BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 28, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01177
StatusUnknown

This text of BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES BONNETTE, JR. : : CIVIL ACTION v. : : NO. 22-4834 HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY :

MEMORANDUM

Chief Judge Juan R. Sánchez February 28, 2022

Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company moves to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice weigh strongly in favor of transfer, the motion shall be granted. BACKGROUND On December 30, 2021, Plaintiff James Bonnette, Jr. (“Bonnette”) was driving on Mount Ephraim Avenue in Camden, New Jersey1 and was involved in a motor vehicle collision with Pamela Waters (“Waters”). Compl., ¶¶ 4-6, ECF No. 1-4. Bonnette alleges he suffered injuries to the neck and lower back.2 Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. Bonnette’s vehicle was insured under a policy issued by

1 Plaintiffs Complaint lists the location as “Mantephraim Ave” which does not seem to exist. The Police report describes the accident occurring around “2619 Mount Ephraim Ave” which does exist. Police Report 3, ECF No. 4-4.

2 Bonnette’s injuries are described as “various serious and permanent personal injuries, serious impairment of bodily function, permanent serious disfigurement, aggravation of certain injuries and/or other ills and injuries including to the neck and middle to lower back, all to Plaintiff’s great loss and detriment.” Compl. ¶ 12. Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (“Hartford”). Ins. Pol., ECF No. 7-3. The complaint alleges Waters was uninsured at the time of the collision. Compl. ¶ 16. The New Jersey Police Report, attached and referenced by both parties,3 relates the following facts: the vehicle collision occurred on “NJ 168” and the report was filed by the Camden

County Police Department; Bonnette lives in Woodbury, New Jersey; Waters lives in Camden, New Jersey; Waters’ vehicle had a New Jersey license plate and was removed to Camden Towing; Bonnette’s vehicle had a New Jersey license plate and “sustained moderate but functional damage” and was driven away from the collision; Demetrius Grant and Jamey Shopkin were passengers in Waters’ vehicle and both reside in Camden, New Jersey; Ivy Novak was a passenger in Bonnette’s vehicle and resides in Woodbury, New Jersey; Waters was “transported to Cooper4” with complaints of head and arm pain; Bonnette “did not report any injury or complaint of pain for himself or the occupant” of his vehicle. Police Rep. 2-3, ECF No. 7-4. As a result of the incident, on October 21, 2022, Plaintiff initiated a civil action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against Hartford asserting an Uninsured Motorist Claim.

Compl. ¶ 16-17; Civ. Cov. Sheet 2, ECF No. 1-4. Defendant removed this action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on December 6, 2022, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Defendant now moves to transfer the case to the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). LEGAL STANDARDS “In federal court, venue questions are governed either by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Section 1404(a) provides for the transfer of a case where both the original and the requested

3 See Def.’s Mot. Trans. Venue 2-3, ECF 4-4; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n, 2-3, ECF No. 7-4.

4 The Court infers this is a reference to the well-known Cooper Hospital in Camden, New Jersey. venue are proper.” Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). Under § 1404(a): “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” Id. The purpose of transferring venue “is to prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to

protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). The Defendants, as the moving parties, bear the burden of establishing the need for transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. As a threshold matter, the Court must first determine whether venue is proper in either or both the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District of New Jersey. Id. at 878. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” Further, “in a State which has more than one judicial district . . . such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). DISCUSSION Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F. 4th 204, 207 (3d Cir. 2021). “General jurisdiction extends to all claims against a defendant and exists where a company is essentially at home.” Id. Specific jurisdiction requires a two-pronged analysis: (1)

“there must be purposeful availment: minimum contacts with the [district] that show the defendant took a deliberate act reaching out to do business in that [district],” and (2) “the contacts must give rise to – or relate to – plaintiff's claims.” Id. (emphasis added). “[T]he ‘or’ “contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). Under the first prong, the plaintiff “must show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home – by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum [district].” Id. at 1025. “For the contacts to satisfy the second prong, there must be ‘a strong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Hepp, 14 F. 4th at 207 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1028). In this case, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because Hartford

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BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bonnette-v-hartford-fire-insurance-company-njd-2023.