Bonilla v. Koehler

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01597
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No. 25-cv-01597-BAS-DDL CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY v. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. 1914(a) 15 FRANCIE KOEHLER, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at 22 California Medical Facility, has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 23 Defendants Francie Koehler, Randy Ontiveros, and Rand Investigation. (ECF No. 1.) 24 Plaintiff seeks to “void” his Alameda County Superior Court criminal judgment of 25 conviction and seeks compensatory damages and criminal punishment against the named 26 defendants, who he claims violated his federal due process rights. (Id. at 1–3.) Plaintiff 27 has not filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid 28 the initial civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, 1 the Court dismisses the case. 2 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 3 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 4 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 5 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed IFP—which means as a person 6 without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 7 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 8 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s 9 case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 10 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 11 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file a 12 document called an affidavit. That affidavit must include a statement of all assets, or things 13 of value, the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate the plaintiff’s inability to pay the 14 filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps 15 the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee. 16 Plaintiffs who are imprisoned at the time they file their civil case must submit 17 another document as well, called a “trust fund account statement.” The Prison Litigation 18 Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit this “certified copy of the 19 trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period 20 immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 21 King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). “While the previous version of the IFP statute 22 granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . [t]he PLRA 23 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 24 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for 3 collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 4 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this 5 civil action. He also has not submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See 6 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Thus, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 7 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 8 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 9 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 10 A. Standard of Review 11 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 12 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 13 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 14 filing fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 15 U.S. 82, 85 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)), and Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 16 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege 17 to proceed IFP: 18 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 19 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 20 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 21 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 23 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 24 2016). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 25 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing 26 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th 27 Cir. 1997). 28 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 1 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.” 2 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (citation modified). This is true “even if the district court 3 styles such dismissal as [a] denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 4 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 5 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 6 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 7 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 8 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 9 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 10 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 11 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 12 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 13 F.3d at 1051‒52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make [] a 14 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 15 the time of filing.”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly 16 traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray 17 v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022). 18 B. Discussion 19 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it does not contain any 20 “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 21 injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 22 Instead, Plaintiff requests relief from what he asserts is a “void” judgment of conviction by 23 the Alameda County Superior Court, and seeks to punish two private investigators and their 24 investigative agency, whom he contends violated his federal due process rights by 25 conspiring to “illegally tape record[] me without my permission and illegally obtain[] my 26 phone records by paying an employee to steal them[,]” and by subsequently providing 27 those materials to law enforcement. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) 28 Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case; nevertheless, the Court finds it 1 would be futile for him to do so. While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to 2 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 3 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show 4 that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore 5 counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is true here. 6 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,2 this Court 7 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 8 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 9 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 10 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-6306 CW (PR), C 11-6307 CW (PR), C 12- 11 0026 CW (PR), C 12-0027 CW (PR), C 12-0206 CW (PR), 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. 12 Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of 13 California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and 14 October 31, 2011, alone, which were dismissed because “the allegations in [his] complaints 15 d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are 16 DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon 17 which relief may be granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; 18 Bonilla v. Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California 19 Supreme Court, C 12-0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme 20 Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in 21 accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis 22 in any civil rights action.” (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), 23 Order of Dismissal at 6:23–7:19)). 24

25 26 2 See Kim v. Allison, 87 F.4th 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting courts “may take notice of 27 proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 28 1 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 2 ||the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible 3 || allegation that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this 4 || case, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 5 || Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 6 || “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with 7 history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP 8 status”). When a prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily 9 ||enumerated grounds[,]...a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with respect 10 || to his additional civil actions.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). This is 11 because “court permission to proceed [IFP] is itself a matter of privilege and not right.” 12 || Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). 13 ||. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 15 1. DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the civil filing 16 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and 17 2. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the case and accept no further 18 documents for filing in this matter, except a timely-filed Notice of Appeal, 19 which this Court CERTIFIES would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 || DATED: July 10, 2025 yatta Bahar 4 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 25 26 27 28 -6-