1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1605-CAB-AHG CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) INYO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 15 AND IT’S COURT CLERKS OFFICE; 16 JOHN DOE 1-1000, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently 20 incarcerated at California Medical Facility, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has not filed a Motion to Proceed in forma 22 pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the initial civil filing fee required by 28 23 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, the Court DISMISSES the case. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 2 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 3 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 4 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed IFP—which means as a person 5 without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 6 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th 7 Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] 8 proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 9 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 10 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file an 11 affidavit that includes a statement of all assets the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate 12 the plaintiff’s inability to pay the filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 13 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing 14 fee. 15 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit 16 a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 17 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). While “the previous 19 version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable 20 to pay[,]’ . . . [t]he PLRA amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: 21 under the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an 22 appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing 23 fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides 24 a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this 2 civil action. He also has not submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See 3 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Thus, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 4 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 5 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 6 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 7 A. Standard of Review 8 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 9 Sheriff’s Off., 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 10 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 11 filing fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 12 U.S. 82, 85 (2016), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 13 proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 15 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 16 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 17 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 19 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 20 2016). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 21 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing 22 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th 23 Cir. 1997). 24 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 25 were dismissed on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a 26 claim[,]” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (quotations omitted), “even if the district court 27 styles such dismissal as [a] denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 28 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 2 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 3 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 4 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 5 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 6 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 7 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 8 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1605-CAB-AHG CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) INYO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 15 AND IT’S COURT CLERKS OFFICE; 16 JOHN DOE 1-1000, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently 20 incarcerated at California Medical Facility, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 21 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff has not filed a Motion to Proceed in forma 22 pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the initial civil filing fee required by 28 23 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, the Court DISMISSES the case. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 2 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 3 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 4 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed IFP—which means as a person 5 without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 6 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th 7 Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] 8 proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 9 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 10 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file an 11 affidavit that includes a statement of all assets the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate 12 the plaintiff’s inability to pay the filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 13 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing 14 fee. 15 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit 16 a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 17 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). While “the previous 19 version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable 20 to pay[,]’ . . . [t]he PLRA amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: 21 under the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an 22 appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing 23 fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides 24 a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this 2 civil action. He also has not submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See 3 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Thus, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 4 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 5 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 6 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 7 A. Standard of Review 8 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 9 Sheriff’s Off., 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 10 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 11 filing fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 12 U.S. 82, 85 (2016), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 13 proceed IFP: 14 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 15 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 16 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 17 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 19 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 20 2016). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 21 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing 22 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th 23 Cir. 1997). 24 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 25 were dismissed on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a 26 claim[,]” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (quotations omitted), “even if the district court 27 styles such dismissal as [a] denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 28 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 2 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 3 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 4 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 5 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 6 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 7 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 8 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 9 F.3d at 1051‒52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 10 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 11 the time of filing.”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly 12 traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray 13 v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022). 14 B. Discussion 15 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it does not contain any 16 “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 17 injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 18 Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on a fraudulent and invalid arrest warrant and is 19 the victim of a malicious Alameda County criminal prosecution. [Doc. No. 1 at 3–5.] He 20 seeks to sue the Inyo County Superior Court, that court’s clerk’s office, and other 21 unidentified parties for continually refusing to “void” his judgment of conviction. [Id. at 22 3.] 23 Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case; nevertheless, the Court finds it 24 would be futile for him to do so. While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to 25 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 26 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that [] 27 prior dismissal[s] satisf[y] at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g)” and thus count as 28 strikes against him. Id. at 1120. That is true here. 1 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER, this Court 2 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 3 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 4 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 5 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 6 Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 7 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were 8 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 9 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 10 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 11 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 12 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 13 Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 14 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 15 he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In re 16 Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23–7:19)). 17 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 18 the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible 19 allegation that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this 20 case, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 21 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 22 “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with 23 a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP 24 status”). When a prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily 25
26 2 See Kim v. Allison, 87 F.4th 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 27 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have 28 1 enumerated grounds[,]...a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with respect 2 ||to his additional civil actions.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). This is 3 || because “court permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of privilege and 4 ||not right[.]” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 7 1. DISMISSES this civil action based on Plaintiff's failure to pay the civil filing 8 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and 9 2. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal, close 10 the file, and accept no further documents for filing in this matter, except a 11 timely-filed Notice of Appeal, which this Court CERTIFIES would not be 12 taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 Dated: August 11, 2025 € 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28