Borstad v. Galaza
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Demetrius Borstad, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Borstad’s habeas petition, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
Borstad contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because the district court incorrectly calculated the time during which the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year limitation period was tolled. This contention has merit.
The one-year limitations period began to run in Borstad’s case on April 24, 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d at 1105. Given the benefit of tolling for the entire time during which Borstad was properly pursuing habeas relief in the California courts, the statute of limitations expired on September 30, 1997. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104, 120 S.Ct. 1846, 146 L.Ed.2d 787 (2000); Bunney v. Mitchell,
VACATED and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. [759]*759that prison "mailbox rule" applies to state as well as federal habeas petitions).
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27 F. App'x 758 (Borstad v. Galaza) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.