Bonilla v. Diedrich

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01598
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1598-JES-LR CDCR #J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL Plaintiff, 13 ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY vs. FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 14 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) GERALD DIETRICH, 15 Defendant. 16

17 Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently 18 incarcerated at California Medical Facility, has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff, however, has not filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma 20 Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid the initial civil filing fee required by 28 21 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses the action. 22 I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 23 Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 24 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 The case may go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire filing 25 26

27 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See 28 1 fee, though, if the court grants him permission to proceed in forma pauperis—which means 2 as a person without the money or resources to pay the filing fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 3 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 4 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, 5 Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). 6 The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2) 7 requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file a 8 document called an affidavit. That affidavit must include a statement of all assets, or things 9 of value, the plaintiff possesses and must demonstrate the plaintiff’s inability to pay the 10 filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). This helps the 11 court to evaluate the plaintiff’s ability to pay the filing fee. 12 Plaintiffs who are imprisoned at the time they file their civil case must submit another 13 document as well, called a “trust fund account statement.” The Prison Litigation Reform Act 14 (“PLRA”) requires imprisoned plaintiffs to submit this “certified copy of the trust fund 15 account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately 16 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 17 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the 18 authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ … the PLRA amended the IFP 19 statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if 20 a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be 21 required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. 23 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). 24 Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required to begin this civil 25 action. Nor has he submitted a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP. See Escobedo, 26

27 Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 787 F.3d at 1234. Therefore, his case cannot go forward. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Andrews, 2 493 F.3d at 1051. 3 II. LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP 4 Even if Plaintiff had filed a Motion to Proceed IFP, the Court finds he is not entitled 5 to do so in this action for the reasons set forth below. 6 A. Standard of Review 7 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. 8 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face 9 an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing 10 fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 11 85 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 12 Cir. 2015), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 13 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 14 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 15 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 16 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’ 18 rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Andrews, 20 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous 21 prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 23 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 24 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles 25 such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment 26 of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts 27 “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or 28 the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal 1 ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. 2 Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 3 (4th Cir. 2013)). 4 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 5 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 6 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d 7 at 1051‒52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 8 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 9 the time of filing.”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly 10 traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray 11 v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022). 12 B. Discussion 13 The Court has reviewed both Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it does not contain any 14 “plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical 15 injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 16 Rather, Plaintiff alleges his criminal conviction is “void” because it was obtained by “fraud 17 and concealment.” See ECF No. 1 at 3. 18 Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case; nevertheless, the Court finds it 19 would be futile for him to do so. While Defendants typically carry the initial burden to 20 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d 21 at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior 22 dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a 23 strike.” Id. at 1120. That is true here. 24 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,2 this Court 25

26 2 A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 27 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), 28 1 finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while incarcerated, 2 has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were 3 frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See In re 4 Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s 5 litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se 6 civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed 7 “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983.”); 8 id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave 9 to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: Bonilla v. Superior 10 Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, 11 C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; 12 Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently 13 informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to 14 proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 15 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19)). 16 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than the 17 three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible allegation 18 that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he is 19 not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez 20 v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not 21 prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of 22 abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”). When a 23 prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily enumerated 24 grounds[,] . . . a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with respect to his 25 26 27 if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United 28 1 || additional civil actions.” Coleman vy. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). This is becaus 2 “court permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.” Franklin | 3 || Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). 4 Ht. CONCLUSION 5 Accordingly, the Court: 6 1. DISMISSES this case based on Plaintiff's failure to pay the civil filing fe 7 ||required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 8 2. DENIES Plaintiff's request for judicial notice as moot. 9 3. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken in goo 10 || faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 11 4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file and_ accept no furthe 12 ||documents for filings, except a timely Notice of Appeal, which this Court CERTIFIE 13 || would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 7 Dated: June 24, 2025 \ i SF mes 4, 18 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 19 United States District Judge 20 21

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