UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
AMY ROSE BONNING, Case No. 1:24-cv-00249-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
MATTHEW CLIFFORD, Ada County Sheriff,
Defendant.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Amy Rose Bonning’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning
that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable
legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate currently held in the Ada County Jail. Plaintiff sues Ada County Sheriff Matthew Clifford, complaining of jail conditions. The entire factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims is as follows:
[Sheriff Clifford] “enter[s] into contracts with fraudulent contractors. He orders distruction [sic] of all normal incoming federal mail without notice. He withholds inmates from ability to practice religion worship or the community volenteers [sic] to provide religious materials or services and prohibits the community from seeing his deprivation and knowing of inhumane treatments. He abuses his power [illegible] to provide nutrition to the inmates – daily repeated uncooked rice and beans no equel [sic] [illegible]. No womens [sic] underwear. No womens [sic] deodorant. He gives no reasons for his gross negligences [sic]. Women are treated horribly. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2 (capitalization regularized). 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Complaint is overly vague and generalized and fails to provide specific facts in support of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following. Plaintiff brings her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. Compl. at 1. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a
violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Jail officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A
plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional
deprivation; or (4) engaged in conduct showing “a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint.
Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
It is unclear whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate when her claims arose. Because the legal standards applicable to some of Plaintiff’s claims differ depending on that distinction, any amended complaint
should clarify Plaintiff’s status. A. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events described in the Complaint, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs her jail
conditions claims. That clause is violated when the conditions to which a pretrial detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d
1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1125. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the Court uses an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of- confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial
detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of confinement must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.
If, however, Plaintiff was a convicted inmate when her claims arose, then her jail conditions claims must be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. That amendment protects convicted inmates against cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees the right to minimally adequate conditions of confinement. “[T]he
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons … which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). However, though prison conditions may be
restrictive—even harsh—without violating the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. at 347; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
(1995). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that she is (or was) “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,” or that she has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as a result of the defendants’ actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim
requires the plaintiff to satisfy both (1) an objective standard, “that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,” and (2) a subjective standard, that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Snow
v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As for the objective prong of the analysis, “[n]ot every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Rather, the deprivation alleged must be objectively sufficiently harmful or, in other words, sufficiently “grave” or “serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see Whitley, 475
U.S. at 319 (“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). With respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation,
“deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “To be
cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
To exhibit deliberate indifference, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a [prison
official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d 1060. Moreover, even prison officials who did actually know of a
substantial risk to inmate health or safety will not be liable under § 1983 “if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
B. Religious Exercise Claims The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion; it does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Inmates
retain their free exercise of religion rights in prison. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate who is an adherent of a minority religion must be afforded a “reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). A prison need not, however, provide “identical facilities or personnel” for “every religious sect or
group within a prison,” and a “special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Id. at 322 n.2.
To serve as a basis for a viable claim challenging a prison restriction under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate’s belief must be both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, the burden placed on the
inmate’s religious exercise by the defendants’ actions must be substantial. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). De minimis—or minor—burdens on the free exercise of religion are not of a constitutional dimension, even if the
belief upon which the exercise is based is sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See, e.g., Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (the unavailability of a non-pork tray for inmate at 3 meals out of 810 does not constitute more than a de minimis burden on inmate’s free exercise of religion).
Challenges to prison restrictions that are alleged “to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been
committed in accordance with due process of law.” Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity for religious exercise, therefore, must be evaluated within the context
of a prison’s need for security, among other legitimate goals. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (1987) (holding that a prison’s policy of not allowing Muslim inmates on work detail to return to the prison to attend Jumu’ah, a group worship service, did
not violate the Constitution). So long as a restriction on an inmate’s religious practice “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” that restriction is valid. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Factors to be considered in this reasonableness
inquiry include (1) whether there is a logical connection between the governmental interest and the particular policy or decision at issue; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the right remain open to prison inmates”; (3) the impact that
accommodating a prisoner’s religious practice would have on “other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether there is an absence of “obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by” prison officials. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350–53 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted) Courts must take care to avoid “substitut[ing] [their] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration.” Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A prison’s occasional failure to accommodate a religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause where there is no evidence that the failures were
caused by “anything other than institutional shortage.” Id. Similarly, a temporary delay in accommodating religious practice does not violate the First Amendment when caused by ordinary administrative or institutional delay. See Tapp v. Stanley,
2008 WL 4934592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished) (holding that a 3-month delay in providing a prisoner with a religious meal did not substantially burden the prisoner’s sincerely-held religious beliefs where the delay was “caused by ordinary administrative delay”).
The First Amendment is not the only source of religious protection within a jail or prison. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., provides, “No government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person[] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA applies to entities receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at (b)(1). By accepting federal funds, however, states do not waive sovereign
immunity to suits for money damages under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 280 (2011). Further, although the statute provides for injunctive relief, RLUIPA does not allow for monetary damages against individuals. Wood v. Yordy,
753 F.3d 899, 902–04 (9th Cir. 2014). An inmate asserting a claim under RLUIPA must plausibly allege that the governmental action constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of the
inmate’s religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). For an official’s action to constitute a substantial burden on an inmate’s religious exercise, it “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,
1034 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether an inmate’s religious exercise is substantially burdened, a court may not inquire “into whether a particular belief is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13
(2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). However, “the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.” Id. If the inmate establishes “the prima facie existence” of a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate’s religion, then the burden shifts to prison officials
“to prove that [the] substantial burden on [the inmate’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both ‘in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest’ and the ‘least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”
Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)). As the Supreme Court has explained, The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party. If a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it.
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364–65 (2015) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Prison officials or a state department of correction “cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999. Although RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s religious rights, id., the statute does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). A prisoner’s requests for religious accommodation must not override other significant interests within a prison setting. “Should inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive,
impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726. In the words of the Supreme Court, “context
matters.” Id. at 723 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). 4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how
the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed
deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive
screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a
state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met— for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of an Eighth
Amendment or due process claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant.
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must
reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint
supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering
judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate,
numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the
first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if
the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant
simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.1
2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state
1 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. 8§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend with Open Stay (Dkt. 10) is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint as described above. The Motion is denied in all other respects. 4. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's other pending motions (Dkts. 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13) are DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew these motions if she files an amended complaint.
in Yr DATED: August 7, 2024 ° We □□□ ) Qiao y U's District Court Judge
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 18