Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Association

389 F. Supp. 327
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 10, 1975
DocketCiv. A. 74-849
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 389 F. Supp. 327 (Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Association, 389 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HUYETT, District Judge.

Plaintiff has filed this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2) and federal and state common law against defendant, American Speech & Hearing Association (ASHA), a non-profit, non-stock, scientific, and professional organization, incorporated in Kansas. Defendant has moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) for improper venue and improper service or, alternatively, to transfer this action to the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). We deny defendant’s motions.

Venue and service in antitrust actions against corporate defendants are governed by Section 12 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 22), as supplemented by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c) and 1392(a) of the general venue statute. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 255 (E.D.Pa.1968). Under Section 12 venue is appropriate in this District if defendant is an “inhabitant,” is “found,” or “transacts business” in this District. 1

Defendant is not an “inhabitant” of this District because it is incorporated in Kansas and not in Pennsylvania. See Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F.Supp. 812, 814 (E. D.Pa.1972). Defendant is not “found” in this District because it does not have agents, officers, or employees who continually carry on local activities in this District. See 291 F.Supp. at 255. We conclude, however, for the reasons set forth below that defendant does transact business in this District.

There is little legislative history to guide us in determining the meaning of the term “transacts business” or the extent to which Section 12 was intended to broaden venue. Note, “Antitrust Venue: Transacting Business Under the Clayton Act,” 55 Geo.L.J. 1066 (1966). In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 373, 47 S.Ct. 400, 403, 71 L.Ed. 684 (1927), the Supreme Court stated that “a corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district . . . if in fact, in the ordinary and usual sense, it ‘transacts business’ therein of any substantial character.” In United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, *329 807, 68 S.Ct. 855, 862, 92 L.Ed. 1091 (1948), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation of Eastman Kodak, stating that “the practical, everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying on business ‘of any substantial character’ became the test of venue.”

This test mandates a case by case factual inquiry to determine whether, from a practical business standpoint, some amount of business continuity, more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts with this district exists. Eastern Pre-Cast Corporation v. Grant Portland Cement Company, 311 F.Supp. 896, 897 (E.D.Pa.1970). From an examination of the pleadings certain facts are clear. Defendant is a non-profit, non-stock, scientific, and professional organization, incorporated in Kansas, maintaining no office or employees in this District. Defendant’s goals are to encourage basic research and scientific study of human communication and disorders, stimulate exchange of information about human communication through conventions, publications, and other continuing professional education activities, promote investigation of clinical procedures used in treating communication disorders, maintain high standards of clinical competence for professionals providing services to the public, and encourage the development of comprehensive clinical service programs. Defendant provides information and assistance to members, to state and federal government agencies, and to the general public in areas concerning the profession and its related activities. Defendant is the accrediting agent for college and university programs offering master’s degrees in speech pathology and audiology 2 and programs offering clinical services in speech pathology and audiology to the public. Defendant requires that all members subscribe to a code of ethics, and new members hold advance degrees or their equivalent in speech pathology, audiology, or speech and hearing science or a graduate degree in an allied discipline and have demonstrated an interest in communication disorders. Only members who have met requirements for the certificate of clinical competence may provide clinical services in speech pathology and audiology. By maintaining high standards for its certified members, accredited clinics, and accredited university graduate education programs, defendant attempts to protect the public. Defendant has a total of 18,621 members of which 393 reside in this District. Of a total of 925 academ-. ic and clinical service programs evaluated by defendant, 15 are in this District. Only a small percentage of conferences and workshops conducted by defendant have been held in this District. 3 Over the past four years less than $6000, representing approximately 3.13% of defendant’s total advertising revenue, was received from this District. In the first quarter of 1974-approximately 8.47% of defendant’s total advertising revenue was received from this District.

Defendant contends that only 1.4% of its current membership and .75% of its board and committee members reside in this District and that only one representative of any of its accreditation units has been in this District within the last four years. Plaintiff, using a different figure for the total number of ASHA members, argues that 2.23% of defendant’s members reside in this Dis *330 trict, between 17,826.06 and 22,053.01 dollars were received from these members in 1973, and, while the exact number of visits by defendant’s agents to this District is unknown, defendant’s travel vouchers suggest 13 visits to this District over the past four years. Plaintiff further argues that the National Examination in Speech Pathology was offered 26 times within this District by the Educational Testing Service of Princeton under contract with defendant. Defendant contends there is no connection between defendant and the exam.

Neither the low volume of activity conducted in this District as compared with defendant’s total operation nor defendant’s status as a non-profit, non-stock corporation, maintaining no office or employee in this District, is dispositive of the issue of whether defendant transacts business in this District. Levin v. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 122 U.S.App.D. C.

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389 F. Supp. 327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bogus-v-american-speech-hearing-association-paed-1975.