Boniey v. Kuchinski

677 S.E.2d 922, 223 W. Va. 486, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 37
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMay 14, 2009
Docket34152
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 677 S.E.2d 922 (Boniey v. Kuchinski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boniey v. Kuchinski, 677 S.E.2d 922, 223 W. Va. 486, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 37 (W. Va. 2009).

Opinion

BENJAMIN, Chief Justice:

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the appellant herein, appeals the September 14, 2007, order of the Circuit Court of Brooke County that granted summary judgment to Jennifer Boniey, the appellee, on the basis that the uninsured motor vehicle exclusion in Ms. Bonie/s automobile insurance policy for vehicles “Designed for use mainly off public roads, except while on public roads” violates the letter and spirit of the uninsured motorist statute, W.Va. Code § 33-6-31(b) (1998). Because we conclude that an ATV is not an “uninsured motor vehicle” within the meaning of W. Va.Code § 33-6-31(b), we reverse and remand.

I.

FACTS

A thumbnail sketch of the relevant facts is as follows. Jennifer Boniey, the appellee, was injured while a passenger on an all-terrain vehicle (hereafter “ATV”) owned and operated by Brian Kuchinski. At the time of the accident, the ATV was being driven off road. Mr. Kuchinski’s automobile insui’er at the time was GEICO Insurance. Ms. Boniey was insured under two policies issued by State Farm, the appellant, which contained uninsured motorist coverage. Liability coverage was denied to Mr. Kuchinski by GEI- *489 CO Insurance. 1 Therefore, Ms. Boniey submitted a claim to State Farm for uninsured motorist coverage. State Farm denied uninsured motorist coverage to Ms. Boniey on the basis that an ATV does not qualify as an uninsured motor vehicle while not operated on public roads. The policy language relied upon by State Farm for its denial of coverage provides that “An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a motor vehicle ... Designed for use mainly off public roads, except while on public roads.”

Ms. Boniey then sued State Farm for coverage and both Ms. Boniey and State Farm subsequently moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Brooke County ultimately granted summary judgment to Ms. Boniey in a September 14, 2007, order, after finding that the exclusion relied upon by State Farm in denying coverage to Ms. Boniey violated the letter and spirit of the uninsured motorist statute. On appeal, State Farm asks this Court to reverse the grant of summary judgment on behalf of Ms. Boniey.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We are called upon in this case to review a grant of summary judgment. Our review requires us to construe a statute and determine the coverage of an insurance contract. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. See Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavij, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”); Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”); Syllabus Point 1, Tennant v. Smallwood, 211 W.Va. 703, 568 S.E.2d 10 (2002) (“Determination of the proper coverage of an insurance contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.”).

III.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue in this case is whether a provision in an automobile insurance policy excluding an off-road ATV from uninsured motorist coverage violates the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute at W.Va. Code § 33-6-31(b).

The contractual language in dispute in Ms. Boniey’s State Farm automobile insurance policy provides that “An uninsured vehicle does not include a motor vehicle ... Designed for use mainly off public roads, except while on public roads.” Under our law, “[wjhere the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended.” Syllabus, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 W.Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970). We find that the uninsured motorist exclusion in Ms. Boniey’s State Farm policies is unambiguous. The provision clearly excludes from coverage Mr. Kuchinski’s ATV which is designed for off-road use and which was not being operated on a public road at the time of the accident.

However, we also have held that “[i]nsurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policy as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as any such exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes.” Syllabus Point 3, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989). Thus, even though the exclusion at issue in the State Farm automobile insurance policy is unambiguous, it will be given full effect only if it does not conflict with the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute.

W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(b), known as the uninsured motorist statute, provides in applicable part:

[No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, or of property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising *490 from the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this state] unless it shall contain an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of section two [§ 17D-4-2], article four, chapter seventeen-d of this code, as amended from time to time[.]

The circuit court below, in deciding whether an off-road ATV is a “motor vehicle” for the purposes of W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(b), first determined that W. Va.Code § 33-6-31 does not define the term “motor vehicle.” As a result, the circuit court looked to the definition of “motor vehicle” in W. Va.Code § 17A-1-1 (b) (2004) which defines “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.” In order to define “vehicle,” the court relied upon W. Va.Code § 17A-l-l(a), which provides that “ ‘Vehicle’ means every device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” For the definition of the term “all-terrain vehicle,” the court referred to W. Va.Code § 17F-1-9 (2004), which provides that

As used in this chapter, “all-terrain vehicle” or “ATV” shall mean any motor vehicle, fifty-two inches or less in width, having an unladen weight of eight hundred pounds or less, traveling on three or more low pressure tires with a seat designed to be straddled by the rider, designed for or capable of travel over unimproved terrain.

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Bluebook (online)
677 S.E.2d 922, 223 W. Va. 486, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boniey-v-kuchinski-wva-2009.