Bonner v. Lumpkin

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJuly 3, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-02373
StatusUnknown

This text of Bonner v. Lumpkin (Bonner v. Lumpkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bonner v. Lumpkin, (S.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 03, 2024 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

RYAN RYDELL BONNER, § TDCJ # 02359198 § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-2373 § BOBBY LUMPKIN, § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Ryan Rydell Bonner, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), initiated this civil action by filling out and filing a form Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 After reviewing this document as required under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the court concludes that this action must be dismissed. The reasons are explained below. I. Background

In 2021, Bonner was sentenced to ten years in TDCJ based on a Texas state court conviction for retaliating against a peace officer. See Inmate Info. Search, Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch/start (last visited July 1, 2024). Bonner’s habeas petition does not challenge his conviction or sentence, and he does not seek relief from a prison disciplinary conviction or a parole decision. Instead, Bonner challenges the withdrawal of funds

1 Despite submitting his claims on a form habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, because Bonner is a convicted felon in state prison, any habeas claims would be properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996) (“Authority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relief may be granted to ‘a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”). from his inmate trust fund account. (See Docket Entry No. 1). He asserts that a cashier’s check was deposited in his inmate trust fund account on the same day that a child support hold was placed on the account. (Id. at 6). He asserts that funds in the account were withdrawn, in violation of his right to procedural due process. (See id.). He asserts a “deprivation of interest” in his inmate trust

fund account “without due process of law.” (Id. at 2). He also brings a claim under the “Indemnity Clause” based on the Texas attorney general “fail[ing] to properly intervene to seek delinquent child-support payments in T.D.C.J. Inmate Trust Fund Account . . . where . . . Bonner received child support hold on trust fund account because the attorney general never filed a petition providing . . . Bonner with no opportunity to prepare a proper response.” (Id. at 7). In the “Request for Relief” section of the form petition, Bonner wrote “15 USCS § 77+(b) Action for injunction or criminal prosecution in district court.” (Id.). II. Discussion

Bonner’s petition arises from the child support hold placed on his inmate trust account. The court must first decide whether the claims Bonner asserts are civil rights claims or claims that sound in habeas. The “core issue in determining whether a prisoner must pursue habeas corpus relief rather than a civil rights action is to determine whether the prisoner challenges the ‘fact or duration’ of his confinement or merely challenges the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of confinement.” Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. Transitional Plan. Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987)). If a favorable determination would not entitle the prisoner to an earlier release from confinement, then the complaint is construed as one for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995). Bonner’s federal petition does not challenge the fact or 2 duration of his confinement, and a favorable determination of the claims would not entitle Bonner to an earlier release date. The claims are properly construed as challenging his conditions of confinement. See Williams v. Cockrell, 54 F. App’x 795, 2002 WL 31845296 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a § 1983 complaint in which an inmate asserted that money

was taken from his inmate trust fund account without his consent). Claims challenging an inmate’s conditions of confinement must be brought in a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2017). Civil-rights claims are not actionable in federal habeas proceedings. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Poree, 866 F.3d at 243 (explaining that “challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought under habeas, while challenges to the conditions of confinement are properly brought under § 1983”). The Fifth Circuit has advised that if a prisoner has filed a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that contains both habeas and civil rights claims under § 1983, the district court should separate the claims and decide the § 1983 claims. See Orellana, 65 F.3d at 31 (citing Serio v.

Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987)). It is not appropriate, however, to consider civil-rights claims in a habeas proceeding because of requirements posed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Unlike habeas proceedings, the PLRA requires prisoners asserting civil-rights claims under § 1983 to pay the filing fee for a civil action even if the prisoner receives leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

2 The filing fee for a federal habeas proceeding is $5.00 and the fee for a civil action is $350.00, plus a $55.00 administrative fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)-(b); Schedule of Fees, United States District & Bankruptcy Court Southern District of Texas (last updated Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/FeeSchedule. If a prisoner qualifies for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and the $50.00 administrative fee is waived, the prisoner must still 3 Additionally, a court is required by the PLRA to review the pleadings and dismiss an action if it (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (setting forth the same grounds). A prisoner who incurs three

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Related

Orellana v. Kyle
65 F.3d 29 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Felker v. Turpin
518 U.S. 651 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Alan James Spina v. C.L. Aaron, Etc.
821 F.2d 1126 (Fifth Circuit, 1987)
In Re Peter C. Smith
114 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Circuit, 1997)
Eddie Brown v. April Megg
857 F.3d 287 (Fifth Circuit, 2017)
Carlos Poree v. Kandy Collins
866 F.3d 235 (Fifth Circuit, 2017)
Adepegba v. Hammons
103 F.3d 383 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Bonner v. Lumpkin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bonner-v-lumpkin-txsd-2024.