Bowen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

67 S.W.2d 164, 17 Tenn. App. 322, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 1, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 67 S.W.2d 164 (Bowen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 67 S.W.2d 164, 17 Tenn. App. 322, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Opinion

SENTER, J.

By this suit Andrew J. Bowen, complainant, seeks a recovery of the defendant for the sum of $57.60 representing two monthly total and permanent disability benefits provided in a certificate issued in connection with a policy of group life insurance. The benefits referred to being for the months of November and December, 1931.

Complainant alleges, in substance, that on and prior to November 1, 1928, he was an employee of the Knoxville Power & Light Company, and insured under a policy of group life insurance issued by the defendant to said power and light company. That the policy and certificate issued in connection therewith provided for the payment of indemnity in case an employee insured thereunder should become totally and permanently disabled; that on-November 1, 1928, complainant sustained an injury while in the course of his employment with said company, “and which has disabled him from assuming his former duties, and which he has been advised by reputable physicians that his disability is total and permanent. ’ ’ Complainant also sought to recover the statutory penalty because of the failure of defendant “to pay this just claim within proper time.” Other allegations are contained in the bill, but need not be noticed at this time. The cer *324 tificate issued by the defendant to complainant in connection with the policy of group insurance was made an exhibit to the bill, but the group insurance policy was not so exhibited.

The defendant filed a demurrer setting forth several grounds, but it is conceded by defendant that it now relies on only the first two grounds of the demurrer. The first two grounds of the demurrer are as follows:

“1. Because there is no equity upon the face of the bill.
“2. Because the bill states no cause of action under the policy of insurance exhibited to the bill against this defendant.”

The demurrer was overruled by the chancellor, and to the action of the chancellor in overruling the demurrer, the defendant excepted.

The defendant then filed its answer. The answer admits that the defendant issued and delivered to the Electric Bond & Share Company its policy of group life insurance No. 3323G, by the terms of which the employees of said Electric Bond & Share Company, and its associated and affiliated corporations, one of which was the Knoxville Power & Light Company, were privileged to obtain insurance upon their lives in accordance with a schedule attached to and made a part of .said group policy. The answer then states: “A full, true and correct copy of said group policy is filed herewith, marked Exhibit No. 1 to this answer, and made a part hereof as fully as if copied herein.” The answer further alleges that complainant, while an employee of the said Knoxville Power & Light Company, or its successor, Tennessee Public Service Corporation, made application for and obtained insurance upon his life in the initial sum of $1,000, said insurance being granted by the defendant under the terms and subject to the conditions of said group policy, “Exhibit No. 1 hereto, as evidence thereof the defendant issued and caused to be delivered to complainant its certificate No. 1347, which is the certificate which is attached to the original bill in this cause and made a part thereof.”

The answer further alleges that according to defendant’s information and belief, which is believed to be true, the complainant remained in the employ of the said Knoxville Power & Light Company and said Tennessee Public Service Company from the date of said certificate, to-wit, July 18', 1927, up until on or about the 29th day of October, 1930, on which date complainant’s employer terminated said employment, and complainant was never thereafter an employee of either the said Electric Bond & Share Company, the Knoxville Power & Light Company, or the Tennessee Public Service Company.

The answer further specifically denies that the complainant sustained an injury on or about November 1, 1928, or at any other time, which rendered him totally and permanently disabled, as averred in said original bill. It denies that the contract of insurance sued on contains the provisions averred and set out in the second section of the bill, and relies upon said group policy and said certificate to *325 show the contents thereof. The answer then proceeds to set out certain provisions contained in the group policy, with respect to the duty of the employer to report to the company in writing the names of all persons insured under the formula, not previously reported, who shall have ceased to he in its employ since the 20th day of the preceding calendar month, together with the date when each such employee left said employment. ‘ ‘ The insurance hereunder as to each of such employees, shall be discontinued as of the date when such employee left the employ of the employer.”

The answer alleges that, pursuant to said provision in the policy, the Knoxville Power & Light Company, on the 29th day of October, 1930, reported in writing to the defendant that the complainant, Andrew J. Bowen, was no longer in the employ of said employer, and thereupon directed the defendant to discontinue the insurance under said group policy upon the life of the complainant as of October 29, 1930; that, in accordance therewith, said insurance was discontinued and no further premiums were paid thereon to 'the defendant, and the complainant has not, since the 29th day of October, 1930, been insured under said group policy.

The answer specifically denies that complainant, while insured under said group policy, and prior to his sixtieth birthday, became totally and permanently disabled, as the result of bodily injury or disease, so as to be prevented from thereby engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit.- Certain other admissions and denials and allegations are set forth in the answer, but the above are sufficient to present the questions made in this court.

- At the hearing of the cause, the chancellor sustained the original bill, holding and decreeing, among other things, as follows:

“2. That on or about the 1st day of November, 1928, and while in the employ of the said Knoxville Power & Light .Company, the complainant sustained an injury which resulted in total and permanent disability, and the Court finds that from and after said date, the complainant was totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the provisions of total and permanent disability contained in the policy of insurance.
“3. And it appearing that at the time of the filing of the bill in this cause, there were two monthly installments due the complainant, on which interest to this date amounts to the sum of $3.45', making a total of $61.05, it is ordered and decreed by the Court that- the complainant Andrew J. Bowen, have and recover of the defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Compafiy,' said sum of $61.05 and all the costs of this cause for which execution may issue.”

• To the action of the court’ in adjudging and decreeing liability on the part of defendant, the defendant excepted, and from said'decree prayed an appeal to this court. It is further provided in the decree that, in case of appeal, all exhibits may be sent up in their original

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Bluebook (online)
67 S.W.2d 164, 17 Tenn. App. 322, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowen-v-metropolitan-life-ins-co-tennctapp-1933.