Bost v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided July 14, 2026·No. 22-0001V·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 22-01V

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CHRISTOPHER BOST, * Chief Special Master Corcoran

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Petitioner, * Filed: June 15, 2026

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v. *

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SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

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Respondent. *

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David J. Carney, Green & Schafle LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.

Dima J. Atiya, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION GRANTING IINTERIM AWARD FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS1

On January 4, 2022, Christopher Bost filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”).2 Petitioner alleges that as a result of receiving a seasonal influenza vaccine on September 18, 2020, he developed Chronic Inflammatory Demyelinating Polyneuropathy. See Petition at 1. After briefing, I issued a ruling in favor of Petitioner, and resolution of damages is still pending. Ruling, dated Mar. 18, 2026 (ECF No. 47).

Petitioner has now filed a motion for an interim award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated July 21, 2025 (ECF No. 45) (“Interim Fees Mot.”). It is the first fees request in the case.

1 Under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen (14) days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public in its present form. Id. 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012). Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Vaccine Act (but will omit that statutory prefix).

Petitioner requests a total of $200,635.05 (reflecting $147,235.25 in attorney’s fees, plus $53,399.803 in costs) for the work of attorneys, law clerks, and paralegals at Green & Schafle LLC. Interim Fees Mot. at 3. Respondent reacted to the fees request on August 4, 2025. See Response, dated Aug. 4, 2025 (ECF No. 46) (“Resp.”). Respondent defers to my discretion as to whether the statutory requirements for a fees and costs award are met herein, and if so, the calculation of the amount to be awarded. Resp. at 2, 4. Petitioner did not file a reply.

For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $200,635.05.

ANALYSIS

I. Requests for Interim Attorney’s Fees and Costs

I have in prior decisions discussed at length the standards applicable to determining whether to award fees on an interim basis. Auch v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 12-673V, 2016 WL 3944701, at *6–9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 2016); Al-Uffi v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *5–9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015). It is wellestablished that a decision on entitlement is not required before fees or costs incurred to that point in time, but prior to the case’s full resolution, may be awarded. Fester v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 10-243V, 2013 WL 5367670, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 27, 2013); see also Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But because no entitlement determination has been (usually) made at the time an interim award is sought, the party requesting such an award must meet the reasonable basis standard applicable to literally “unsuccessful” cases. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.

While there is no presumption of entitlement to interim fees and costs awards (rendered in advance of a case’s final determination), special masters may in their discretion make such awards, and often do so. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Requests for interim costs are subject to the same standards. Perreira, 27 Fed. Cl. at 34; Presault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2002); Fester, 2013 WL 5367670, at *16. Criteria that I have found to be important in determining whether an interim award should be permitted include: 1) if the amount of fees requested exceeds $30,00.00; 2) where expert costs are requested, if the aggregate amount is more than $15,00.00; or 3) if the case has been pending for more than 18 months. See Knorr v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15- 1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017). In addition, the withdrawal or

3 Petitioner listed his litigation costs as $53,147.94 at first in his motion, but then lists his costs as $53,399.80 on the same page. Interim Fees. Mot. at 3. His invoices included with his motion are consistent with the latter figure. Id. at 48. Therefore, I shall interpret his requested costs as $53,399.80.

substitution of counsel is often deemed reasonable grounds in and of itself for an interim award (except where the special master has foundational concerns about the claim’s reasonable basis). See e.g., Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012).

For fee requests generally, counsel must submit contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in his experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing a petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

The Petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended, the rates charged, and the expenses incurred.” Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1991). The Petitioner “should present adequate proof [of the attorney’s fees and costs sought] at the time of the submission.” Id. at 484 n.1. Petitioner’s counsel “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

I find an interim award is appropriate in this case considering that it has been over four years since its inception, and a significant amount of fees and costs have already been generated. In addition, although interim fees requests are subject to a showing of reasonable basis, that requirement is clearly met, given that I have already found entitlement in favor of the Petitioner. Accordingly, I will allow a fees award.

II. Calculation of Fees

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