemical spray irritant containing, among other things, camphor benzoid, a lacrimator, which causes the eyes to sting and water profusely. Ronald whirled, sprayed Robinson in the face, and turned to spray appellant Bowie, who, accompanied by Smith, had begun to move quickly toward the store’s exit. Robinson then jumped back across the counter and tried to run out the door; however, he was pursued by the relentless medical student who grabbed him from behind and, with the as[801]*801sistance of several customers, subdued him. Although Robinson told the other two men to “get the hell back and help him”, his pleas went unanswered. Smith and Bowie, ignoring the car that had been left beside the store with its engine running, traveled very rapidly down the street on foot and were last seen jumping over a fence bordering a nearby Dairy Queen.

Bowie’s participation in the robbery was passive; he remained throughout on the customer side of the counter. Although he testified that he did not participate in the robbery and did not know that one was planned until Robinson jumped over the counter, several state witnesses testified that Bowie told customers in the store that a robbery was in progress. No weapons were displayed at any time.

Robinson plead guilty and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Smith was not charged. Appellant Bowie plead not guilty to a charge of attempted robbery, his single defense being that he did not know about or intend to participate in the robbery and thus' did not have the requisite criminal intent. However, the jury returned a guilty verdict and Bowie was sentenced to a term of five years in prison.

Appellant has asserted three separate errors in the proceedings below: (1) that the lower court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a protective order prohibiting the state from introducing impeachment evidence of two previous convictions; (2) that he was denied due process of law by the failure of the state to transcribe the grand jury proceedings and make the transcription available to defense counsel; and (3) that the sentence imposed is excessive. Each of these issues can be disposed of summarily.

In Griggs v. State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska, March 13, 1972), we reaffirmed the general discretion of a trial court to permit impeachment of a criminal defendant’s . testimony by admitting evidence of prior convictions. That decision is controlling here.1

In Robinson v. State, 489 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1971), we held that it is not a denial of due process to fail to transcribe grand jury proceedings. This holding is, of course, dispositive of appellant’s second specification of error.2

In previous sentence appeals we have examined the sentence imposed to determine if it is within the “zone of reasonableness”.3 In this case appellant has had two prior felony convictions, one in 1966 for passing a forged check and one in 1967 for larceny from a building. The larceny occurred while appellant was out on probation for the forged check conviction ; the attempted robbery herein occurred while he was on parole for the larceny conviction. The five-year sentence4 imposed below is clearly not without the zone of reasonableness. Less stern measures have proven unsuccessful.

The judgment and commitment of the trial court is affirmed.

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Related

Jones v. United States
67 A.3d 547 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2013)
Nelson v. State
628 P.2d 884 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1981)
Holloway v. State
535 P.2d 467 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1975)
People v. Jackson
217 N.W.2d 22 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1974)
Condon v. State
498 P.2d 276 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1972)
Bowie v. State
494 P.2d 800 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
494 P.2d 800, 1972 Alas. LEXIS 207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowie-v-state-alaska-1972.