Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 1, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BRYAN C. BOLDRIDGE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-3190 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-04004-EFM-RES) CITY OF ATCHISON, KANSAS; (D. Kan.) DARREN KELLY; JESSE GREENLY; LAURACHAL YOUNG,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before McHUGH, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Bryan C. Boldridge, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his lawsuit as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Underlying Events. On October 31, 2018, Boldridge arrived at his home
in Atchison, Kansas, and encountered three men standing outside: two employees of
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 2
the Atchison Water Department plus an Atchison police officer named Darren Kelley.
See State v. Boldridge, No. 121,942, 2021 WL 3573831, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug.
13, 2021). 1 These men were investigating suspected theft of services. Id. Boldridge
and Kelley have conflicting accounts of what happened next, but Boldridge at least
understood that Kelley intended to charge him with theft of services, and from there,
the situation escalated. Id. at *1–2. It is undisputed that Kelley and Boldridge soon
opened fire on each other, or at least discharged their respective sidearms in each
other’s direction. Id.
State Court Proceedings. “The State [of Kansas] charged Boldridge with one
count each of attempted second-degree murder, theft, criminal discharge of a firearm,
and criminal damage to property. At the outset of the trial, Boldridge pled guilty to
theft, and the case went forward on the remaining three charges.” Id. at *2. “The
jury convicted Boldridge of attempted voluntary manslaughter [a lesser included
offense of attempted second-degree murder], criminal damage to property, and
criminal discharge of a firearm.” Id. The trial court imposed a 32-month prison
sentence for the manslaughter conviction and shorter, mostly concurrent sentences for
the other convictions. Id.
1 The events leading to this lawsuit are very thinly described in the district court record. We therefore take judicial notice of the Kansas Court of Appeals’s decision, which is based on the evidence developed in a criminal trial against Boldridge arising from the same events that underlie the current lawsuit. See, e.g., United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of official court filings). 2 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 3
Boldridge appealed only his attempted manslaughter conviction. See id. at *1.
He argued the jury did not have enough evidence to support this conviction because
the trial court “only instructed the jury as to the variation of voluntary manslaughter
committed in the ‘heat of passion.’” Id. at *3. “[W]hether a person acts in the heat
of passion is subject to an objective test,” id., and, according to Boldridge, “he could
not have acted with legally sufficient provocation because he was reacting to Kelley’s
attempt to make an arrest and a person ordinarily cannot use force to resist an arrest
even if he or she believes the arrest is unlawful,” id. at *4. Elaborating, “Boldridge
assert[ed] the circumstances did not give rise to legally sufficient provocation for the
jury to find he acted in the heat of passion because a reasonable person would not
have unlawfully resisted an officer’s lawful use of force in making an arrest by
discharging a firearm in the officer’s direction.” Id. In a decision dated August 13,
2021, the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed with Boldridge: “We find Boldridge’s
argument is correct even if the result it mandates feels wrong.” Id. The court
therefore reversed the manslaughter conviction and vacated the corresponding
sentence. Id. at *5.
Federal Court Proceedings. On January 16, 2024, Boldridge filed a pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
The named defendants were the Atchison Police Department, Officer Kelley, the city
commissioner, and the mayor (collectively, Defendants). Boldridge accused Kelley
of using excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when he arrested
Boldridge on October 31, 2018.
3 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 4
Boldridge further claimed that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In support of that theory, he
stated, “On Sept 13[,] 2021[,] I was given my mandate/reversal/vacated sentencing,”
R. at 9, apparently referring to the Kansas Court of Appeals’s decision. He then
cross-referenced a written claim he made against the City of Atchison and Officer
Kelley under Kansas’s notice-of-claim statute, which governs claims against
municipalities and their employees. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-105b. The date written
on this notice-of-claim document—presumably the date Boldridge submitted it to the
City—was September 13, 2023. R. at 13.
Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss
Boldridge’s complaint with prejudice for various reasons, including untimeliness.
They argued that Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims,
see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4), applies to § 1983 claims. They further argued
that Boldridge’s excessive force claim accrued on the day the alleged excessive force
occurred (October 31, 2018). Thus, he needed to file his lawsuit no later than
October 31, 2020, whereas his actual filing date was January 16, 2024. Boldridge
responded that he had no cause of action until September 30, 2021, when his
conviction was allegedly vacated or reversed. 2
The district court agreed with Defendants that the Fourth Amendment claim
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Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 1, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BRYAN C. BOLDRIDGE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-3190 (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-04004-EFM-RES) CITY OF ATCHISON, KANSAS; (D. Kan.) DARREN KELLY; JESSE GREENLY; LAURACHAL YOUNG,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before McHUGH, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Bryan C. Boldridge, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his lawsuit as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Underlying Events. On October 31, 2018, Boldridge arrived at his home
in Atchison, Kansas, and encountered three men standing outside: two employees of
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 2
the Atchison Water Department plus an Atchison police officer named Darren Kelley.
See State v. Boldridge, No. 121,942, 2021 WL 3573831, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug.
13, 2021). 1 These men were investigating suspected theft of services. Id. Boldridge
and Kelley have conflicting accounts of what happened next, but Boldridge at least
understood that Kelley intended to charge him with theft of services, and from there,
the situation escalated. Id. at *1–2. It is undisputed that Kelley and Boldridge soon
opened fire on each other, or at least discharged their respective sidearms in each
other’s direction. Id.
State Court Proceedings. “The State [of Kansas] charged Boldridge with one
count each of attempted second-degree murder, theft, criminal discharge of a firearm,
and criminal damage to property. At the outset of the trial, Boldridge pled guilty to
theft, and the case went forward on the remaining three charges.” Id. at *2. “The
jury convicted Boldridge of attempted voluntary manslaughter [a lesser included
offense of attempted second-degree murder], criminal damage to property, and
criminal discharge of a firearm.” Id. The trial court imposed a 32-month prison
sentence for the manslaughter conviction and shorter, mostly concurrent sentences for
the other convictions. Id.
1 The events leading to this lawsuit are very thinly described in the district court record. We therefore take judicial notice of the Kansas Court of Appeals’s decision, which is based on the evidence developed in a criminal trial against Boldridge arising from the same events that underlie the current lawsuit. See, e.g., United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of official court filings). 2 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 3
Boldridge appealed only his attempted manslaughter conviction. See id. at *1.
He argued the jury did not have enough evidence to support this conviction because
the trial court “only instructed the jury as to the variation of voluntary manslaughter
committed in the ‘heat of passion.’” Id. at *3. “[W]hether a person acts in the heat
of passion is subject to an objective test,” id., and, according to Boldridge, “he could
not have acted with legally sufficient provocation because he was reacting to Kelley’s
attempt to make an arrest and a person ordinarily cannot use force to resist an arrest
even if he or she believes the arrest is unlawful,” id. at *4. Elaborating, “Boldridge
assert[ed] the circumstances did not give rise to legally sufficient provocation for the
jury to find he acted in the heat of passion because a reasonable person would not
have unlawfully resisted an officer’s lawful use of force in making an arrest by
discharging a firearm in the officer’s direction.” Id. In a decision dated August 13,
2021, the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed with Boldridge: “We find Boldridge’s
argument is correct even if the result it mandates feels wrong.” Id. The court
therefore reversed the manslaughter conviction and vacated the corresponding
sentence. Id. at *5.
Federal Court Proceedings. On January 16, 2024, Boldridge filed a pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas.
The named defendants were the Atchison Police Department, Officer Kelley, the city
commissioner, and the mayor (collectively, Defendants). Boldridge accused Kelley
of using excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when he arrested
Boldridge on October 31, 2018.
3 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 4
Boldridge further claimed that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In support of that theory, he
stated, “On Sept 13[,] 2021[,] I was given my mandate/reversal/vacated sentencing,”
R. at 9, apparently referring to the Kansas Court of Appeals’s decision. He then
cross-referenced a written claim he made against the City of Atchison and Officer
Kelley under Kansas’s notice-of-claim statute, which governs claims against
municipalities and their employees. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-105b. The date written
on this notice-of-claim document—presumably the date Boldridge submitted it to the
City—was September 13, 2023. R. at 13.
Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss
Boldridge’s complaint with prejudice for various reasons, including untimeliness.
They argued that Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims,
see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4), applies to § 1983 claims. They further argued
that Boldridge’s excessive force claim accrued on the day the alleged excessive force
occurred (October 31, 2018). Thus, he needed to file his lawsuit no later than
October 31, 2020, whereas his actual filing date was January 16, 2024. Boldridge
responded that he had no cause of action until September 30, 2021, when his
conviction was allegedly vacated or reversed. 2
The district court agreed with Defendants that the Fourth Amendment claim
accrued on the date of the excessive force (October 31, 2018), making Boldridge’s
2 It is unclear why this date differs from the September 13 date alleged in the complaint. 4 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 5
lawsuit untimely as to that claim. The district court also liberally construed
Boldridge’s thinly explained Eighth Amendment claim as a Fourth Amendment false
imprisonment cause of action. As to that, the district court relied on Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384 (2007), which states, “Limitations begin to run against an action for
false imprisonment when the alleged false imprisonment ends,” id. at 389 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The district court accepted Boldridge’s assertion in his
response that he was released on September 30, 2021, meaning he needed to file his
lawsuit by September 30, 2023. Therefore, his filing on January 16, 2024, was too
late.
The district court further liberally construed Boldridge’s papers to be arguing
that his claim submitted to the City under the Kansas notice-of-claim statute tolled
the statute of limitations period. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the notice-of-claim statute is not a prerequisite to bringing federal claims (such
as a § 1983 claim), so a pending notice has no effect on the statute of limitations for a
federal claim.
In light of all this, the district court granted Defendants’ motion, dismissed
Boldridge’s complaint, and entered final judgment against him. Boldridge timely
appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
“This court reviews de novo [a] district court order granting [a Rule] 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.” Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.,
538 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 2008). But Boldridge does not attack the reasoning
5 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 6
underlying the district court’s conclusion that he filed his suit too late. Boldridge
instead argues the district court’s dismissal was illegitimate because the district court
never heard the facts of his case or the supporting evidence. He further argues that
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is not a substitute for an answer to his complaint.
Construing Boldridge’s arguments liberally given his pro se status, see Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we understand him to be arguing
that a district court may not, at the pleading phase, dismiss an action on
statute-of-limitations grounds. But we have long held the opposite. See Aldrich v.
McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) (“While the statute
of limitations is an affirmative defense, when the dates given in the complaint make
clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished, . . . [s]tatute of limitations
questions may . . . be appropriately resolved on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motion.”).
Here, Boldridge’s complaint and its attached documents specified the relevant dates.
See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Exhibits attached to a
complaint are properly treated as part of the pleadings for purposes of ruling on a
motion to dismiss.”). Those dates show a clear statute-of-limitations problem. The
district court therefore appropriately reached the issue.
Boldridge offers no argument that the district court incorrectly selected the
accrual date for his cause of action, incorrectly identified the relevant statute of
limitations, or incorrectly applied the relevant law. We therefore will not further
examine the court’s reasoning. See Carney v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
6 Appellate Case: 24-3190 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 10/01/2025 Page: 7
875 F.3d 1347, 1351 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Although we construe . . . pro se papers
liberally, we cannot make arguments for [the pro se party].” (citation omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge