Boggetta v. Burroughs Corp.

118 N.W.2d 980, 368 Mich. 600, 1962 Mich. LEXIS 371

Opinions

Brack, J.

I adopt the ensuing statement of facts from a memorandum submitted by Justice Kavanagh to other members of the Court under date of December 20, 1961. The memorandum was prepared for consideration by the Court of defendant’s then pending application for leave to appeal. It concluded with recommendation that the application be denied. The writer agreed then and agrees now with such recommendation.

Footnotes

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* The adopted facts:

“Martin Boggetta began work at 4 p.m., on August '20,1960, at defendant’s Plymouth plant. At approximately 6 p.m., he collapsed. He was taken to a .■hospital and was pronounced dead on arrival.

“On December 5, 1960, a petition for dependency benefits was filed by the widow. On May 24, 1961, the widow filed a petition for interrogatories requesting that, pursuant to Buie No 7 of the rules of practice of the workmen’s compensation department ■and the statutes of the State of Michigan, the defendant Burroughs Corporation be ordered to supply complete and correct answers to the following ques^ tions:

“1. Type of work performed by Mr. Boggetta.

. “2. Type of work being done in August, 1960.

“3. Names, addresses and phone numbers of eo^ workers of Mr. Boggetta during August, 1960.

“4. Names and addresses of Mr. Boggetta’s supervisors.

“5. Temperature and variance therein under which Mr. Boggetta was working in August of 1960.”

The appeal hoard, reversing the hearing referee’s denial of plaintiff’s “petition for interrogatories,” held as follows:

“The defendant should furnish the information requested. Nothing is asked which could conceivably prejudice the defendant. Nothing is asked which, if answered, would even tend to establish a case for or against either the plaintiff or defendant. All that is asked is for information which would enable the plaintiff widow to inquire into the facts which might or might not establish her rights to* compensation. Without a chance to inquire she has nothing even though something may be there. The information necessary to a proper inquiry is peculiarly and possibly exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant. If plaintiff is not given such information she will not have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

“The defendant says that Rule No 7 * of the workmen’s compensation department’s rules of practice does not provide for such interrogatories and that the plaintiff’s petition, therefore, cannot be granted. Rule No 7 reads:

“ ‘At the hearing in any case, the hearing referee may call witnesses and order the production of books, records, including hospital records, accounts and papers which he deems necessary for the purpose of making an award.’

“Rule No 7 provides that the referee may do certain things but it does not say that he cannot do anything else. Rule No 7 was not intended as, and does not purport to be, an exclusive list of prerogatives of a hearing referee in a workmen’s compensation proceedings.

“Section 8, part 3 of the workmen’s compensation law * provides that a referee assigned to any hearing ‘shall make snch inquiries and investigations as it (he) shall deem necessary.’ This is broad general language consistent with the intent and purpose of the law and placing ultimate responsibility in the hearing officer to make such inquiries and investigations as may be necessary to determine whether or not an injured worker is entitled to benefits under the law. We do not believe the referee’s responsibility to investigate is limited to personal detective work on his part. It is broad enough to require the answering of interrogatories requested by one of the parties if such answers are necessary to a proper inquiry into the facts.”

As in Lucas v. Ford Motor Co., 299 Mich 280, 283 (followed on this point in Dodge v. General Motors Corp., 316 Mich 425, 429), this application for leave “was improvidently allowed.” The reason is that the statute authorizes certiorari to review only “questions of law involved in any final decision or determination” of the appeal board (CL 1948, § 413.12 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.186]). For amplification, see the Lucas Case at 283. For that reason, also for reason that no court should assume to interfere with administration by the appointed administrators of this remedial act unless and until such administrators arrive at some reviewable decision of finality, I would dismiss the appeal and remand the record to the department for further proceedings. Plaintiff should have costs.

Since the issue did arrive here and is fully briefed, we may and probably should note agreement with the appeal board’s view of the statutory authority of the workmen’s compensation department. The hearing referee had full authority, by the statute quoted In the appeal hoard’s ruling, to require that the •defendant disgorge the requested information.

Kavanagh, Souris, Otis M. Smith, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

Justice Kavanagh’s recommendation did not meet with majority approval. Accordingly, on December 28, 1961, the application was granted.

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See 1954 AC, § R 408.7, p 4502. — Reporter.

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CL 1948, § 413.8 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.182). — Reporter.