Bonilla v. Gill

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 19, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02370
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 24-cv-2370-AJB-AHG CDCR #J-48500, 14 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 15 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 16 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

17 DAVID GILL, JOHN DOE, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently 22 incarcerated at California Medical Facility, has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1983, along with a Request for Judicial Notice. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. Plaintiff has not filed 24 a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the initial 25 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, the Court 26 DISMISSES the case and DENIES the request for judicial notice as moot. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 2 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 3 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 4 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed in forma pauperis—which means 5 as a person without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 6 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 7 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, 8 Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 9 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 10 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file a 11 document called an affidavit. That affidavit must include a statement of all assets, or things 12 of value, the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate the plaintiff’s inability to pay the 13 filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps the 14 court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee. 15 Plaintiffs who are imprisoned at the time they file their civil case must submit another 16 document as well, called a “trust fund account statement.” The Prison Litigation Reform Act 17 (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit this “certified copy of the trust fund 18 account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately 19 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 20 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the 21 authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . the PLRA amended the IFP 22 statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if 23 a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be 24 required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of 27 $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 3 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this civil 4 action. He has also has not submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See 5 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Therefore, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 6 Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051. 7 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 8 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 9 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 10 A. Standard of Review 11 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 12 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 13 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing 14 fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 15 85 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 16 Cir. 2015), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 17 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 18 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 19 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 20 21 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 22 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). 23 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Andrews, 24 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous 25 prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 26 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 27 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 28 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles 1 such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment 2 of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts 3 “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or 4 the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal 5 ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. 6 Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 7 (4th Cir. 2013)). 8 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 9 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 10 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d 11 at 1051‒52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 12 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 13 the time of filing.”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly 14 traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray 15 v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022). 16 B. Discussion 17 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds that it does not contain any 18 “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 19 injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 20 Rather, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested based on a “false affidavit” and that an unnamed 21 judge “discriminated” against him. See ECF No. 1 at 3. 22 Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case; nevertheless, the Court finds it 23 would be futile for him to do so. While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to 24 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d 25 at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior 26 dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a 27 strike,” id. at 1120. That is true here. 28 /// 1 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER, this Court 2 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while incarcerated, 3 has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were 4 frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See In re 5 Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s 6 litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se 7 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed 8 “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); 9 id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave 10 to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: Bonilla v. Superior 11 Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, 12 C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; 13 Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently 14 informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to 15 proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 16 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19)). 17 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than the 18 three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible allegation 19 that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he is 20 not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez 21 v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not 22 prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of 23

24 25 2 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA- WMc, 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 26 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 27 system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson 28 1 abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”). When 2 ||prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily enumerate 3 || grounds[,] ... a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with respect to h: 4 || additional civil actions.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). This is becaus 5 ||“court permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.” □□□□□□□□ 6 || Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). 7 I. CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, the Court: 9 1. DISMISSES this case based on Plaintiff's failure to pay the civil filing fe 10 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 11 2. DENIES Plaintiff's request for judicial notice as moot. 12 3. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in goo 13 || faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 14 4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file and accept no furthe 15 ||documents for filings, except a timely Notice of Appeal, which this Court CERTIFIE 16 || would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: December 19, 2024

20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28