Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. EV3, INC.

502 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46047, 2007 WL 1813262
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJune 19, 2007
DocketCiv. 05-651 (JNE/JSM)
StatusPublished

This text of 502 F. Supp. 2d 931 (Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. EV3, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. EV3, INC., 502 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46047, 2007 WL 1813262 (mnd 2007).

Opinion

ORDER

ERICKSEN, District Judge.

Boston Scientific SciMed, Inc., and Boston Scientific Corporation (collectively, Boston Scientific) brought this action against ev3 Inc. alleging claims of patent infringement. ev3 brought counterclaims for patent infringement and declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement. The case is before the Court on the parties’ request for construction of disputed claim terms pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, *934 Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996).

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves medical device technology relating to “embolic protection,” which generally involves the capture and removal from the bloodstream of debris that is dislodged during a medical procedure, such as angioplasty, the placement of a stent, or atherectomy. Nine patents are at issue in this case. Boston Scientific owns the patent rights to U.S. Patent Nos. 6,027,520 ('520 Patent); 6,652,505 ('505 Patent); 6,142,987 ('987 Patent); 6,872,216 ('216 Patent); 6,676,682 ('682 Patent); and 6,663,652 ('652 Patent). ev3 owns the patent rights to U.S. Patent Nos. 6,949,103 ('103 Patent); 6,989,019 ('019 Patent); and 7,033,375 ('375 Patent). Each patent-in-suit describes a device, or a device and method, for filtering loose embolic material from bodily fluids.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claim construction principles

Patent claim construction is a matter of law for the court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Proper claim construction requires an examination of the intrinsic evidence of the record, including the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed.Cir.1996). The start- . ing point for claim construction is a review of the words of the claims themselves. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170, 126 S.Ct. 1332, 164 L.Ed.2d 49 (2006); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonassert-ed, to define the scope of the patented invention.”). The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning — the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13. The person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but also in the context of the entire patent. Id. The claims must be read in view of the specification, which is always highly relevant to claim construction. Id. at 1315. The specification may provide a special definition given to a claim term or a disavowal of claim scope by the inventor. Id. at 1316. Generally, however, the court should not import limitations found only in the specification. Id. at 1323. The line between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations into the claim can be difficult to discern, but can be approached with reasonable certainty if the court’s focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim terms. Id. The court should also consider the patent’s prosecution history, which provides evidence of how the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the inventor understood the patent. Id. at 1317. The court, in its discretion, may also consider extrinsic evidence, though it is less reliable than intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1317-18. In most situations, however, intrinsic evidence will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed term, and it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence when intrinsic evidence does so. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

B. Claim terms resolved during the Markman hearing

During the Markman hearing, the Court construed many of the disputed claim terms. For the reasons stated on the record and those briefly discussed be *935 low, the Court construes the following claim terms.

1. Boston Scientific’s '520 Patent

a. “filter”

ev3 proposes that the term “filter” be construed consistently across all patents-in-suit and given its plain and ordinary meaning as a “device for separating suspended particulate matter from liquid that can be made from a variety of materials.” Boston Scientific argues that the term “filter” is used in an ordinary, generic fashion in the Boston Scientific patents-in-suit and need not be construed. Because the Court discerns no ambiguity as to the meaning of the term “filter” and because “filter” is readily understood, the Court declines to construe the term as it is used in the '520 Patent. 1

b. “region of interest”

ev3 seeks a construction that would limit the term “region of interest” to “the lesion or stenotic portion of the vessel that is being treated — i.e., the portion of a vessel that has been narrowed by disease.” Boston Scientific, on the other hand, argues that the term should be construed as the “area within the patient’s vessel where a medical treatment procedure is to be performed.” Neither party disputes that the term “region of interest” refers to a fixed location.

The term “region of interest” appears in several claims of the '520 Patent. There is no indication in the intrinsic evidence that the term “region of interest” should be limited strictly to the lesion or stenotic portion of the vessel being treated. Instead, the Court construes “region of interest” as the “location of a percutaneous procedure to be performed within a patient’s vessel.” 2

c. “deploying the filter” and “filter ... deployment capabilities”

The phrases “deploying the filter” and “filter ... deployment capabilities” appear in independent claim 1 and the preamble to independent claim 9, respectively. Boston Scientific proposes that the phrases be construed as “expansion of the filter from a smaller collapsed size to a larger open size” and “the ability to have the filter expand from a smaller collapsed size to a larger open size,” respectively.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
502 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46047, 2007 WL 1813262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boston-scientific-scimed-inc-v-ev3-inc-mnd-2007.