Bolling v. Long

Opinion

25CA0647 Bolling v Long 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0647 Logan County District Court No. 24CV16 Honorable Stephanie Mg Gagliano, Judge

Kapatrick Bolling, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

Jeff Long, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility, and Moses “Andre” Stancil, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS

Tow, C.J., and Brown, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 3, 2026

Kapatrick Bolling, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Evan P. Brennan, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

¶1 Plaintiff, Kapatrick Bolling, appeals the dismissal of his complaint against defendants, Jeff Long, the Warden of the Sterling Correctional Facility (SCF), and Moses Stancil, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), which asserted a single claim under the Premises Liability Act (PLA), § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2026.

¶2 We agree with the district court that the PLA claim is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. 2026, and, therefore, we affirm.

I. Background

¶3 The relevant facts are undisputed. Bolling is an inmate in the custody of the DOC serving a sentence at SCF. In January 2024, while walking to the SCF dining hall, Bolling slipped and fell on an outside walkway on which snow and ice had accumulated. He sustained injuries from the fall.

¶4 Bolling sued the defendants for money damages under the PLA, alleging that they had acted negligently by failing to “take reasonable steps” to mitigate the walkway’s dangerous condition. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under C.R.C.P.

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12(b)(1) on the ground that the CGIA barred Bolling’s tort claim. The district court granted the motion.

II. Discussion

¶5 Bolling contends that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint because the defendants waived their immunity under the CGIA.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 Whether governmental immunity applies to bar a lawsuit is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction properly resolved pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Burnett v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2015 CO 19, ¶ 11. In other words, “once a public entity raises the defense of sovereign immunity, the court must immediately . . . decide that issue.” City & County of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37,

¶ 10. Therefore, we reject Bolling’s assertion that the court was not permitted to resolve the CGIA issue before addressing his status under the PLA. To the contrary, before the district court could address any issues concerning the merits of Bolling’s PLA claim, it had to first determine whether it had jurisdiction to proceed under the CGIA.

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¶7 When, as here, the facts are not in dispute, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36,

¶ 11. Under those circumstances, whether the CGIA precludes a plaintiff’s claim presents solely a question of law; therefore, we review the district court’s jurisdictional ruling, including its interpretation of the CGIA, de novo. Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, ¶¶ 9-10.

¶8 In interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Smith v. City & County of Denver, 2025 COA 70,

¶ 18. We do so by looking to the plain language of the statute and construing words and phrases according to their common usage unless they have acquired a particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise. Dodge, ¶ 10.

B. Bolling’s PLA Claim Is Barred

¶9 The primary purpose of the CGIA is to protect the state and its political subdivisions — which provide essential public services and functions — from unlimited financial liability that will ultimately be borne by taxpayers. See § 24-10-102, C.R.S. 2026; Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 20. To that end, the CGIA immunizes

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public entities1 and public employees from liability for tort claims, unless an enumerated exception applies. § 24-10-105(1), C.R.S. 2026.

¶ 10 As Bolling acknowledges in his complaint, a PLA claim is a tort claim. See Warembourg v. Excel Elec., Inc., 2020 COA 103, ¶ 36 (explaining that the PLA “preempts prior common law theories of liability, and [is] the sole codification of landowner duties in tort” (quoting Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 328 (Colo. 2004))). Thus, his complaint can proceed only if he establishes a waiver of immunity. See Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13 (“[T]he plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show that the government waived its immunity.”).

1. The Public Entities Did Not Waive Immunity

¶ 11 Bolling contends that the State waived immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. 2026, for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of any public building (the dangerous condition waiver), and under section 24-10-106(1)(d)(III), for injuries

1 Although Bolling sued only SCF’s Warden and the DOC’s

Executive Director, we, like the Attorney General, treat his claim against the public employees as a claim against the public entities as well. See Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67, ¶ 13.

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sustained due to an accumulation of snow and ice on walkways “leading to a public building open for public business” (the public building waiver). We conclude that neither waiver applies.

¶ 12 First, for purposes of the dangerous condition waiver, “[t]he mere existence of wind, water, snow, ice, or temperature shall not, by itself, constitute a dangerous condition.” § 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2026. Rather, under the CGIA, “dangerous condition” refers to a “physical condition of a facility,” meaning a structural defect of a public building. Id.; Duong v. County of Arapahoe, 837 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Colo. App. 1992) (“[T]he dangerous condition exception to the [CGIA] is limited to building or structure defects . . . .”). Thus, the presence of snow and ice can constitute a “dangerous condition” only if the accumulation is “directly caused by, or attributable to, a physical or structural defect of [a public] building.” Seder v. City of Fort Collins, 987 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo. App. 1999).

¶ 13 Bolling did not allege that the accumulation of snow and ice on the walkway to the dining hall resulted from a structural defect of a public building at SCF. And his reliance on Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000), is unavailing. That case does not stand for the proposition that PLA claims “fall within

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the scope of [the] immunity waiver in section 24-10-106(1)(c),” as Bolling argues. Instead, the case makes clear that a plaintiff must establish that a PLA claim falls within the scope of a waiver provision before he can procced with the merits of his claim. In Springer, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she sustained injuries resulting from a construction defect in the entryway to a public building. Id. at 799-800. The supreme court held that because plaintiff’s PLA “claims f[e]ll within the scope of the immunity waiver, [she could] advance them.” Id. at 804. Bolling’s allegations, on the other hand, do not establish the existence of any construction defect, so his PLA claim does not fall within the scope of section 24-10-106(1)(c)’s waiver provision.2

¶ 14 Accordingly, the district court properly determined that the dangerous condition waiver does not apply.

¶ 15 Second, although the public building waiver applies to claims of injuries caused by the accumulation of snow and ice, the snow

2 Any reliance on Carson v. Corrections Corp. of America, No.

10-CV-01329, 2011 WL 1656509 (D. Colo. May 3, 2011) (unpublished opinion), is similarly misplaced. The defendant in that case was a private corporation, not a public entity or public employee, so the CGIA did not apply.

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and ice must “physically interfere[] with public access on walks leading to a public building open for public business.” § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III) (emphasis added). “The primary purpose of a correctional facility is to confine . . . persons convicted of crimes.” Pack v. Ark. Valley Corr. Facility, 894 P.2d 34, 37 (Colo. App. 1995). While members of the public may visit inmates, visitation is “regulated,” and entry is restricted by “prison rules or by special permission.” Id. When the government restricts entry to a building, the building is not “public.” Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, 2019 COA 91, ¶ 35.

¶ 16 Bolling alleged that he fell on a walkway leading to the SCF dining hall. He did not allege that the public could access the walkway or the dining hall or that any building at SCF is open for public business.

¶ 17 Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that the public building waiver does not apply.

2. The Public Employees Did Not Waive Immunity

¶ 18 Public employees are immune from liability for injuries arising out of an act or omission occurring within the scope of their employment unless the act or omission was willful and wanton.

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§ 24-10-105(1); Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 2012 COA 113, ¶ 34, overruled on other grounds by Cisneros v. Elder, 2022 CO 13M, ¶ 35. “[W]illful or wanton conduct ‘must be not only negligent, but exhibit [a] conscious disregard for [the] safety of others.’” Martinez v. Est. of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, ¶ 31 (citation omitted). In other words, the defendant must have “purposefully pursued a course of action or inaction that he . . . considered would probably result in the harm” to the plaintiff. Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1141 (D. Colo. 2001). The plaintiff must plead “the specific factual basis” to support his allegation that a defendant’s conduct was willful or wanton. § 24-10-110(5)(a), C.R.S. 2026.

¶ 19 Here, Bolling did not plausibly allege that the DOC’s Executive Director or SCF’s Warden knew about the icy conditions on the SCF walkway and purposefully decided not to remedy the condition even knowing that the decision would likely result in his injury. Instead, Bolling alleged that some unidentified person at SCF told maintenance crews not to shovel the walkway on the day of his accident because it was “too cold” and that someone placed a sign on the walkway warning of icy conditions. Even if we assume the

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defendants were responsible for both decisions — keeping the crew indoors and putting up a warning sign — that conduct does not show a conscious disregard for the safety of others. To the contrary, that alleged conduct shows an attempt to avoid injuries to the SCF inmates. In any case, allegations that a public employee failed to perform his duties adequately are insufficient to waive the employee’s immunity, “even where the employee actually knew that the consequences would likely result if he failed to perform adequately.” King v. McKillop, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (D. Colo. 2000).

¶ 20 Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that the public employees’ immunity was not waived.

¶ 21 In sum, we conclude that the CGIA bars Bolling’s tort claim, and, therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE TOW and JUDGE BROWN concur.