IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-41021 _____________________
JIMMY SOL BOOKER
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
JAMES A COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; RICHARD SODERLING, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; DWIGHT MACK, Correctional Officer III (Law Library) at Telford Unit; SHAWN LOMAX, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; SHARON GILBERT, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; DEBRA PRAZAK, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; TONY BURNS, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; KEITH CLARK, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; ROBERT OAKES, Correctional Officer III at Telford Unit; RONALD STAFFORD, Lieutenant at Telford Unit; REGINALD STANLEY, DR; LINDA GILDON; VIRGINIA BUCHANAN; MICHAEL PARKER; PAULA HITCHCOCK; A ROBERTS; DAVID SWIEITH; ROCHELLE MCKINNEY; JOHN DOE, Unknown person
Defendants - Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 97-CV-319 _________________________________________________________________ April 5, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges. KING, Chief Judge:*
This case involves an excessive use of force claim brought
by Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmy Sol Booker, who alleges that certain
Defendants-Appellees treated him with excessive force, that other
Defendants-Appellees failed to protect him from such force, and
that still other Defendants-Appellees treated him with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff-Appellant
appeals from the district court’s grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of those Defendants-Appellees who were sued for
failure to protect and for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff-
Appellant’s medical needs. Plaintiff-Appellant also appeals from
the district court’s final judgment in favor of the remaining
Defendants-Appellees on his claim of excessive use of force. For
the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmy Sol Booker is an inmate who was,
at all times relevant to this appeal, incarcerated with the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice at the Telford Unit in New Boston,
Texas (the “Telford Unit”). Proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, Booker brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
certain officers and medical personnel at the Telford Unit
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2 (collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Defendants”),
alleging violations of his constitutional right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Booker claims that certain
Defendants treated him with excessive force, that other
Defendants failed to protect him from such force, and that still
other Defendants treated him with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.
This suit arose from an altercation between Booker and
Defendants James Collins, Richard Soderling, and Shawn Lomax, who
are correctional officers at the Telford Unit. Booker contends
that, on April 10, 1997, Collins, with the assistance of Lomax
and Soderling, struck him in the face and “rammed his head into a
desk” while his hands were handcuffed behind his back.
Furthermore, Booker alleges that Defendants Dwight Mack, Sharon
Gilbert, Debra Prazak, Tony Burns, Keith Clark, Robert Oakes, and
Ronald Stafford, also correctional officers at the Telford Unit,
“stood idly by” during the alleged assault. Booker contends that
after the alleged assault, he was taken to the Telford Unit
medical department and was subsequently denied proper medical
care by Defendants Dr. Reginald Stanley, Linda Gildon, Virginia
Buchanan, Michael Parker, Paula Hitchcock, A. Roberts, David
Swieith, and Rochelle McKinney. Booker states that, as a result
of the assault and denial of medical care, he sustained injuries
to, inter alia, his back, neck, ribs, right eye, and right wrist.
3 On November 7, 1997, Booker brought this civil rights action
against the Defendants. On June 28, 1999, the case was referred
to a magistrate judge, and on August 3, 1999, the magistrate
judge held a management conference, wherein both parties
consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. On August 4,
1999, the magistrate judge issued a partial summary judgment in
favor of all Defendants (except Collins, Soderling, and Lomax),
concluding that Booker failed to adduce facts sufficient to
demonstrate that those Defendants were “deliberately indifferent
to [Booker’s] medical care needs or his safety.” The magistrate
judge determined that the remaining use of force claim against
Collins, Soderling, and Lomax would proceed to a bench trial set
for September 14, 1999.
After the bench trial, the magistrate judge issued his final
judgment, finding that the force used by Collins, Soderling, and
Lomax to restrain Booker was reasonable.
Booker timely appealed both the grant of partial summary
judgment and the final judgment.
II. ISSUES REGARDING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Booker raises two issues regarding whether the magistrate
judge’s grant of partial summary judgment was appropriate.
First, Booker contends that the district court did not
specifically refer the case to the magistrate judge as is
required under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1993), and also that, at the time
4 the partial summary judgment was entered by the magistrate judge,
Booker was the only party to have consented to the magistrate
judge’s jurisdiction. Second, Booker asserts that summary
judgment was improper because he raised genuine issues of
material fact on his claims of failure to intervene and
deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
A. The Magistrate Judge’s Jurisdiction
For the first time on appeal, Booker contends that the case
was not properly referred to the magistrate judge and that the
Defendants failed to consent prior to the magistrate judge’s
grant of partial summary judgment. Even though these contentions
are raised now for the first time, we must address them because
they implicate the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. See United
States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1999); Mendes Jr.
Int’l Co. v. M/V SOKAI MARU, 978 F.2d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“[A]bsence of the appropriate consent and reference (or special
designation) order results in a lack of jurisdiction (or at least
fundamental error that may be complained of for the first time on
appeal).”).
1. Effectiveness of Referral
As stated above, the district court referred the case to the
magistrate judge on June 28, 1999. However, the referral order
failed to expressly indicate that the district court was
referring the case to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
5 § 636(c).1 Instead, the order simply stated: “This action is
referred to Robert W. Faulkner, Magistrate Judge in Sherman,
Texas, for further proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.”
Booker contends that the lack of a specific designation under
§ 636(c) at the time of the grant of partial summary judgment
precluded the magistrate judge from exercising jurisdiction over
the case. We disagree.
1 Section 636(c) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-- (1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves. . . . (2) If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties of the availability of a magistrate to exercise such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. . . . Rules of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent. (3) Upon entry of judgment in any case referred under paragraph (1) of this subsection, an aggrieved party may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from the judgment of the magistrate in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court. The consent of the parties allows a magistrate designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection to direct the entry of a judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
6 In civil matters, the district court must specifically
indicate that it is referring a case to a magistrate judge
pursuant to § 636(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“Upon the
consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate
. . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury
civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves.” (emphasis added)). This is
referred to as § 636(c)’s “special designation” requirement. See
Hill v. City of Seven Points, 230 F.3d 167, 168-69 (5th Cir.
2000).
Conceding that the district court may not have “specially
designated” the case to the magistrate judge, we conclude that,
in this case, such a designation was not required. Pursuant to a
general order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas, prisoner civil suits are automatically assigned to the
magistrate judge when the parties consent to trial and entry of
judgment by a magistrate judge. See E.D. TEX. GEN. ORDER NO. 98-
10.II.A (1998)2; see also Hill, 230 F.3d at 169.
2 General Order No. 98-10 provides:
1. Prisoner suits shall be referred at the time of filing equally among magistrate judges with concurrent civil case responsibilities except as specified. Prisoner suits shall automatically be assigned to the magistrate judge to whom the case originally was referred when parties consent to trial and entry of judgment by a magistrate judge. 2. All other civil matters shall be referred or
7 In Hill v. City of Seven Points, a nonprisoner civil suit,
this court observed that, in prisoner civil suits, “the general
order apparently provides the requisite order of reference for
the magistrate judge to enter a final judgment pursuant to
§ 636(c), in that the assignment is automatic upon the consent of
the parties.” 230 F.3d at 169. Accordingly, we conclude that
under General Order No. 98-10 and Hill, the general language in
the magistrate judge’s referral order in this prisoner civil suit
became effective once the parties properly consented to trial and
entry of judgment by the magistrate judge. We must now determine
whether the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter partial
summary judgment several days before the Defendants filed a
written consent to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
2. Effectiveness of the Defendants’ Consent at the Management
Conference
At the August 3, 1999 management conference, only Booker
signed a consent form to proceed in front of the magistrate
judge. The Defendants, on the other hand, did not sign a consent
form until August 9, 1999, although they did consent on the
record at the management conference. Booker argues on appeal
that the magistrate was without jurisdiction to enter partial
assigned randomly except as specified above or unless a specific order of the court directs otherwise.
Hill, 230 F.3d at 168 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting E.D. TEX. GEN. ORDER NO. 98-10.II.A (1998)).
8 summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on August 4, 1999,
because the Defendants had yet to give their written consent to
proceed before the magistrate judge. Again, we disagree with
Booker’s argument.
This court has consistently held that “consent to proceed
before a magistrate [must] be explicit.” Mendes Jr. Int’l Co. v.
M/V SOKAI MARU, 978 F.2d 920, 922 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Caprera v.
Jacobs, 790 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also Parks v.
Collins, 761 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore, we will
not “infer this statutorily required consent from the conduct of
the parties.” Mendes Jr. Int’l Co., 978 F.2d at 922 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Caprera, 790 F.2d at 445).
We find that, in this case, the record indicates that the
Defendants explicitly consented to proceed in front of a
magistrate judge. The minutes of the August 3, 1999 management
conference reveal that “the parties consent to proceed before US
Magistrate Judge” and that both parties “further consent to a
bench trial.” In addition, the docket sheet similarly states,
“[p]er law clerk,” that both Booker and the Defendants “consented
to proceed before US Magistrate Judge during hearing.” That
Defendants’ written consent did not come until six days later did
not divest the magistrate judge of jurisdiction.
We conclude that because the Defendants’ consent was
explicit and indicated on the record at the August 3, 1999
9 management conference, the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to
issue the partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
See Kofoed v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 237 F.3d 1001, 1004
(9th Cir. 2001) (“In the instant case, the parties did not file
their written consent forms with the district court until after
the magistrate judge entered judgment and the case was on appeal.
However, the record reflects that the parties gave express oral
consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction while they were
before the magistrate judge and before he made a dispositive
ruling.”).
B. No Fact Issues Precluding Partial Summary Judgment
Next, Booker appears to allege that he created genuine
issues of material fact on his claims of failure to intervene and
deliberate indifference to his medical needs, sufficient to
preclude summary judgment against him. After considering the
summary judgment evidence offered by the Defendants, the
magistrate judge found that the facts alleged by Booker did not
demonstrate that any of the Defendants, with the exception of
Collins, Soderling, and Lomax, “participated in the alleged force
or were under a duty to intervene.” Moreover, the magistrate
judge concluded that Booker’s medical records submitted by the
Defendants showed that Booker “received constant medical care
from the time of the alleged injuries to the time the summary
judgment motion was submitted.”
1. Standard of Review
10 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same criteria employed by the district court in the first
instance. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1994). “Summary judgment is proper only ‘if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Turner v. Houma
Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 482 (5th Cir.
2000) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
“Courts of Appeals consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, yet the nonmovant may not rely on
mere allegations in the pleadings; rather, the nonmovant must
respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth
particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774-75 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248-49 (1986)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2659 (2000); see also
Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir.
2000) (“If the movant succeeds in making that showing, the
nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial and not rest upon the allegations or denials
contained in its pleadings.”), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 766
(2001). After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to
11 raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find
for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
2. Propriety of Partial Summary Judgment
In an effort to support his assertion that a genuine issue
of material fact exists, it appears that Booker is arguing that
the magistrate judge erred in considering the Defendants’ summary
judgment evidence because the submitted documents were “unsworn
and unauthenticated” and that “the burden never shifted to
Appellant to go beyond the pleadings to show specific facts
creating a genuine issue for trial.” Aside from these alleged
errors, Booker merely states that “there existed genuine issues
of material facts precluding summary judgement [sic].”
First, we note that the summary judgment evidence was
authenticated by properly sworn and notarized business record
affidavits. In addition, contrary to Booker’s assertion, he was
given sufficient time to respond to the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and, in fact, did so by filing his own motion
for summary judgment and declaratory judgment. His motion was
replete with conclusory statements and allegations, however, as
he was unable to point to any specific facts to demonstrate that
the Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on his claims of failure to intervene and deliberate indifference
to his medical needs.
12 The summary judgment evidence contained “Major Use of Force
Reports,” which were completed immediately after the altercation
on April 10, 1997. As the magistrate judge noted, these reports
demonstrate that Booker was quickly taken down and restrained,
and we agree with the magistrate judge that those Defendant
observers “did not have time to get involved.”3
Furthermore, we agree with the magistrate judge that summary
judgment was appropriate for Booker’s claim of deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. “[I]nadequate medical care by
a prison doctor can result in a constitutional violation for
purposes of a § 1983 claim when that conduct amounts to
deliberate indifference to [the prisoner’s] serious medical
needs, constitut[ing] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Stewart v. Murphy, 174
F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted)
(alterations in original) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104 (1976)); see also Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159
(5th Cir. 1999). Under the “deliberate indifference” standard, a
prison official is not liable for the denial of medical treatment
“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
3 The evidence also showed that before Booker was restrained, he became “belligerent” and pushed Collins in the chest. The magistrate judge found, however, that Booker did create a genuine factual issue regarding the altercation and, therefore, declined to grant summary judgment in favor of Collins, Soderling, and Lomax on this issue.
13 inmate health or safety.” See Stewart, 174 F.3d at 534 (emphasis
omitted) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
As the magistrate judge noted, the Defendants’ summary
judgment evidence showed that, after the time of the altercation,
Booker received continuous medical care for his claimed injuries
and pain. The fact that Booker disagrees with the medical
personnel’s conclusions regarding his injured state does not, in
this case, create a genuine issue of fact as to whether members
of the prison’s medical personnel were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs. Instead, Booker makes only conclusory
allegations to the effect that each member of the medical
department who examined him made “false notations” in his
records. Such “mere allegations” are insufficient to sustain
Booker’s burden at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.
See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1986)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2659 (2000).
Accordingly, we find that the magistrate judge did not err
in granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on
Booker’s claims of failure to intervene and deliberate
indifference to his medical needs.
III. ISSUES REGARDING THE BENCH TRIAL
Booker also raises three issues concerning the bench trial
before the magistrate judge. First, Booker claims that he was
14 “induced” into consenting to the magistrate judge conducting the
bench trial. Second, Booker makes allegations concerning the
magistrate judge’s direction of the bench trial and the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate judge’s
final judgment. Finally, Booker contends that the district court
failed to make a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law after Booker objected.
A. Voluntariness of Booker’s Consent
Booker argues that the district court improperly induced him
to consent to proceeding before the magistrate judge. Booker
claims that he was informed at the management conference that no
jury in that court had ever awarded damages to a plaintiff on his
“type of claims.” Moreover, he alleges that an unidentified
“assistant” advised him at the conference that his signing the
form would result in the district court, not the magistrate
judge, conducting the trial.
The record contains the consent form that Booker signed on
August 3, 1999. The title of that form, which is in bold letters
and underlined, states: “CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND ORDER OF REFERENCE.” In addition, just
above Booker’s signature is the language: “[T]he undersigned
party . . . hereby voluntarily consent[s] to have United States
Magistrate Judge Robert Faulkner conduct any and all further
proceedings in this case, including trial, and order the entry of
a final judgment” (emphasis added).
15 A party’s consent to proceed to trial in front of a
magistrate judge must be voluntary. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)
(providing that in informing the party of the availability of a
magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, the district court must “advise
the parties that they are free to withhold consent without
adverse substantive consequences”). Booker does not contend that
the district court failed to inform him that he was free to
withhold his consent. Accordingly, we conclude that his
signature on the consent form makes clear that he was aware that
a magistrate judge, and not the district court, would be
presiding over the bench trial and that Booker’s allegations do
not support a claim of “inducement” on the part of the district
court.
B. Claims Concerning Conduct of the Bench Trial
Booker makes various allegations concerning the bench trial,
including claims that the magistrate judge abused his discretion
in allowing a “surprise” witness to testify, that the magistrate
judge refused to admit into evidence “medical records . . . which
evidenced injuries he had sustained and was treated for,” and
that the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions with respect
to the bench trial were unsupported by the trial evidence.
An appellant who wishes to challenge findings or conclusions
that are based on proceedings at a hearing or trial has the
responsibility to provide the court with a transcript. See FED.
R. APP. P. 10(b)(2); see also Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
16 910 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1990). This court will not consider
the merits of an issue when the appellant does not satisfy this
responsibility, and failure to provide a trial transcript is a
proper ground for dismissal of an appeal. See Richardson v.
Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1990).
The circumstances in this case differ somewhat from those in
Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 910 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1990).
In Alizadeh, this court declined to consider the appellant’s
claims because she failed to furnish the court with a trial
transcript. See id. at 237. In contrast to the facts in this
case, the Alizadeh court noted that the appellant never moved for
a transcript on the grounds of inability to pay. See id. In
this case, Booker did ask the district court, and this court, to
provide a trial transcript at the government’s expense. His
requests were denied.4
Even with this factual difference, the result is the same.
An appellant’s pro se and in forma pauperis status does not
excuse the failure to provide a transcript for appellate review.
Cf. Richardson, 902 F.3d at 416 (pro se and in forma pauperis
appellant) (adopting the rule that “inability to bear the
financial burden of providing a transcript does not make the
transcript unavailable within the meaning of [Federal Rule of
4 The district court concluded that the “appeal d[id] not present a substantial question,” and this court determined that Booker raised “only conclusional claims.” As such, both courts denied Booker’s requests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753(f).
17 Appellate Procedure] 10(c)”); Riley v. Collins, 828 F.2d 306, 307
(5th Cir. 1987) (pro se appellant). Booker has failed to provide
this court with a transcript, leaving us unable to consider his
claims concerning the merits of, or the magistrate judge’s
conduct during, the bench trial. Accordingly, based on our
inability to review Booker’s challenges to the bench trial
without examining the transcript of the proceedings, we must
dismiss Booker’s claims on these issues.5
C. District Court’s Failure to Make a De Novo Determination
Finally, Booker asserts that because he objected to the
magistrate judge’s final judgment, the district court was
required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to make a “de novo determination
of those portions of the . . . specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
As discussed above, the case was referred to the magistrate judge
for trial pursuant to § 636(c). In contrast to § 636(b),
§ 636(c) contains no such de novo review requirement. Instead,
5 Booker also contends that the magistrate judge failed to locate or summon witnesses that he had requested for trial. He concedes that the magistrate judge informed him that the court had been unable to locate several of his listed witnesses. Booker offers no argument or evidence to suggest that the magistrate judge’s information was incorrect or suspect. Moreover, the authority that Booker cites in his brief concerns a case in which the district court refused to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery and, instead, dismissed the plaintiff’s claims as frivolous. In this case, Booker was allowed to conduct discovery and to call witnesses. Therefore, we find no merit in Booker’s contention that the magistrate judge erred by being unable to locate all of Booker’s witnesses.
18 it allows the magistrate judge to enter final judgment in the
case and permits an aggrieved party to appeal directly from the
magistrate judge’s judgment to the court of appeals, which is
what Booker is currently doing. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in failing to make a de novo review of the magistrate
judge’s final judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge’s grant of
partial summary judgment and subsequent final judgment in favor
of the Defendants is AFFIRMED.