Bouvier v. Fusaro

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 10, 2025
Docket3:24-cv-30154
StatusUnknown

This text of Bouvier v. Fusaro (Bouvier v. Fusaro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bouvier v. Fusaro, (D. Mass. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

LADY CARLA BOUVIER,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-30154-MGM

RICK FUSARO,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER September 10, 2025

MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

For the reasons set forth below, the court allows Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (Dkt. No. 4.) If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, the court grants her time to file an amended complaint that sets forth a basis for this court’s jurisdiction and a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. I. BACKGROUND Lady Carla Bouvier (“Plaintiff”), a resident of Westfield, Massachusetts, filed her self- prepared complaint against Rick Fusaro, identified as a resident of Santa Barbara, California. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff states that she “is engaged in legal proceedings to recover overdue Social Security benefits and backpay totaling $64,300.00.” (Id. ¶ 5.) As to Defendant Fusaro, she states that he “engaged in deliberate and malicious actions to intimidate Plaintiff and sabotage her payback case.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Fusaro’s “threatening statements were captured on video, where he admitted and confessed to his intent to disrupt Plaintiff’s case.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to state laws for intentional inflection of emotional distress, defamation, and harassment as well as federal claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15, 16.) For relief, she seeks unspecified compensatory and punitive damages as well as a court order that “prohibit[s] Defendant from engaging in any further harassment or interference with Plaintiff’s legal case” and “[o]rder[s] Defendant to publicly retract any false statements made about Plaintiff.” (Id. at 5.) II. THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit. Upon review of Plaintiff’s financial disclosures in her Application to Proceed in District Court Without

Prepaying Fees or Costs, the court concludes that she has adequately demonstrated that she is without income or assets to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. III. PRELIMINARY REVIEW When a plaintiff proceeds without legal representation, the court must construe the complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiff is proceeding without the prepayment of the filing fee, the complaint is subject to review to determine if it satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis). Section 1915 authorizes the federal courts to dismiss an action in which a plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee if the action lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), or if the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). In addition to screening, the court has an independent obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into its subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004). To invoke this court's subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff must allege either that this action raises a federal question, in that the cause of action arises under federal law, or that this court has diversity jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1332 (diversity). “Diversity jurisdiction requires both an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs, on the one hand, and all defendants, on the other hand.” Bearbones, Inc. v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., 936 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). It is long-settled that “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of

establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Amoche v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing cases). IV. DISCUSSION To the extent the complaint asserts a claim for obstruction of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, Plaintiff cannot bring a civil lawsuit based upon the alleged violation of a federal criminal statute. A private citizen “‘has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution,’ nor to seek other relief based on alleged violations of federal criminal statutes.” Diaz v. Perez, No. 16-11860- RGS, 2016 WL 6871233, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 2016) (citing Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)). The federal criminal statute referred to in the complaint does not confer a private right of action. See Yaghoobi v. Tufts Medical Center, Inc., No. 23-12464-DLC, 762 F.Supp.3d 85, 94 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Scherer v. United States, 241 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1282 (D. Kansas 2003) (no private cause of action exists under federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503)); see also Cent.

Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal statute”). Next, Plaintiff asserts a claim under a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Speaking broadly, § 1983 provides a remedy for the violation of federal right by a person acting under the

1 “42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . furnishes a cause of action against any person who, while acting under color of state law, transgresses someone else’s constitutional rights.” Alfano v. Lynch, 847 F.3d 71, 74 n.1 color of state law, but its application is not without limitations. Here, Defendant is not alleged to be a state actor.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Kalina v. Fletcher
522 U.S. 118 (Supreme Court, 1997)
McCulloch v. Velez-Malave
364 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2004)
Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law
389 F.3d 5 (First Circuit, 2004)
CONNECTU LLC v. Zuckerberg
522 F.3d 82 (First Circuit, 2008)
Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance
556 F.3d 41 (First Circuit, 2009)
Anthony F. McDonald v. Frank A. Hall
610 F.2d 16 (First Circuit, 1979)
Dr. Gladys Cok v. Louis Cosentino
876 F.2d 1 (First Circuit, 1989)
Scherer v. United States
241 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D. Kansas, 2003)
Alfano v. Lynch
847 F.3d 71 (First Circuit, 2017)
Bearbones, Inc. v. Peerless Indemnity Insurance
936 F.3d 12 (First Circuit, 2019)

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