Bonilla v. Ayers

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 16, 2021
• Docket: 4:08-cv-00471
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 STEVEN W. BONILLA, Case No. 4:08-cv-00471-YGR

Plaintiff, 8 DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. 9 ORDER DENYING PRO SE MOTION

10 RON DAVIS, Warden, San Quentin State Prison, 11 Defendant.

13 Over the duration of this case, petitioner, Steven W. Bonilla, who is represented by 14 appointed counsel, has repeatedly filed pro se motions and documents lodging various complaints 15 or requesting measures of relief. With a docket now numbering just over 400 entries, a substantial 16 majority of those entries consist of petitioner’s pro se filings and the Court’s many orders 17 addressing such filings. On July 7, 2015, the Court entered an order (Dkt. No. 313) denying a 18 batch of pro se filings and directing petitioner to cease filing substantive pro se motions and, 19 instead, have counsel file such motions for him. The order permitted only a limited exception for 20 pro se motions concerning the adequacy of appointed counsel. Nevertheless, petitioner has 21 continued to send pro se motions and other documents to the Court. As has been its ongoing 22 practice, the Court has screened all pro se documents that contain a reference in the title to 23 “ineffective assistance of counsel” or a “conflict of interest” with counsel to confirm whether the 24 title accurately represents the substance of the motion. Although this matter was stayed on 25 December 13, 2016, so that petitioner could exhaust certain of his federal habeas claims in the 26 state courts, see Dkt. No. 376, petitioner has recently submitted yet another pro se motion, this one 27 titled “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Expedited Review Requested.” See Dkt. No. 406. 1 In this latest pro se submission, petitioner alleges that his appointed counsel “has provided 2 ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present exculpatory evidence that the defendant was 3 framed by the prosecution.” Dkt. No. 406 at 1. He goes on to allege that his phone records, which 4 he describes as the linchpin of all the evidence used against him at his trial, were improperly 5 seized pursuant to a non-existent federal grand jury subpoena. Id. at 1-2. He alleges that law 6 enforcement committed fraud upon the court in referencing the seizure of his phone records 7 pursuant to the supposedly non-existent grand jury subpoena in an arrest warrant affidavit. Id. at 8 2. He then argues that such fraud “vitiates everything,” including the judgment of conviction 9 entered against him, because it deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over him. Id. As for what 10 any of this has to do with the ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner charges simply that his 11 attorneys are ineffective because they have failed to raise this issue. Id. at 3. 12 Even construed liberally, petitioner’s latest pro se submission does not raise any credible 13 claim of ineffective assistance or conflict with appointed counsel. Petitioner enjoys a statutory 14 right to appointed counsel in these capital habeas proceedings by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), 15 which includes the right for his appointed counsel to “meaningfully . . . research and present [his] 16 habeas claims.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 858 (1994). He does not have a right to dictate 17 tactics in the pursuit of his habeas petition. See United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 18 1981). Nor does he have “a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous 19 points requested by [him], if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present 20 those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 21 Petitioner’s present contentions respecting the trial court’s jurisdiction are but yet another 22 attempt to raise the issue of the seizure of his phone records. As the Court observed in denying a 23 previous pro se motion, petitioner’s claim related to the seizure of his phone records “is raised as 24 Claim Two in his [federal] Petition. His dispute with counsel as to how it is raised and in what 25 format does not constitute either ineffective assistance of counsel or a genuine conflict of interest 26 with counsel.” Dkt. No. 342 at 2. Indeed, as pleaded in the federal petition, Claim Two alleges 27 that the prosecution would not have had any admissible evidence against petitioner but for the ] could not have exercised subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner. See Finalized Petition (Dkt. 2 || No. 343) at 80-82. Hence, it is simply inaccurate for petitioner to allege that his attorneys have 3 failed to raise the issue described in his latest pro se motion. The issue is raised in the federal 4 || habeas petition and, because this matter is stayed pending exhaustion of claims in the state court, it 5 || remains pending before the state courts of California at this time. See Status Report (Dkt. No 410, 6 || filed Sept. □□ 2021). To the extent that petitioner may have some grievance with how and in what 7 || format Claim Two is presented, as the Court has previously instructed, he has no viable claim of 8 ineffective assistance or conflict with counsel warranting further relief. 9 Petitioner’s pro se motion (Dkt. No. 406) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is 10 || DENIED. Petitioner shall file any substantive motions through his court-appointed counsel. The 11 Court will continue to screen any pro se motions that allege a conflict with or the ineffective 12 || assistance of counsel. If those motions fail to assert a genuine conflict with appointed counsel, 13 || they will be returned unfiled. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: September 16, 2021 5 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28